

JPRS-WER-86-007

21 January 1986

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

21 January 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD Economic Program Stresses Jobs, Environment (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 25 Oct 85).....	1
Survey Reveals Guestworker Attitudes Toward National Politics (Claudia-Koch-Arzberger; AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, 9 Nov 85).....	5

FRANCE

Poll After Chirac-Fabius TV Debate Shows Slight Change (Charles Rebois; LE FIGARO, 9 Nov 85).....	19
Lazitch Views Potential Gorbachev Policies (Branko Lazitch; EST & OUEST, Nov 85).....	29
PCF Tactics Relative to Elections, Soviet Ties Examined (Claude Harmel; EST & OUEST, Nov 85).....	33
Recent, Previous Soviet Leaders' Visits Compared (Pierre Rigoulot; EST & OUEST, Nov 85).....	38
Former DST Director Rochet on Secrecy, Controls (Jean Rochet Interview; LE SOIR, 21 Nov 85).....	44
Citizen Views on Illegal Immigrants Polled (Charles Rebois; LE FIGARO, 10 Dec 85).....	46
Commentary on Joxe Denial of Clandestine Immigration Tally (LIBERATION, 13 Nov 85).....	54

GREECE

Papandreou Seeks PASOK Unity After Laliotis Resignation (I KATHIMERINI, 22 Nov 85).....	56
Government Reaction to Polytechnic Violence Assessed (G. Karagiorgas; I KATHIMERINI, 22 Nov 85).....	57
ND, PASOK Views on PASOK's 'Breach' Analyzed (Stamos Zoulas; I KATHIMERINI, 24-25 Nov 85).....	59
ND Grassroots Seen Neglected (POLITIKA THEMATA, 6 Dec 85).....	63
Results of Poll on ND, PASOK, Politicians' Popularity (I VRADYNI, 7 Dec 85).....	64
International Solidarity Day With Palestinian People (RIZOSPASTIS, 30 Nov 85).....	72

NETHERLANDS

Van Den Broek Seeks Good Relations With Suriname (ANP NEWS BULLETIN, 12 Dec 85).....	73
New Efforts To Deal With South Moluccans (ANP NEWS BULLETIN, 9 Dec 85).....	74

MILITARY

DENMARK

Young Officers Question Baltic Defense Doctrine (Christian Palme; DAGENS NYHETER, 20 Dec 85).....	76
--	----

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Von Buelow Asserts Bundeswehr Lacks Reservist Concept (Andress von Buelow Interview; LOYAL, Oct 85).....	79
Mission, Training Proposed for Field Replacement Battalions (Ehrenfried Boege; KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNG- STRUPPEN, Sep/Oct 85).....	87
Briefs	
Reservists Employer Support Sought	92
Reservists Civil Defense Potential	92
Reserve Officers Extension Course	93

FRANCE

Mitterrand Seeks French Role in EFA Program (Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 10-11 Nov 85).....	94
Col Arnaubec (Spartacus) Criticizes PS Military Policy (Spartacus; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, 9 Nov 85).....	96
Group Created To Study Use of Weapons, Air Force in Space (AIR ACTUALITIES, Nov 85).....	99
Defense Ministry Counselor on Budget Policy 1981-1986 (Frederic Tiberghien; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Nov 85).....	101
Briefs Military Use of Merchant Fleet	131

ECONOMIC

GREECE

Unemployment Statistics Released (MESIMVRINI, 4 Dec 85).....	132
---	-----

ENERGY

SWEDEN

Energy Minister Reasserts 2010 End Date for Nuclear Energy (Peter Sandberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 4 Dec 85).....	134
New Law Regulating Nuclear Plants Enacted (Bo B. Melander; DAGENS NYHETER, 13 Dec 85).....	136

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD ECONOMIC PROGRAM STRESSES JOBS, ENVIRONMENT

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 25 Oct 85 p 1

Article by Kg: "The SPD is Talking About 800,000 New Jobs"]

[Text] The SPD Commission on Economics and Finance Policy worked out an extensive program aimed at reducing unemployment, strengthening social programs and reducing environmental pollution by business. An alliance of unions, employers, State and Bundes-bank is proposed. At the same time, an appeal to sacrifice is made to all social groups. In particular, those receiving large incomes are to pay a "solidarity sum" in the form of a supplemental withholding. All interest income is also to be taxed; but at the same time, an increase is proposed in the exclusion of interest income.

A number of leading SPD politicians cooperated on the project, which is being explained to the pertinent party groups and is to be approved at a party congress next May. Those participating include the deputy party chairmen Roth and Apel, and Members of Parliament Ehrenberg, Dressler and Klose, as well as Professor Krupp, Berlin, and the North Rhine-Westphalia Economics Ministers, Jochimsen, and the DGB Council Member Ilse Brusis. The project specifies that a growth policy alone will not overcome the crisis in the 1980's. Nowhere has this method been successful. It has caused more unemployment, shaken the social state, intensified the environmental crisis and affected international economic conditions.

The commission pleads for a mixed economic order whose core elements must be the market, social state principles, economic democracy, and a participatory State. None of these elements can be replaced. The market is indispensable as a motive force and control principle. It prevents the solidification of structures. The market requires a powerful state competition policy. The market economy however, intensifies the unequal distribution of income and capital. The market also cannot solve the problem of unemployment. The state must correct it by acting as investor, employer, with public companies, with the means of a specific and controlled economic policy, and with real employment policy. The cooperation of workers at all levels will also have to be improved.

The SPD wants to increase employment by increasing public and private investment. The core of the proposal was taken by the commission from the known proposals for the special fund for "Labor and Environment". In the event of an election victory, the SPD intends to create 500,000 to 800,000

jobs through immediate action. For unemployed, new job seekers, an "employment bridge" will be recommended. Company and non-company training programs will replace missing public and private training seats. Long-term unemployed are to be assisted with a special program. Creation of new jobs in the service industry and in the social services is also being considered. The SPD continues to believe that nuclear energy will not be needed in the long run, and can be allowed to expire.

Quite specific proposals are made for tax policy. The higher income earners should pay a supplemental tax which should bring in about DM 4 billion. The higher income groups will also be requested in the public interest, to participate in financing the social alliance "Work for all." Through additional employment policy actions, the SPD hopes to reduce costs of unemployment. Considerable funds could also be mobilized by an effective fight against illegal workers.

Interest income would also have to be taxed in the future. It is proposed to have the credit institutions make reports to finance offices regarding interest payments. An annual exemption of DM 3000/6000 (single/married) is proposed. It is also recommended to limit the level of spouse-splitting. Children's exemptions are to be eliminated and children's payments increased. The SPD also favors making step two of the planned tax reform more socially balanced, and to examine both the amount and timing of relief. The goal of the SPD is to have a tax policy favorable to workers and employers.

To finance more company investments, no wage withholding would be needed, we read in the proposal. Rather, it is a matter of directing capital to a far greater extent than before and under more favorable conditions, to the companies. This is to be achieved in particular, by a greater accounting for all interest income and sales profits from private capital institutions. The own-capital financing will also be supported over foreign financing, and double asset taxation of capital companies and part owners will be eliminated.

The SPD is falling back on the economic concept of global taxation, which had been abandoned at the end of the 1970's. In the opinion of the SPD it is not sufficient to improve the framework of the economy. Global taxation is based on cooperation of State, economy and Bundesbank. Employment and finance policy can only be effective when they are supported by income and monetary policy. Income policy has to take into account total economic demand; monetary policy has to take into account interest and investments.

Federal Economic Minister Bangemann called the proposal a resubmittal of ancient social democratic concepts whose implementation would be catastrophic to the economy. The SPD has no other ideas than increasing expenditures and reducing income. The Social Democrats have learned nothing from their misguided economic policy of the past. The CDU deputy Wissmann called it a collection of worthless proposals.

SURVEY REVEALS GUESTWORKER ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL POLITICS

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE (Supplement to DAS PARLAMENT) in German
9 Nov 85 pp 31-45

[Article by Claudia Koch-Arzberger: "Political Orientations of Foreign Nationals in the FRG"]

[Excerpts] II. The Desire for Political Participation

For the German population, participation in elections is the basic element of political involvement. Normally, those who are little involved in politics are "only-voters," and those who are politically active in more than one way, are almost 90 percent certain to also go to the polls. (Footnote 8) (K. Arzberger: "Buerger und Eliten in der Kommunalpolitik," [Citizens and Elites in Local Politics,] Stuttgart, 1980, p 127). As a rule, participation in elections and other forms of political involvement are not considered to be mutually substitutable, but to build on each other in that order. No matter what one personally thinks about the issue, under discussion for several years (although not on a broad basis), of whether guestworkers should have the vote, the opponents are either poorly informed or inconsistent when they are prepared to offer other forms of participation, such as involvement in demonstrations, signature collecting or advisory bodies (none of which require citizenship) as substitutes for the right to vote, which they oppose.

The decision of whether or not guestworkers should get the vote is a prerogative of the FRG legislature that depends to a greater or lesser extent on German public opinion and must be made within the framework of the Constitution which as yet lacks a conclusive interpretation of this issue. But apart from that, it must first of all be established whether there exists indeed an adequate potential among the guestworkers themselves that pushes in that direction and, by doing so, supports the demands the German side has raised--in a sense "advocatorily"--particularly in political party and labor union committees.

At first glance, this seems to be the case. Without very big differences among the various nationalities, 70 percent of the guestworkers themselves are in favor of getting the vote, 10 percent are against it, and for 20 percent the question of a possible vote is of no interest. Their familiarity with this issue seems to be adequate; for instance, only about 2 percent of the interviewed said that they had no idea what was meant by the "right to vote." This appears to be the result of media reports and commentaries on the debate, which has left (not evoked) a defensive reaction among the German population. Presumably, local and special newspapers for guestworkers, which didn't exist until a few years ago, had a major part in this.

Among those guestworkers who demand the vote, only a minority is satisfied with the limitation that they may vote in local elections only, i.e., the only variant most frequently discussed on the German side. Some 85 percent demand that the possible right to vote not be restricted to the local level but that it cover all levels. Among those guestworkers who do not want the right to vote, who reject it or are indifferent about it, only a few say that this is an exclusively German matter. Rather, most have the problem, which they readily admit, to envision which party and candidate they could then vote for, on the basis of which criteria. This then goes into the direction of what was described in the preceding paragraph as general distance and indifference.

However, for the time being, some questions remain with regard to the quite unanimous 70 percent of "yes votes" who favor getting the vote. Normally, there is nothing wrong with coming out in support of an additional right so long as one doesn't have to think about the consequences this entails which one may not want. Therefore, these percentages reflect a general mood, rather than a well-considered and firm desire one would try to carry out by one's own actions, even against opposition. The question about their willingness to give up their political rights at home in favor of getting the vote in the FRG, showed that the interviewed had stronger qualifications on their general approval of the vote for guestworkers. While about half had been prepared to relinquish the right to vote in local, provincial or regional elections at home, only about 20 percent were willing to give up their vote at the national level in their home countries in exchange for the right to vote in the FRG.

A closer analysis of the impact of demographic characteristics reveals the same interrelated factors among the surveyed Greeks, Turks and Italians that have been identified by political research in general and that show themselves when one compares the 90 percent group of voters with the 10 percent group of nonvoters in the FRG. Guestworkers, who have a good command of the German language, hence are better educated and have a higher professional status and higher incomes, are more inclined to take advantage of the opportunity to participate in the political process or, as in the voting rights issue, to demand it. The greater demographic or socio-structural "proximity" to the host society also boosts the eagerness for political participation.

This also shows itself in the fact that this is the same group of guestworkers which much more rarely than the others expressed the desire for guestworker-specific or ethnic institutions: in the political arena, for instance, for candidates of their own nationality in the German parties or for special parties for guestworkers living in the FRG. Analysis of the work and living environment also confirms the argument of proximity or even of the level of integration. (Footnote 9) (C. Koch-Arzberger: "Die schwierige Integration. Die bundesrepublikanische Gesellschaft und ihre 5 Millionen Auslaender," [The Difficult Integration. The FRG Society and Its 5 Million Foreigners], Opladen, 1985, p 57.) Guestworkers who work or live in an exclusively German or mixed German-guestworker environment make stronger demands for the right to vote than those who find themselves in a ghetto situation in both respects.

21 January 1986

But if one only looks at the voting right supporters, the demand for special guestworker parties, which legally have no chance of being permitted and undoubtedly would cause a lot of problems and conflicts caused by possible camouflage organizations, is surprisingly strong. About 53 percent of the survey participants are backing this demand. There is even stronger support for the demand that would require the German political parties to also nominate candidates of the guestworkers' own nationalities. The strongest support for these two demands comes from the Turks who face the most obvious dislike of their host society (Footnote 10) (Ipos: "Meinungen zu Grundsatzfragen der Innenpolitik," [Views on Basic Issues of Domestic Politics], Mannheim, 1983, p 17; Institute for Applied Social Sciences (Infas): "Meinungen und Einstellungen zu Ausländerproblemen," [Views on, and Attitudes Toward Guestworker Problems], Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1982, p 7) and who, in their search for a political "channel" to articulate their concerns, appear to have the least confidence in the existing German party system (chart 1).

Chart 1: Guestworker Demands in the FRG
for Political Parties and Candidates of Their Own
(in percent)

		(1) Forderung nach eigenen Parteien			
		Griechen	Italiener	Türken	Insgesamt
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(6)	Es sollte spezielle Ausländerparteien geben	54	41	59	53
(7)	Es sollte keine speziellen Ausländerparteien geben	46	59	41	47
		100	100	100	100

		(8) Forderung nach eigenen Kandidaten			
		Griechen	Italiener	Türken	Insgesamt
(9)	Eigene Kandidaten unbedingt notwendig	59	55	87	69
(10)	Eigene Kandidaten nicht unbedingt notwendig	40	39	5	28
(11)	Gegen eigene Kandidaten	1	6	8	5
		100	100	100	100

Key:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Demand for parties of their own | 7. There should be no special parties for guestworkers |
| 2. Greeks | 8. Demand for candidates of their own |
| 3. Italians | 9. Own candidates absolutely Necessary |
| 4. Turks | 10. Own parties not absolutely necessary |
| 5. Total | 11. Against own candidates |
| 6. There should be special parties for guestworkers | |

One gets the impression that the idea to enrich the political system in the FRG with guestworker-specific elements, serves those as a bridge so-to-speak who, although they no longer want to stand in the sidelines politically (as this applies to 30 percent of the surveyed), don't feel capable of total integration or can't expect much of it. On the professional-status hierarchy from high to low, a distinction can very roughly be made among 3 groups: those who want unlimited political participation and voting rights; those who, although they want to vote, want elements of their own political system back home; and those who are not interested in political participation.

Nevertheless, the citizenship issue, which would include the right to vote of course, is not a guestworker concern. All three nationalities agree they would reject the German citizenship, if that meant they had to give up their own. The statistics on this range between 92 and 95 percent. Provided they could keep their own citizenship, some 51 percent of the Italians, 46 percent of the Greeks and 43 percent of the Turks could decide in favor of becoming German citizens--if that were possible. These results show again that the demand for the vote is being considered more in terms of an additional right and that it would lose significant luster if viewed in the context of its--also for the respective home countries--typical consequences.

What is behind these desires, attitudes and expectations of the guestworkers becomes clear. When one looks at the German replies in response to the question about the possible right of guestworkers to vote in local elections: a good two-thirds of the Germans would oppose it; a narrow third would support it. A majority of the Greens voters, a narrow half of the FDP voters and about 40 percent of the SPD voters favor it while about three-fourths of all CDU/CSU voters reject the right of guestworkers to vote in local elections. (Footnote 11) (Ipos, op. cit., p 16).

III. Guestworkers Between the Party Landscapes of the FRG and Their Home Countries

The findings described in the preceding two sections demonstrate that it is hard to predict the participation of guestworkers in a possible election. The potential addition of roughly 3 million adult guestworker votes (that is approximately the number of voters in the Rhineland-Palatinate) would represent a 7 percent increase in votes. Assuming a voter participation of only 50-60 percent, that would still be an increase of about 4 percent in the number of voters and, in terms of election arithmetics, a magnitude undoubtedly to be counted with. For instance, last spring, the Frankfurt City Council was elected by about 58 percent of the town's adult population: with 72 percent of the German voters casting their votes and with the exclusion of guestworkers. Here, a 50 percent guestworker participation in the election effectively would have increased the number of voters by about 16 percent, from about 301,000 to 350,000.

However, elections--not a matter for debate at this moment anyway--must not be made the only point of reference. Numerous forms of political participation are already available to the guestworkers; this is an invitation to observers, especially in the mass media, to attach political

It is important to stress the point in time when the survey was undertaken because it may provide a first consideration for explaining the voter distribution. Only on the basis of time series analyses, which, in particular, could include the Bonn government change at the end of 1982, it will be possible to obtain a clearer idea of the important role the chancellor or government-party bonus have played here. The growth in the number of guestworkers following the 1966/67 crisis to the present total of about 4.5 million essentially occurred during the SPD-Liberal coalition headed by 2 SPD chancellors; and there is reason to believe that their quasi "eternal" dominance of, e.g., the media had a particular impact on the somewhat more distant observers of the political scene, namely guestworkers. A similar large drop in recognition (and without recognition there is no popularity) between the government and the opposition shows up in almost all instances, in which--again from a distance--the topic of a survey deals with the political elites in other countries; in other words, whenever the German population is asked about, e.g., Mitterand and Chirac or about Margaret Thatcher and Neill Kinnock.

Data which are comparable with the distribution figures in this chart are contained in a 1984 survey of the MARPLAN Institute, i.e., after the change of the Bonn government. Therefore, it was able to provide first conclusions about the impact of the "office bonus." Included in the inquiry were Spaniards, Italians, Yugoslavs, Greeks and Turks. The SPD won some 30 percent, the CDU/CSU 9, the FDP 1 and the other parties some 2 percent. The shift in the shares of votes--a 10 percent loss for the SPD and 3 percent gain for the CDU/CSU--shows the impact of the lost or newly-won office bonus. The most remarkable change, however, occurred in the share of the nonreplies; it rose from 48 to 58 percent in the 2 intervening years. Whether this demonstrates a greater indifference or only a greater wariness toward the new political constellations, remains to be seen.

But another explanation of the guestworkers' high regard for the SPD are that party's policies, or at least its attitude, toward guestworkers. However well-founded the CDU and CSU positions on that subject were in the context of all the issues they had to cover--from the point of view of the guestworkers, there was no doubt where they could look for more concessions, or at least greater understanding. At the same time, the leading CDU/CSU representatives also announced very openly the "harder line" vis-a-vis guestworkers during the most recent election campaigns; the right-left shift in the attitude of the German population was reflected above in their support or rejection, respectively, of the right of guestworkers to vote in local elections.

In that sense, this is one motive for party preferences that stems from the special situation of living as guestworkers in another country. But it is reasonable to assume that some reasons that are well-known as determining political party ties everywhere and for a long time, have been "brought along," so-to-speak. Among them, the most important is that it was primarily the working people who came to Germany--despite all changes to a "higher" or "lower" social level--i.e., the "working class" in the traditional sense. (Footnote 12) (Upward mobility of guestworkers during their stay in the FRG is very small. Approximately 90 percent remain at the social level they had when they first entered the FRG. See C. Koch-Arzberger, op. cit., p 92.) This is an important reason for their

labels to them that are based on their own views. For this reason, the only objective of the classifications below is to start shedding some more empirically supported light on this research area which is still quite diffused and, therefore, frequently subject to arbitrary interpretation.

At the time of this survey, the SPD would have won a very clear-cut election victory among the guestworkers. In view of the fact that the percentages of nonreplies in response to the question on party preferences were very high, they have been included in chart 2, and the vote shares of the parties have been related to the total of all survey participants, instead of only to "voters"--as is customary. (It should be noted here that of the 47 percent of those who did not indicate any party preference, 14 percent said they didn't know any German party.) As explained above, the group of nonreplies probably includes an above-average share of "rightwingers" so that the total result, of interest here, should be adjusted towards the "right," in all likelihood towards the CDU. But that doesn't change much in the overall picture.

Chart 2. Guestworker Preferences for German Parties
(in percent)

	(1) Nationalität			(2) Geschlecht		Insgesamt (8)
	Griechen (3)	Italiener (4)	Türken (5)	Männer (6)	Frauen (7)	
SPD	32	27	56	43	34	40
CDU/CSU	6	8	4	7	4	6
(9) GRÜNE	6	1	2	3	3	3
FDP	1	1	3	1	1	1
DKP	4	1	2	2	2	2
(10) Andere	—	—	1	—	—	—
(11) Keine Antwort	51	62	32	44	56	48
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Key:


- | | |
|----------------|--------------|
| 1. Nationality | 6. Men |
| 2. Sex | 7. Women |
| 3. Greeks | 8. Total |
| 4. Italians | 9. Greens |
| 5. Turks | 10. Others |
| | 11. No reply |

SPD orientation; it is a tradition and, quite simply, the counterpart to an identical party orientation in Germany. The Turks, who made up the largest share of skilled labor in the analyzed sample, most clearly tended toward the SPD. The relatively minor importance and radiation of the Communist Party in the FRG has no doubt stimulated this concentration on the SPD.

The fact that a relatively large share of more than 10 percent of the Greeks supported the German Communist Party (DKP) and the Greens can be largely explained by their significantly bigger share of high school and university students. In contrast, the slightly higher share of potential CDU/CSU voters among the Italians is primarily the result of their above-average groups of professionals and social-security or annuity recipients.

The issue of orientations "brought along" or only "translated" into the FRG party system can be further clarified by comparing the sympathies for the German parties with those for the home-country parties. But before doing so, we must analyze the extent to which the preferences of the guestworkers living in the FRG for their home-country parties differs from the general picture in their home countries or to what extent they coincide. Since the most recent free elections in Turkey took place a relatively long time ago, only the Greek and Italian samples will be analyzed [chart 3].

Chart 3. Party Preferences in Home Countries
and Results of the Most Recent National Elections
(in percent)



Key:

- | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Communists | 4. 1982 survey | 7. Christian Democrats |
| 2. Others | 5. 1981 elections | 8. Greeks |
| 3. New Democracy | 6. 1979 elections | 9. Italians |

Despite the high proportion of nonreplies and the probable need to make a slight correction toward the "right," there is no doubt that the distributions coincide to a very large degree. The astonishing increase for PASOK, the Socialist Party of Greece--shortly after its big party victory in 1981--probably reflects a genuine voter or, at least, sympathy movement and is not a sampling error. The Italian example, in particular, confirms large-scale agreement with the electorate at home, but also shows that preferences for parties back home are not simply transferred to the respective "sister parties" in the FRG--a process which, in light of the party alliances, e.g., in the European Parliament or in the sometimes world-wide party federations, would make perfect sense and be realistic.


Assuming, on the basis of these considerations, a certain parallelism or a certain correspondence relationship between the Communists here and abroad, and between the Social-Democrats, Christian-Democrats, Liberals etc. here and abroad, we can see that the two nationalities under review--while staying in the respective party-political camp--do not just "translate" their preferences from the home country to the FRG. What the figures at hand merely demonstrate is that the main streams of the "wanderings" between the parties at home and here stay within the large political camps--i.e., Communist, Social-Democratic, Liberal, Christian-Democratic. A more conclusive test of this generalization remains to be undertaken with the help of larger statistical populations, but, for the time being, the hypothesis is justifiable, especially on the basis of the Italian example which does not show as one-sided a distribution of sympathies as the Greek one.

After all, the larger part of Democrazia Cristiana supporters "wanders" to the German CDU, while the supporters of Italy's Socialist Party move almost in their entirety to the German SPD (chart 4). Among the Greeks, the supporters of the "New Democracy," the large right-of-the-center party of President Karamanlis who has been their leader for many years, do no longer fully fit the main-stream argument--maybe because of the special circumstances described earlier. They are turning more and more to the German SPD, and not to the "true pendant," the CDU/CSU (chart 5). The overwhelming number of PASOK supporters, on the other hand, stay in the Socialist or Social-Democratic camp and, when moving to the German party system, a significant percentage splits off to join the Greens. As mentioned, that share consists above all of young and educated PASOK sympathizers.

The Italian example shows particularly well that the German party system, and here again primarily the SPD, evidently is able to attract sympathies which, at home, belong to splinter parties (the category "Others" in chart 4) or remain without a point of reference, without an object (the category of "Wouldn't know any party" in that chart). It is well known that the satisfaction of the Italian people with their democracy has diminished much more over the past decade than that of the German people for theirs. (Footnote 13) (Commission of the European Communities, "Die oeffentliche Meinung in der europaeischen Gemeinschaft" [Public Opinion in the European Community], euro-barometer, Vol 19, Brussels, 1983, p 27) However, it must

be added that this is completely valid only for the model under examination here, which does not include the nonreplies. There was a group who also indicated, when asked for their preferences among the German parties, that they "didn't know a German party."

Chart 4. Italian Party Preferences at Home and in the FRG



Key:

- 1. Home-country parties
- 2. "Wanderings"

- 3. FRG parties
- 4. "Wouldn't know any"


- 5. Others

Some very small parties and "wanderings" have not been listed so that the data for the 3 surveyed blocs (parties here, "wanderings", parties there) do not always add up to 100.

(Example: Of the 26 percent of surveyed Italians, who would vote for the Democrazia Cristiana in the home country, 11 percent would vote for the SPD and 15 percent for the CDU/CSU in FRG elections.)

For both nationalities, the least probable shift of voter shares from the party at home to its German counterpart is in the Communist camp; overall, it shows the largest "losses from wandering." Among the Greeks, more than half of all Communist Party supporters would stay with the party, a good one-fourth would change over to the SPD and the remainder to the Greens. In the considerably larger group of supporters of the Italian Communist Party, not even one-tenth of the survey participants would move their sympathies to the KPD, more than three-fourths would turn to the German Social Democrats and a very small proportion would vote "Green." Besides explaining the reasons for the DKP's minor significance and radiation, the comparison of the Italian and Greek sample may also indicate how important the political orientation of the communist parties back home is for transferring or not-transferring political sympathies. Unlike the Greek Communists, the Italian Communists have distinctly "Euro-Communist" views and, although they keep their distance, they are--because of their well-advertised opening toward the center--closer to the Social-Democrats than to the "petrified" DKP. This probably applies in particular to most of the ideologically less committed non-organized group of people, that is, to those who are only supporters.

Chart 5. Greek Party Preferences at Home and in the FRG



Key:

- | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Home-country parties | 3. FRG parties | 5. "Wouldn't know any" |
| 2. "Wanderings" | 4. New Democracy | |

Some very small parties and "wanderings" have not been listed so that the data for the 3 surveyed blocs (parties there, "wanderings," parties here) do not always add up to 100. Example: Of the 16 percent of surveyed Greeks, who would vote for the "New Democracy" at home, 10 percent would vote for the SPD and 6 percent for the CDU/CSU in FRG elections.)

A preliminary summary of the results of this study may read like this: As indicated at the outset, guestworker preferences for German parties are based on four groups of variables, the relative importance of which can only be determined with any certainty after further, detailed research, which include developments over time, has been done. As everywhere, the basic elements are, first, the demographic and socio-structural characteristics of the voters which, second, determine with some probability, their preferences among the parties at home. In addition to the process of "translating" these preferences to the "corresponding" German parties, there are, third, the politics or positions the German parties are supporting or taking vis-a-vis guestworkers in the FRG, and possibly, fourth, a government party or chancellor "bonus."

IV. Political Self-Classification on the Left-Right Continuum

To make the measuring standards more uniform, an attempt has been made in recent years, especially in international comparisons, to use a general tool to analyze both the political orientations and preferences for political parties. For more than half a century, it was largely undisputed that certain parties were oriented to the left or to the right, but there were no points of reference to determine whether the British Labor Party was as much to the "left" as the French SFIO, or whether the Italian Democrazia Cristiana was as much to the "right" as the German CDU. In the individual countries, a simple classification of parties on the Left-Right continuum has become doubtful, primarily because new political movements have come into being, such as Greens who combine very different characteristics. (Footnote 14) (W. Buerklin: "Die Gruenen und die 'Neue Politik'. Abschied vom Dreiparteiensystem?" [The Greens and the 'New Politics'. Farewell to the 3-Party System?], Politische Vierteljahresschrift [Political Quarterly], Vol. 4, 1981, p 359; and K. Arzberger: "Stabilitaet und Wandel im Verhaeltnis zwischen den Generationen," [Stability and Change in Relations Between the Generations], published by K.O. Hondrich/R. Vollmer in "Beduerfnisse, Stabilitaet und Wandel" [Needs, Stability and Change], Opladen 1983, p 101.)


This tool for measuring political orientations, which aims for greater generalization, is a 10-step scale ending in "left" and "right" points. Every surveyed person indicates on the scale where he himself sees his political orientation between, or also on, these poles.

The tool seems to measure what it is supposed to measure. Based on data from several countries, the more recent election-sociological literature has repeatedly shown that the voters know how to treat fairly consistently the "left" and "right" symbols, as applied to the political parties. (Footnote 15) (F.U. Pappi: "Die Links-Rechts-Dimension des deutschen Parteiensystems und die Parteipraeferenz-Profile der Waehlerschaft" [The Left-Right Dimension of the German Party System and the Party Preference Profiles of the Voters], published by M. Kaase/H.-D. Klingemann in: "Wahlen und politisches System. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1980" [Elections and the Political System. Analyses on the Occasion of the Federal Election in 1980], Opladen 1983, p 423.) Since there can be no criteria for absolute or objective accuracy, it is primarily a matter of relative unanimity on how to use the scale and of agreement of voter and expert views.

It has become clear that the average voter and a "well-informed expert" hold similar views on where on the scale to place the parties in Britain, Germany or France. Particularly for the larger parties, wrong classifications of political orientations are rare. (Footnote 16) (F.U. Pappi: "Die Gegenueberstellung der deutschen Parteien" [The Comparison of German Parties], p 427 (see footnote 15)).

Chart 6 shows how the surveyed foreign nationals are distributed on the continuum and where the Germans, who were asked the same question at about the same time, stand. At first glance, the comparison seems to suggest that the decisive difference between the two groups is the larger presence of guestworkers on the left side. However, it must be kept in mind that a large proportion of the guestworkers--namely 49 percent--did not answer this question and that, if they had answered, the distribution probably would have shifted more to the right. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that the total distribution of the Italians, Greeks and Turks in the FRG, who are not a representative cross-section of their home countries in terms of demography and social structure, tends to deviate from that of the Germans somewhat toward the left.

Chart 6. Self-Classification of Political Orientations
Among Guestworkers and Germans
(in percent)




Key:

1. Left 2. Right 3. Germans 4. Guestworkers

Equally striking is the fact that the total self-classification picture for the political orientations of guestworkers does not exhibit the same normal distribution that characterized, for instance, the German population over the past 3 decades despite all shifts from right to left; this was noted in "Allensbacher Jahrbuecher der Demoskopie" [Allensbach Yearbooks of Demoscopy] and in the "National Surveys." However, it remains an open question whether this is already the sign of a stronger political polarization among the guestworkers or whether the absence, particularly of the "center right," results from the large proportion of nonreplies, which, as explained earlier, may hide an above-average proportion of the Center Right.

A look at the various nationalities, for which distributions are shown in chart 7, reveals that the sloping applies to all of them. For all 3 nationalities, the left is dominant, particularly among the Greeks, who elected the Socialists to power for the first time in their home country when they voted for Andreas Papandreou. To correct these distributions by including the nonreplies, who presumably would have tended more toward the right, may have had a broad balancing effect for the Italians. As the relatively unstable system of government majorities in Italy has proven, they are showing the lowest centralization in their distribution.

Chart 7. Self-Classification of Political Orientations
Among Italians, Greeks and Turks
(in percent)




If the absence of the Central Right does reflect reality and is not attributable, solely or for the major part, to the special composition of those who declined to answer, then this is a phenomenon that characterizes all 3 nationalities. The extreme right is always larger than the 3 categories preceding it, that is, from the right to the center. For the Turks, there is such a "gap" in the normal distribution, which presumably is hard to interpret, on the left side of the scale as well.

The characteristics established for party preferences--for the parties at home as well as for the German parties--also provide the most persuasive explanation for self-classification on the left-right scale. This in itself suggests a very large consistency in the use of the scale and agreement between party preferences and left-right locations--provided the sequence of the parties on the scale, as viewed by well-informed experts, is correct. Hence, the guestworkers know what is left and what is right; they know which parties in Germany and which parties in their home countries are more to the left or more to the right, and they know where they themselves stand.

This is demonstrated in detail in chart 8 where the Greek and Italian sample shows that the supporters of the respective 3 major parties in the home countries classify themselves in the correct sequence. Even the difference in the distances can be explained in a way that makes sense. The supporters of the Moscow-oriented Greek Communist Party are more to the left than those of the Euro-Communist Italian Communist Party; the supporters of the Socialist Parties of both countries are at about the same levels, and like all Democratic Parties and the CDU in the FRG, the orientation of the Catholic Democrazia Cristiana is closer to the center than the conservative-right supporters of Greece's "New Democracy."

Chart 8. Preferences for Home Country Parties
and Self-Classification of their Voters on the Left-Right Scale




Key: 1. Greeks 2. Italians

The most interesting question relating to a possible political integration of the guestworkers into German society, especially their possible participation in elections, is of course how their preferences for the German parties are distributed on the left-right scale and how this distribution compares with the German voters. Hence, regardless of the share of votes this or that party would draw from among the guestworkers, the question is whether the German parties would win the support of similarly oriented, similarly extremist or moderate voters among the guestworkers as they do

among the German voters. It is also conceivable that there may be wide-ranging differences in the mutual perception of where the parties stand, and that could lead to disappointments and problems in the long run. As the voter sees it: he chooses a particular party because he believes it leans toward the left, and he is bound to be disappointed when the party turns out to be much more to the right. As the parties see it: by winning the support of the sum of Germans and guestworkers, a bloc of voters is being accumulated for whose expectations--more difficulties for all modern "people's" parties!--a common denominator can no longer be found.

Of course, this would be conceivable, but chart 9 shows that this does not apply to the 3 nationalities under discussion. Quite generally, guestworkers with "their" German parties are always somewhat more to the left than the German supporters of the same parties. For them, the total distance from the location of the communist voters to those of the CDU is neither longer nor shorter than for the German voters. The SPD would have to do the shortest "split step" to accommodate their German and foreign supporters. (SPD Manager Glotz recently chose this metaphor to illustrate the problem of winning back the voters who had wandered off to the Greens.) The German and foreign SPD sympathizers occupy almost the same spot--a little to the left of the center. The CDU and the FDP would have to bridge a somewhat greater distance. To accommodate "its" guestworkers, the CDU would have to make slight concessions toward the left, and the FDP slight concessions toward the right. The largest move--also to the left--would have to be made by the Greens. Hence, on this somewhat more general basis of the analysis, guestworker inclusion in the German electorate would cause very little trouble.

Chart 9: Party Preferences of Guestworkers and Germans and their Classification on the Left-Right Scale




Key:

1. Guestworkers
2. Germans

Note: The German population data are based on the data of the 1980 National Survey, those for guestworkers on this survey.

A somewhat closer look at the party most popular among the guestworkers makes it clear that the average values in chart 9 may hide a point that should be examined. Chart 10 shows the distribution of Turkish, Italian and Greek SPD supporters on the left-right scale. For all 3 nationalities, the right side is interesting, i.e., although a number of surveyed people, who would vote Social Democratic, classify their orientation as being on the extreme right. (This is true for only a very small segment of German SPD supporters--the world just isn't completely logical--as, for instance, the National Social Survey of 1982 shows.)

Chart 10. Guestworker Supporters of the SPD
and Their Classification on the Left-Right Scale



It is possible that the situation of the guestworkers, i.e., the fact that they live in a foreign country, is responsible for this somewhat stark inconsistency: extreme nationalism or chauvinism just can't be transferred to parties in other countries: what remains is the criterion of maximum friendliness toward guestworkers--an accusation a rightwinger has, in fact, leveled against the SPD. But it may also be true that the existing German party system does not provide an adequate home for genuine rightwingers--there may be parallels here to the German rightwingers, especially the younger generation. Their escape into stating over and over during the survey, that they "wouldn't know any party," points to an--admittedly not very large--potential force that would have to create its own (guestworker-specific) party.

7821

CSO: 3620/110

POLITICAL

FRANCE

POLL AFTER CHIRAC-FABIUS TV-DEBATE SHOWS SLIGHT CHANGE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Nov 85 pp 126-128

[Article by Charles Rebois: "The Prime Minister Has Again Reduced the Majority"]

[Text] Although it does not happen often, we did not publish our monthly poll, in agreement with the management of SOFRES [French Association for Opinion-Polling], in the first issue of the month of November. The reason is simple, for the dates covered by the poll (18 through 24 October) did not make it possible for us to consider an important political event, i.e., the televised Chirac-Fabius Debate of 27 October. At our request, SOFRES compiled a second poll covering the period from 30 October through 4 November and included the figures for the October poll. It is to be noted that the televised debate won seven points for the mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, whereas the prime minister, Laurent Fabius, lost 5 points. In light of their magnitude, such differences must be carefully analyzed. They are linked to a one-time event. Without careful analysis of these differences, future polls will indicate that a real movement in public opinion is involved.

(1)

Mitterrand : 55 % ne lui font pas confiance

□ Question : Faites-vous tout à fait confiance, plutôt confiance, plutôt pas confiance ou pas confiance du tout à François Mitterrand pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en France actuellement ?

(2)

	Rappel enquête octobre 1985	Novembre I 1985 avant le débat CHIRAC/FABIUS	Novembre II 1985 après le débat CHIRAC/FABIUS
(3) ● Tout à fait confiance	7	7	7
(4) ● Plutôt confiance	31	34	32
(5) ● Plutôt pas confiance	29	29	31
(6) ● Pas du tout confiance	28	25	24
(7) ● Sans opinion	5	5	6
	100 %	100 %	100 %

(8), (9), (10)

- (1) Mitterrand: 55% of those polled do not trust him.
- (2) Question: Do you trust completely, trust somewhat, do not trust, do not trust at all Mitterrand to resolve the problems existing in France today?
- (3) Trust completely
- (4) Trust somewhat
- (5) Do not trust
- (6) Do not trust at all
- (7) No opinion
- (8) October 1985 Poll Figures
- (9) 1 November 1985 before the Chirac-Fabius Debate
- (10) 11 November 1985 after the Chirac-Fabius Debate

(1)

Fabius : 46 % ne lui font pas confiance

□ Question : Faites-vous tout à fait confiance, plutôt confiance, plutôt pas confiance ou pas du tout confiance à Laurent Fabius pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en France actuellement ? (2)

	Rappel enquête octobre 1985	Novembre I 1985 avant le débat CHIRAC/FABIUS	Novembre II 1985 après le débat CHIRAC/FABIUS
(3) ● Tout à fait confiance	9 } 48	9 } 49	8 } 45
(4) ● Plutôt confiance	39 } 48	40 } 49	37 } 45
(5) ● Plutôt pas confiance	21 } 44	21 } 41	24 } 46
(6) ● Pas du tout confiance	23 } 44	20 } 41	22 } 46
(7) ● Sans opinion	8	10	9
	100 %	100 %	100 %

(8), (9), (10)

- (1) Fabius: 46% of those polled do not trust him.
- (2) Question: Do you trust completely, trust somewhat, do not trust, do not trust at all Laurent Fabius to resolve the problems existing in France today?
- (3) Trust completely
- (4) Trust somewhat
- (5) Do not trust
- (6) Do not trust at all
- (7) No opinion
- (8) October 1985 Poll Figures
- (9) 1 November 1985 before the Chirac-Fabius Debate
- (10) 11 November 1985 after the Chirac-Fabius Debate

This double poll for November was compiled for a period of less than two weeks because of the major event that the face-to-face event of Chirac-Fabius was, demonstrates to what point public opinion shows sensitiveness to the political opposition to the grand spectacle. As polls of public opinion that are compiled immediately after an event indicate, the chairman of the RPR [Rally for the Republic], who, for a long time, has not done well in the opinion polls, jumps ahead with 7 points. These points are added to the 3 points he had already acquired in the October poll. Forty-two per cent of the Frenchmen surveyed want to see him in an important role in the future. The possibility that Chirac may become prime minister after March 1986 is gaining ground.

The debate on 27 October made Laurent Fabius lose 4 points. Judging by his capability to resolve problems that exist in France, the prime minister appears for the first time with a negative balance. But if the indications show the influence that a televised broadcast, promoted with a large amount of publicity, can have, it is too early to measure the long-term effects. Let us limit ourselves to the statement that the media event has contributed

to upsetting a trend favorable to those in power positions. Thus, Francois Mitterand, who gained 3 points before the debate, was hit by the backlash from the poor showing of his prime minister. Jean-Marie Le Pen's case holds our attention. The National Front chairman committed a gaffe on 16 October during his "Hour of Truth" on Channel 2. The survey made on 18 October revealed a gain for him of 4 points; however, he lost these 4 points a week and a half later. It is an example of the hazards of a political show.

Raymond Barre (+ 4 percent), a stranger to these ups and downs, showed a particularly notable recovery, for the former prime minister had seen interest in him steadily diminishing during the past six months. On equal footing with Jacques Chirac's performance, this recovery tends to show that the two leaders of the opposition do not, in the eyes of the French public, appear as rivals, at least in the present phase of the political fight. Beyond considerations pertaining to personalities, two observations may be made. The first regards the rating of the political parties. At a point four months from the legislative elections, the rating remains stable. Each political entity rests firm in its positions, except for the National Front, which has received no more than 10% of the favorable response (- 4 percent).

The second observation is less reassuring for the opposition. Before the Chirac-Fabius debate a slight improvement in the general climate was noted, except in unemployment. The government gained some points in the fight against the rise in prices. These signs, however, are too weak to carry any weight in the voters' desire on 16 March and it remains to be seen to what extent the televised shock of 27 October has not offset the effects of socialist propaganda.

(1) |

Les personnalités politiques de la majorité

(2) |

☐ Question : Pour chacune des personnalités politiques suivantes, votez pour le mois et les années à venir ?

	RAPPEL OCT. 85	NOV. 85 AVANT	NOV. 85 APRÈS
Michel Rocard	56	58	58
Laurent Fabius	46	48	43
Jacques Delors	40	38	36
Jean-Pierre Chevènement	30	33	33
Lionel Jospin	25	30	28
Edith Cresson	23	26	25
Pierre Mauroy	21	21	23
Pierre Bérégovoy	20	20	18
Georges Marchais	9	9	10

(3), (4), (5)

(6)

La fiche technique de la Sofres

- Sondages effectués pour le Figaro-Magazine.
- Date de réalisation du premier sondage (novembre I) : du 18 au 24 octobre 1985.
- Date de réalisation du second sondage (novembre II) : du 30 octobre au 4 novembre 1985.
- Échantillon national de 1 000 personnes représentatif de l'ensemble de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus.
- Méthode des quotas (sex, âge, profession du chef de ménage P.C.S.) et stratification par région et catégories d'agglomération.

- (1) Political Personalities of the Majority.
- (2) Question: For each of the following political personalities, would you tell me if you wish to see him or her play a major role during the months and years to come?
- (3) Recap October 1985
- (4) Before November 1985
- (5) After November 1985
- (6) SOFRES Data Sheet
 - Polls taken for the FIGARO-MAGAZINE
 - Dates covered by the first poll (1 November): from 18 through 24 October
 - Dates covered by the second poll (11 November): from 30 October through 4 November 1985
 - National sampling of 1000 men and women representing the totality of the French population aged 18 and older
 - System of selection (by sex, age, profession of the head of a household P.C.S. [expansion unknown]), by regions and by categories of population centers.

(1)

Les personnalités politiques de l'opposition

(2)

si vous me dire si vous souhaitez lui voir jouer un rôle important au

	RAPPEL OCT. 85	NOV. 85 AVANT	NOV. 85 APRÈS
Raymond Barre	46	43	47
Simone Vell	41	41	43
Jacques Chirac	32	35	42
François Léotard	37	37	34
V. Giscard d'Estaing	26	26	28
J. Chaban-Delmas	26	25	25
Jacques Toubon	20	23	20
Jean-Marie Le Pen	14	18	14
René Monory	13	15	13

(3), (4), (5)

(6)

La cote des partis politiques

(7)

	P.C.	P.S.	M.R.G.	U.D.F.	R.P.R.	Fr. Nat.
(8) Bonne opinion	13	45	22	38	41	10
(9) Mauv. opinion	74	43	46	41	40	73

- (1) Political Personalities of the Opposition
- (2) For each of the following political personalities, would you tell me if you wish to see him or her play a major role during the months and years to come?
- (3) Recap October 1985
- (4) Before November 1985
- (5) After November 1985
- (6) Assessment of Political Parties
- (7) PC [Communist Party]
PS [Socialist Party]
MRG [Movement of Left Radicals]
UDF [French Democratic Union]
RPR [Rally for the Republic]
Fr. Nat. [National Front]
- (8) Favorable
- (9) Unfavorable

SOFRES Monthly Poll -- FIGARO-MAGAZINE

First Priority: Always unemployment

Question: Among the following subjects, which one, according to you, should the government give priority at the present time?

	October 1985	November 1985
- Fight rising prices	9	9
- Fight unemployment	65	66
- Fight violence and crime	18	17
- Maintain social peace	6	6
- No opinion	2	2
	<hr/> 100 %	<hr/> 100 %

Rising Prices and Unemployment

64 percent consider the stand against inflation to be ineffective.

Question: As to the stand against rising prices, do you believe that the Government's action is...

	October 1985	November 1985
...very effective	3 } 28	2 } 31
...fairly effective	25 }	29 }
...not very effective	45 }	46 }
...totally ineffective	22 } 67	18 } 64
- No opinion	5	5
	<hr/> 100 %	<hr/> 100 %

84 percent consider the stand against unemployment to be ineffective.
 Question: As to the stand against unemployment, do you believe that the Government's action is...

	October 1985		November 1985	
...very effective	1	13	-	12
...fairly effective	12		12	
...not very effective	46	83	49	84
...totally ineffective	37		35	
- No opinion	4		4	
	100 %		100 %	

Optimism and Pessimism

54 percent believe that things are getting worse.
 Question: When you look at the way France and the French population are developing, do you have the impression that things are getting better or, on the contrary, are getting worse?

	October 1985		November 1985	
- Things are getting better	13		14	
- They are getting worse	59		54	
- There is no change	26		31	
- No opinion	2		1	
	100 %		100 %	

47 percent believe there will be many social conflicts...
 Question: Do you believe that there are going to be many or few social conflicts in the next two or three months?

	October 1985		November 1985	
- Many social conflicts	50		47	
- Few social conflicts	35		37	
- No opinion	15		16	
	100 %		100 %	

...and 36 percent fear recourse to violence.
 Question: In your opinion, during the next two or three years, the main problems that are going to arise in France...

	October 1985		November 1985	
...can be resolved by negotiation and by compromise	50		54	
...or are they running the risk of leading to a return to open defiance, opposition, and violence	36		36	
- No opinion	14		10	
	100 %		100 %	

France's Role in the World

43 percent believe that France's role in the world is weakening.

Question: Do you consider that France's role in the world in becoming stronger or becoming weaker?

	October 1985	November 1985
- Is becoming stronger	16	19
- Is becoming weaker	50	43
- There is no change	27	30
- No opinion	7	8
	<hr/> 100 %	<hr/> 100 %

9766/12948

CSO: 3519/39

POLITICAL

FRANCE

LAZITCH VIEWS POTENTIAL GORBACHEV POLICIES

Paris EST & OUEST in French Nov 85 pp 4,5

[Article by Branko Lazitch: "Gorbachev, 'Reformer' Without Reforms?"]

[Text] During the days following the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party (on 11 March), two diametrically opposed opinions were heard, one in the West, the other in Moscow, about the position the new Number 1 would adopt with regard to the main problem of the USSR: the weakness of the economy.

In the West, as fate would have it the first book dedicated to the life of Gorbachev was published at the very moment he reached the top. In December of last year a NEW YORK TIMES reporter, Thos. G. Butson, decided to write a biography of Gorbachev, in anticipation of the impending disappearance of Chernenko. The reporter turned his manuscript over to the publisher in mid-February and the binding of the book was completed on the very day that Chernenko's death was announced. Hence the book appeared in the bookstores in mid-March and its general orientation was clearly stated in the second sentence of the text which appears on the cover: "Gorbachev is the man most likely to move the Soviet Union from state capitalism to a search for stimuli prompting individuals to produce more, on the farms and in the factories." (Thos. G. Butson: "Gorbachev: A Biography," E. Stein & Day, New York, 170 pages).

At the same time that the book appeared, but without having read it, large numbers of reporters in the West threw themselves into commentaries and forecasts about Gorbachev's future economic policy. Virtually all their articles turned around this key thought: Gorbachev would gradually introduce a market economy in the Soviet Union, following the example of Hungary and China. They foresaw pell-mell a real decentralization of the economy, a clear-cut autonomy of the enterprises, a reappearance of the private sector in commerce and in cottage industries, a future privatization of land at the expense of the kolkhozes, and even an authorization given to Western capital to invest in the consumer goods industry, as Lenin had allowed it as of 1921 with the NEP [New Economic Policy].

Parallel to these speculations expressed in the West, voices were heard from the Kremlin itself. This time it was not a question of intellectual constructions coming forth from the fertile pen of reporters of the "capitalist" press, but of the official opinion expressed, by Vadim Zagladine (assistant to Boris

Ponomarev), in charge of introducing the new secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party to Western public opinion. Zagladine expressed himself through the intermediary of the weekly journal TEMPS NOUVEAUX (published in 10 languages). Following the compulsory praise of Gorbachev, "eminent personality of the party and of the state, known throughout the country for his attachment to the great Leninist cause, for his energy, his realistic spirit and his firmness in the accomplishment of party tasks, his simplicity," etcetera, Zagladine touched on the favorite speculations of the Westerners about economic reform to brush them away in one sweep:

"Everyone knows that there are always 'kind souls' in the West to give us lots of advice as to the road the country should follow to achieve new successes in economic development. As a general rule, those recipes boil down to a single thing: the Soviet Union should give up the principles of economic development which are its own and bend itself to the mechanisms of a market economy... Such 'advice' corresponds perfectly with the wishes of Western politicians and ideologues to put an end to socialism, to brush it away from the face of the earth. But, of course, our people and our party will never accept it." (No 13, March 1985, page 5).

For once it will be better to trust the words of Zagladine rather than those of a NEW YORK TIMES reporter. Zagladine's position could even be interpreted within the framework of a strict Marxist-Leninist reasoning. Having become the holder of power through the trust of the governing class (the nomenklatura), Gorbachev is called to protect the interests of that class and not at all to threaten them or erode them. But any profound reform of the Soviet system would run the risk of calling into question the interests acquired by the "apparatchiks." Marx and Lenin continually repeated that a governing class, master of economic and political power, does not defend the general interests of society (even if it sincerely thinks so), but its own interests. That is exactly what the nomenklatura does and what it expects from Gorbachev, as was the case as a matter of fact for his predecessors.

Hence, for lack of thorough structural reforms the Kremlin has recourse to palliatives, to a very well known tune: the Soviet economic system is superior to "capitalism," but it suffers from a few minor insufficiencies which have to be gotten rid of now. Hence the appeals, directives, resolutions, decrees and other periodic measures in favor of a greater work discipline and of better productivity, against waste and corruption, against alcoholism and absenteeism, in favor of a better selection of cadres...

What is surprising is to see an exceptional originality ascribed to those measures. In reality, this inventory of measures is neither new nor efficient. How, for example, does one find a difference between the two following diagnoses of the Soviet economy?

Speech No 1: "Our urgent task consists in a strong improvement in supplying the people with foodstuffs and industrial goods over the course of 2 or 3 years... It must be recognized that we are behind in terms of mass consumption merchandise... To the shame of the workers of our industry, clients often prefer foreign goods... There are still numerous enterprises where cost prices are higher than sale prices..."

Speech No 2: "Society must solve urgent problems in order to improve the supply of foodstuffs, to increase the production of goods and services for the people... However, it must be recognized that the quality of the products remains one of the vulnerable points in the economy... Even those products included in the top category cannot bear comparison with the best world samples... The process of price formation will have to be improved radically ..."

No, there is no difference between these two speeches, not in terms of ideas nor even of formulation. But there is one in terms of time: the first text came from the program speech made by Malenkov on 6 August 1953 in his capacity as successor of Stalin to the position of president of the government; the second came from the program speech made by Gorbachev on 11 June 1985. Thirty-two years have gone by between the two, but the leaders in the Kremlin continue to speak the same language. The reason for this is simple: the economic problems of the USSR as they appeared in 1953 present themselves exactly in the same terms in 1985.

As a matter of fact, the rather critical comments about the current state of Soviet economy and industry made by Gorbachev during his first speeches in Moscow and within the country, lie within the framework of a quasi-tradition of the Soviet system: every new secretary general begins his rule with a more or less direct criticism of his predecessor's balance sheet.

At the time of the first post-Brezhnev meeting of the Central Committee (22 November 1982), Yuri Andropov, having been installed in the position of secretary general for barely 10 days, stated: "We would like to draw your attention to the fact that in terms of a number of important indicators, the tasks of the plan for the first 2 years of the 5 year plan have not been accomplished ... The main indicator of the effectiveness of the economy, that is to say the productivity of labor, grows at a rate which cannot satisfy us."

Another example from the past, 1 month after Khrushchev was driven from power (October 1964), Brezhnev convened the Central Committee to severely criticize Khrushchev's economic management and even to abolish some of the measures taken at his instigation.

And Khrushchev himself, as soon as he was brought into the secretariat general of the Party (September 1953), presented a report on the sad state of the Soviet economy at the time of Stalin's death which created a sensation, the first sizable admission in the process of economic destalinization...

To return to Gorbachev, we are compelled to recognize today that in matters of "reforms" of the structures of the Soviet economy, both the word and the act are missing! First the word "reform": it never appears in Soviet comments concerning the few economic measures taken or considered by Gorbachev. The word currently used is "experience." There is nothing surprising about systematically avoiding the word "reform": everything tied to it was condemned by Lenin at the dawn of the century, as being a synonym for opportunism in politics and for revisionism in Marxist doctrine. At that time Lenin was setting himself against the first reformist tendency in the Marxist-socialist movement

in Russia: economism, a tendency very much attached to improving the economic situation of the working class.

As for the act, not a single measure of real economic scope for the Soviet system has been taken so far by Gorbachev, everyone agrees on that. However, instead of the period of grace, one could allow him another grace period and await the 27th congress of the Communist Party, which will open next 25 February, before pronouncing a definitive judgement on the matter.

8463

CSO: 3519/52

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF TACTICS RELATIVE TO ELECTIONS, SOVIET TIES EXAMINED

Paris EST & OUEST in French Nov 85 pp 6-8

[Article by Claude Harmel: "PCF: Stunted Ambition and Confused Tactics"]

[Text] The joint statement issued after the meeting of Marchais and Gorbachev at the Kremlin (see L'HUMANITE, 4 September 1985) outlined the general framework of the policy which the French Communist Party [PCF] had to follow in agreement with the Soviet Communist Party. The Central Committee of the PCF, which met on 8 October, and the National Conference* which was held at Saint-Ouen on 12 and 13 October were to define current party tactics in terms of its broad strategic lines, very specifically its tactics in the electoral campaign of March 1986, which has already been started unofficially.

No Return of PCF to Power

Hence, what is essentially the PCF strategy for the "current period" as they say in jargon. The Gorbachev-Marchais resolution recalled, as expected, that the main characteristic of the era is that it is the transition from capitalism to socialism. But that was only a routine affirmation, which was already found in the previous joint statement of the two parties, in January 1980, which had already appeared on that date and which has appeared in a large number of texts since then.

* Statutes of the PCF, Article 44: "The National Conference meets upon decision of the Central Committee. The latter sets its agenda and the form of representation. Participants in the work of the National Conference are members of the Central Committee and of the Central Commission of financial control and representatives elected by the federal committees. The Central Committee may invite Party members, who will have a consultative role, to participate in the deliberations of the Party conferences."

Article 45 - "Based on the general political line adopted by the Congress, the National Conference makes decisions applicable to the whole party."

As one can see, this involves a meeting of organization men.

As was very well demonstrated in this very space by Branko Lazitch (EST & OUEST, No 23, October 1985), while reaffirming that the relationship of forces in the world is always more favorable to "socialism," the resolution stressed the vigor of the counter-offensive of capitalism: "Faced with the crisis and the national liberation movement, the capitalist forces do not remain idle. They are doing everything to slow down, stop and, if they could, reverse the movement. Such is the direction of the counteroffensive launched by imperialism, which has taken on a more aggressive character since the advent to power of the current American administration." In other words, capitalism and imperialism are not satisfied with defending themselves. From the defensive they have gone over to the offensive. Hence, today it is socialism which is on the defensive.

This text takes on all its significance when it is compared with the corresponding passage in the statement of 1980: "The labor and democratic struggles have grown in size to the point that, in many capitalist countries, the question of political change is the order of the day."

It would not be a careless interpretation of this statement to say that these "political changes" would not be "profound" if they did not bring communist parties and their progressive allies to power.

In other words, at a time when the Soviets did not wish for an electoral victory of the left at all and advised the PCF to follow a tactic which was supposed to cause its defeat, they admitted (was it a concession to the PCF?) that the advent of communists to power was among the reasonable probabilities in "many capitalist countries."

Was France among them? That is not certain, but it is possible. Whatever the case may be, this statement was eliminated from the 1985 declaration, and this elimination has a great deal of significance. It means that profound political changes (to be understood in the sense used above: the advent of communists to power) are no longer on the agenda in many capitalist countries; in any case, they no longer are in France.

In other words, during the "current period," the prospect for the PCF is no longer a return to power.

The Right Was Better

Not only did the joint statement of 1985 eliminate the prospect of a return of the PCF to the ministerial palaces, but, for those who know how to read communist documents, it also expressed nearly openly the wish for a return to power of the French right.

As Branko Lazitch also stressed, the emphasis is placed on international policy. It is in that area that, for the moment, the French Communist Party can play its role most effectively in the overall action of the world communist movement, that is to say in that of the USSR. Thus, the PCF has committed itself to lead the struggle against "the militarization of space," but Mr Marchais placed his signature at the bottom of a surprising declaration, which must be quoted again after Branko Lazitch:

"Cooperation between the Soviet Union and France constitutes an important element of peace and security in Europe and in the world... It started developing in the sixties (let us say, as of 1962, when General de Gaulle evoked a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals -- Claude Harmel) when it was possible to speak of good relations between the Soviet Union and France. It experienced a remarkable development in the seventies. Enterprises and workers of both countries have long ago learned to cooperate with one another. These considerable gains have not been used at the greatest level of possibility during the last period and it is urgent to make them bear fruit."

If what matters primarily is international policy, and in this international policy the quality of relations between France and the USSR; if, on the other hand, it has been proven that it is when the national right or the liberal right is in power in France that relations are best with regard to the Soviet Union; that, on the contrary, they have deteriorated since the left came to power, the following conclusion must be drawn: the best way for the PCF to make its contribution to today's most urgent action, the defense of peace in the world, is to contribute to the victory of the right in the upcoming legislative elections.

Finding Its Voters Again

Let us try to place the tactics the PCF has just defined for the upcoming elections within this framework.

Its declared concern is to gain votes. As a matter of fact, its ambition in that area is relatively modest (even if it appears to be too ambitious yet to the observer). As Andre Lajoinie said in his report to the National Conference (L'HUMANITE, October 14, 1985), what is involved is:

- 1 - to "mobilize all the political voters who, each time, have made the right choice," that is to say to prevent new defections;
- 2 - to bring "communist voters who have abstained in order to express their disappointment" back to the ballot boxes;
- 3 - to return to the party those voters who have abandoned the communist candidates "to vote socialist and who regret it."

The modesty is obvious: the PCF is trying to keep or find back its voters. It does not intend to leave what was its field. Specifically, it does not even talk about the possibility of drawing "those who are disappointed with socialism," the traditional or occasional PS [Socialist Party] voters, other than those voters who left the PCF for the Socialist Party in 1981.

Truly, the communists could not lower the bar any further without appearing to abdicate.

Effective Vote

In order to keep or bring back those voters whom, in spite of the desertion of a large number of them, the Communist Party stubbornly persists in considering its voters, Mr Marchais and his comrades chose to take one of the mottos of the

socialists in 1981 as their own. To vote socialist was to vote effectively. Messrs Lajoinie and Marchais have done their utmost to show that, this time, to vote effectively is to vote communist.

The statement is easy to make. The proof is less so.

"To vote communist," said Mr Lajoinie, "is to unite in favor of a new perspective for the country." But what is this new perspective?

A return to power of the right would not constitute this new perspective; and Mr Marchais, like Mr Lajoinie, stated, without warmth and without insisting on it as if it were a matter of course, that one should not cast a vote for the right which would confirm his eviction from power.

But the maintenance of a socialist majority would be just as serious as the return of a majority of the right. One must absolutely not vote for that party which, "holding all powers, broke its promises to conduct the policy practiced by the right before 1981, leading in the same manner to a worsening of the crisis, playing the game of the right with which it considers cohabiting and cooperating after 1986."

But then, if there should be neither a majority of the right nor a socialist majority, and as the communists really do not go so far as to mention the possibility of a communist majority, in what way can voting communist open up a new perspective which would be neither a victory of the right nor of the socialists?

The average communist voter must have a hard time making sense out of it.

Government Party

To get out of this logical deadend, the communist leaders have no other recourse than to state:

- that the PCF remains "a government party" and that it aspires "to leading the affairs of the country";
- that it is ready to participate in power with other political forces, particularly with the Socialist Party.

If that is, to use Mr Marchais' expression, to emerge onto something new, then the average communist must wonder.

How can you make him accept, on the one hand, that the PS is not any better than the right with which it aspires to cooperate and, on the other hand, that the PCF is ready to return to power with that same PS?

Then they help you understand this. The great tragedy was that the PS had the majority all on its own, hence that it had "all power" and that consequently it has been impossible for the communists to prevent the socialists "from re-turning to an austerity policy."

If there were once again a majority of the left, but a "balanced" majority of the left in which the socialists would have communist votes to hold the majority in the National Assembly, then it would be possible to pick up the experiment of 1981 again under better conditions, this time forcing the socialists to keep the promises made to the voters in 1981.

This subtle (!) policy has what it takes to disconcert the voters.

It will be hard for them to understand that the PCF is considering government participation with the socialists after having conducted one of the most violent campaigns against them to cause them to lose the maximum number of votes -- votes which will not for all that be won by the PCF.

Hence, goodbye to a new majority of the left!

They will have an equally hard time understanding that one might want to implement the measures announced by the PS during its 1981 campaign, all of which were taken from the joint program of the leftist government: they note that if the situation has gotten worse, it is not because the government has been unfaithful to the program on which the current majority was elected, but, on the contrary, /because it wanted to keep the promises made during the electoral campaign/ [printed in italics].

The only logical attitude for the PCF would be to adopt a frankly revolutionary policy. Then effective voting would be to vote in such a manner as to strengthen the party of the revolution, the party of opposition to the end. At least it would be able to hope gathering around itself all the remaining revolutionaries in the country, which is probably not many, but which could return to the PCF an interest it no longer has.

However, among the orders it has received there is certainly also one to prepare itself to be only "Her Majesty's opposition" in case the right, if returned to power, were to show itself more accommodating with regard to the USSR than Mr Mitterrand.

8463

CSO: 3519/52

POLITICAL

FRANCE

RECENT, PREVIOUS SOVIET LEADERS' VISITS COMPARED

Paris EST & OUEST in French Nov 85 pp 8-11

[Article by Pierre Rigoulot: "From Khrushchev to Gorbachev — When the Secretaries General of the Soviet Communist Party Come to France"]

[Text] Mr Gorbachev's visit to Paris in October was not a first: in 25 years, 6 visits have been made by 3 secretaries general of the Soviet Union's Communist Party.

Khrushchev was received in Paris on 22 March 1960. Brezhnev alone made four visits — a record hard to beat! On 25 October 1971 and on 25 June 1973, he was received by Georges Pompidou; on 4 December 1974 and on 20 June 1977, Giscard d'Estaing received him. The latest one, Mr Gorbachev's visit of 2 to 5 October 1985 has traits in common with the preceding ones, but it also has specific aspects.

The common traits concern primarily the issues touched on during the talks: Europe and its security, disarmament, commercial, economic, scientific and technical agreements. The visits themselves even have common traits: to admire the works of Picasso is a virtually unchanging ritual, which Soviet retinues escape only for reasons of the leader's health, like a visit to the Renault factory, a meditation at the Lenin Museum on Marie-Rose Street, and a meeting with the leaders of France-USSR.

On the other hand, from 1960 to 1985, a comparison of the six meetings makes it possible to detect a clear evolution in terms of the people's welcome, the welcome by the intellectuals, the reports of the journalists and the welcome by the "political class."

People's Welcome

First of all, it was excellent for Khrushchev. The latter even registered clear popular success: a "large" crowd for the arrival on the 23rd, an "enormous" crowd at the Champs Elysees on the 24th, where "Long Live Khrushchev!" was constantly heard. Sellers of flags and periscopes raked in the money.

On the 26th there were still 8,000 at Marie-Rose Street and 15,000 at city hall... On the 28th, the welcome was cordial and at several points enthusiastic, to the extent that the French authorities worried about that success and

were grateful to the secretary general for not taking advantage of these demonstrations to turn them into political demonstrations.

True, the police took their precautions and 200 people were asked to go take a rest in Corsica. But demonstrations of hostility were minimal: here, a few dozen young people quickly dispersed; there, a minute of silence for the Hungarians. A hostile banner was unfurled in Lille... The church also demonstrated its reservations by considering that Canon Kir, mayor of Dijon, could not welcome Khrushchev "without deeply shocking the victims of religious persecution" (which brought down the wrath of the PC and... of the Human Rights League upon the church!).

Eleven years later, in October 1971, when Georges Pompidou received for the first time a secretary general of the PC [Communist Party], Leonid Brezhnev, in an official capacity the people's reactions were more reserved. The warmth of the welcome was interpreted in varied ways by the press organs, whereas Khrushchev's success was unanimously recognized.

PRAVDA was pleased about "the warm embrace of Paris," but on the 28th only 2,000 people were assembled at the Paris city hall. There were numerous cheers at the Renault factory, but an irreverent reporter indicated that the same militants were going from one workshop to another with the same banner at the same time as the official procession... At Marie-Rose Street there was no longer any enthusiasm on the part of the Parisians. LE MONDE noticed less mingling with the crowd there: a "quick dip" by Leonid Brezhnev.

In Marseilles, the same subdued impression: 2,000 people were gathered together, but along the long route the crowd was sparse. In LE MONDE, B. Feron wondered "how one could not remember the crowds which hurried to Marseilles and in that region?".

About 50 people were still removed.

Which did not prevent sporadic demonstrations of hostility. The biggest one, on the 25th, brought 500 people together...

The Brezhnev visits of 1973 and 1974 had more the character of working meetings. Hence it is difficult to take them into consideration. On 21 June 1977 it was a question that time of a "major visit," comparable to that of 1971. Demonstrations of hostility clearly outmatched the signs of sympathy. In fact, there was no favorable demonstration and the absence of talks planned between Marchais and Brezhnev may not have been foreign to that.

Not only did hostile demonstrations bring together more people, but they were diverse. The extreme right began demonstrating on the 18th. The extreme left was also one of the party: the Maoists demonstrated in Paris, Grenoble and Lyon. On the 19th, the Committee for Coordination and Support of the struggles of the countries of the East and of the USSR denounced Brezhnev's visit, and then it was the Front of Jewish Students.

In October 1985, Gorbachev's visit brought out yet more numerous crowds against him. He certainly did not see them because the itineraries he followed had been totally cleared beforehand. The communists did not show up at all either, except during the visit to Marie-Rose Street.

On the other hand, demonstrations, rallies and meetings followed one another. And if the results did not match the hopes of the organizers, the latter would find consolation in the thought that over a period of 8 years the number of demonstrations increased tenfold: 3,000 with "S.O.S. Human Rights" on 1 October; 2,000 with "International Resistance"; on the 2nd, at the Palace of Congresses, there were 15,000 to 20,000 with CRIF [expansion unknown] and "S.O.S. Racism" in favor of the Jews in the USSR. Numerous other demonstrations, smaller ones, brought together from a few dozen to a few hundred people. On 19 September, in a unique and significant event, the Political Bureau of the PCF [French Communist Party] denounced the "conditioning of public opinion" prior to Gorbachev's visit.

Intellectuals' Welcome

The manner in which the non-communist intellectuals welcomed the secretaries general of the Soviet Union's PC reflects the same evolution. With Khrushchev's visit there was hope and satisfaction in their ranks. Thus, under the aegis of France-USSR, Jean Cocteau and Andre Maurois made a record with Ilya Ehrenbourg to the glory of the rapprochement that was taking place! On 1 April 1960, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were at the reception given at the embassy of the USSR, along with Edgar Faure, Mendes-France, Daladier, Couve de Murville, Sudreau and Thorez.

But when Brezhnev was received the first time in 1971, the tone changed. The same Sartre, together with Lwof, Cassin, and Kastler made an appeal to public opinion in favor of "all those who are imprisoned for crimes they have not committed." And as the "third basket" of Helsinki was already being mentioned, the signatories asked that "every citizen be free to leave his country or return to it, in accordance with the Human Rights declaration." On 3 October, among the signatories of a document protesting the measures of repression in the Soviet Union were the names of Michel Leiris, Marguerite Dumas, Laurent Schwartz and Michel Rocard.

Charles Denner and Vladimir Jankelevich demonstrated in favor of the Jews of the USSR in 1973. And while no notable protest was registered at the time of the 1974 working meeting, the intellectuals kept away en masse and conspicuously from the official receptions in 1977: on 22 June, a counter-reception was organized at the Recamier Theater: Sartre, Beauvoir, Foucault and Ionesco welcomed the big names of the dissident movement: Pliuch, Bukovski, Maximov, etcetera.

As for Andre Glucksmann, he opened his opinion forum on French Radio Channel 3 to dissidents. Next this broadcast was prohibited and the author of "La cuisiniere et le mangeur d'hommes" [The Cook and the Man-eater] denounced a government convinced that "if a little truth were told about Brezhnev, the latter would pack his bags."

In 1985, the intellectuals participated in the various demonstrations and meetings. No separate appeals on their part, and some of them put their signature at the bottom of the S.O.S. Human Rights document (Besancon, Chaunu); others, such as B.-H. Levy, F. Sagan, and M. Halter, participated in the meeting of S.O.S. Racism and of LICRA [expansion unknown] (with as motto: "Hey, Gorbachev, the Soviet Jews are also our pals!"). Others, finally, supported a document issued by the Workers Force (this union intervention was a new event). Those who signed together with Andre Bergeron were, for example, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Philippe Robrieux.

Press Reports

It is amusing to note that as a whole the press was easily reassured: the visitors did not carry knives between their teeth? Phew! "The time when the spouses of Russian leaders did not dare show themselves in public is far gone. Many among them sported long dresses, some very elegant ones" (LE MONDE, 25 March 1960). They are elegant, those Soviets, hence sensitive to the charm of our world. Another effort, it was felt, and they would be assimilated! In its editorial of the 27th, LE MONDE stated that "that regime is evolving toward less rigidity," it spotted a loss of "revolutionary tone." Henceforth, concern for everyday matters came before proselytism. In short, "Khrushchev Rediscovered Tolerance!".

Let us go directly to 1977: LA VIE sang the praises of Brezhnev, "more popular in the USSR than Khrushchev." In LE MONDE, Francois Schlosser contrasted Carter, pacifist in appearance and warmonger in reality, with Brezhnev, pacifist in appearance and... probably also in reality! (21 June)

A totally different picture would be drawn of Gorbachev on 3 October 1985. The apparatchik no longer covers up his smile. On the contrary, it is stated now that "the smiles and the overall more modern appearance of the Number 1 should not cause one to forget that he began his career thanks to the protection of the great ideologue of the regime, Suslov." Alain Jacob noted that Gorbachev's hands, "held out to the audience," can also "pound the table with the edge of the palm with vigor and harshness... This Southerner with jovial appearance can be very harsh when it suits him" (LE MONDE, 6 October).

Welcome of the Political Class

It was first enthusiastic with Khrushchev's visit. The promises of a future heavenly society, published by L'HUMANITE, announcing on 1 April that "20 years from now the USSR will produce twice as much as the United States," found politicians very willing if not to believe them, at least to be troubled by them. Canon Kir, CNI [National Center of Independents] mayor of Dijon, stated that "the Russian revolution did not put an end to its journey" and that it will include "without any doubt, the recognition of freedom and of religion."

Leon Harmon, leftist gaullist, stated: "It is because we believe that Mr Khrushchev's policy is oriented toward peace that he is welcome."

Khrushchev could announce that "the sphere of cooperation between our two countries has no limits," and his political interlocutors did not contradict him. Sycophancy triumphed: several members of parliament, among whom a member of the UNR [Union for the New Republic], addressed Khrushchev in Russian!

On the left, Guy Mollet stated on 28 March that "Khrushchev is a man who needs to be loved... And when a head of state wants to be loved, the surest way for him to achieve this is to guarantee a long period of peace for his country."

When Brezhnev came for the first time, they were willing to consider the London spy affair an accident, not to mention Czechoslovakia (the events of 1969 were still present in people's memories) or the absence of freedom in the USSR. Presenting himself as a successor to General de Gaulle, Pompidou signed a joint statement, as in 1960, plus a statement of the principles of Franco-Soviet cooperation. True, there would not be a friendship treaty, as Brezhnev wanted (Gaston Defferre, on the 29th, also called it one of his wishes), but the Soviet initiative of setting up a new European security conference in Helsinki was warmly supported by the government. Overall, the politicians of the majority considered the possibility of putting an end to the politics of blocs. France provided the example by withdrawing from the integrated NATO organization and the USSR asserted its own hostility to this politics of blocs. Thus LA NATION, the gaullist organ, did not hesitate to announce that "the USSR accepts the basic orientations of gaullist policy."

The final communique of 1960 stated the desire to develop Franco-Soviet relations in the future "in a spirit of friendship and cooperation." In 1973, the same "cordial" atmosphere. And if both the French and the Soviets were "pessimistic" about the Near East, according to LE MONDE both were "optimistic" about Vietnam.

The 1974 visit resembled a round of observation: what did Giscard, who had been recently elected, want? The anti-communist comments just heard from the mouth of Pomiatowski worried the Soviet leaders. Never mind! Pomiatowski was asked not to attend the dinners in order not to embarrass the Soviet hosts. Giscard d'Estaing multiplied the "vibrant proclamations of friendship" and supported the increased preparations for the "conference on security and cooperation in Europe." There were still problems surrounding what was called the "third basket," but they should not be insolvable: as LE MONDE wrote on 6 December 1974, Giscard was not inclined to fight about the principle of exchanges of information and newspapers. Did he not want -- he stated on the 7th -- to go from detente to understanding"?

A new final communique was signed, which congratulated itself on the friendly climate which presided over the talks.

In June 1977, Brezhnev was received with exceptional consideration. The conditions of detente were stated jointly and Giscard stated that detente "is the only way open in the direction of peace and of a rapprochement between peoples." Brezhnev departed on the 22nd with a joint statement in which both parties "confirmed that the respect for human rights and for basic freedoms by all countries constitutes one of the bases for a profound improvement of their

mutual relations." In addition, there was a statement on the "non-proliferation of nuclear arms and of scientific, technical, and commercial agreements."

One can measure the distance traveled in 1985. The Soviet press was not wrong in October, when it stressed the blessed times of Soviet relations under de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard. At the time of Gorbachev's visit, the disagreements showed through from the first talks: the spokesman for the Elysee Palace spoke in measured terms of "a desire to better understand the other, to explain ourself and to do so with frankness..." And while there was no real surprise in hearing the leaders of the opposition, such as Francois Leotard, denounce "the development of state anti-semitism in the countries of the East, specifically in the Soviet Union," or such as Jacques Chirac, the lack of human rights in the USSR, Fabius' statement, "understanding" his children if they wanted to demonstrate against Gorbachev, was more surprising. In any case, it provoked the fury of L'HUMANITE.

There is no surprise either about the fact that Paris indicated a clear refusal to negotiate about the deterrent, or that the latest secretary general of the Soviet PC to go to Paris was the first to leave again without a joint communique.

Sign of the times: it is the French who rejected it.

8463

CSO: 3519/52

POLITICAL

FRANCE

FORMER DST DIRECTOR ROCHET ON SECRECY, CONTROLS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 21 Nov 85 p 1

[Interview with Jean Rochet, former director of France's Directorate of Territorial Security (DST), by Rene Haquin; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The hard and fast rule in Belgium is that the secret services remain secret and always keep silent. Is this a good rule?

[Answer] No. We must be able to speak out. Today's intelligence operations are the modern form of warfare under the balance of terror. Penetration of governmental offices and agencies has assumed major dimensions. Intelligence agencies have expanded their sphere of activity to include economic and technological matters. The press has been penetrated. Public opinion is the target of disinformation and insidious propaganda. Forged documents are being foisted on the public. We must be able to speak out on this.

Each time a serious espionage case breaks, the intelligence services become the butt of vicious mudslinging. If the press fails to receive an authoritative explanation, it will inquire elsewhere. It will question the victims, colleagues, and families. This approach is liable to give a false picture of what actually happened. The public must have confidence in its intelligence agencies. All Western governments consider that their secret services are meant to take it on the chin. Such an attitude is prejudicial to the country's security. Intelligence agencies must, of course, keep their organization, missions, and the number and identity of their agents secret. But they must also caution and alert public opinion to potential targets of enemy agencies.

[Question] As head of the DST in France, did you feel you were closely supervised? And if so, by whom?

[Answer] For intelligence missions, we are under tight governmental control exercised by the minister of interior. This is more practical than being under the minister of justice, because the interior minister can close his eyes to certain methods employed. Obviously, the DST, through the interior minister, is also under the control of the President of the Republic. For all matters pertaining to the DST's criminal investigation function--Belgium's State Security Agency has no such function--we are under the supervision of the judicial authority.

[Question] In certain special infiltration missions, do you consider it acceptable that no internal written report be submitted on the secret activities of some agents lasting for months indeed even for years? This is what happened in Belgium recently in a situation where State Security agents infiltrated a neo-Nazi group for more than 2 years, even conducting courses and organizing training exercises for the group.

[Answer] I am not familiar with that case. In principle, however, my answer is that such a procedure is unacceptable. In practice, some one-time missions or assignments can be accomplished without thereafter making any internal reports on them. But when the mission goes on for months, this practice is, in my opinion, very dangerous.

[Question] What do you think of the Belgian intelligence services?

[Answer] We have had the opportunity to appreciate the work of Belgian intelligence and counterintelligence agents. The collaboration and effectiveness of the Belgian secret services contributed to the success achieved in Europe in such cases as that of the spy of the century, Harold Philby, a Briton who was a Soviet agent for 30 years in London, or that of Georges Pacques, the French agent who spied in NATO for the Soviets.

8041

CSO: 3519/46

POLITICAL

FRANCE

CITIZEN VIEWS ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS POLLED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Charles Rebois: "Immigration: A Key Problem"]

[Text] The immigration issue is one of the most exasperating facing France and this is probably a result of the economic crisis. However, the latter has been a factor for 12 years whereas the presence of foreigners in our country became a political issue only in 1981. The Socialists have made it an ideological issue, thereby sometimes causing extreme reactions, even to the extent that now, 3 months before the parliamentary elections, it is a subject of the election campaign.

The FIGARO/Sofres poll that we are publishing shows that the French view this issue unenthusiastically. They seem to say that they are unfamiliar with racism. The solutions they favor are commonsensical and comparisons with previous polls even show a greater tolerance. Between the lax measures taken by the government since 1981 and some Socialist plans on the one hand and the program of the National Front, on the other, the French favor a firm but humane policy.

But the French have not made their decisions solely on the basis of political criteria; sociocultural factors also influence them. Professionals, for example, are more sensitive to the issue than other social categories and they are more willing to accept assimilation. On the other hand older people, more concerned about safety, are more reserved.

We would say that firmness is the attitude toward illegal immigrants. Seventy-one percent of the French (in all age groups and occupations) say illegal immigrants should be sent back to their countries, compared to 22 percent who believe that the status of those who have been in France a long time should be legalized. This is a condemnation by default of the widespread legalizations which the Left began to implement after it came to power. Even today those Socialists polled agreed with the majority in the poll but 45 percent of the Communists questioned did not agree. The PCF, along with the illegal immigrants, could constitute a reserve that would be easy to mobilize, but its attitude is different from that of the workers' world which it claims to represent. It does, however, approach the attitude of the better educated Frenchman.

Unemployed Immigrants

The public's interest in seeing humane solutions adopted is verified by responses to the question: "Should a large number of immigrant workers be returned to their countries?" Only 25 percent agree while 67 percent think that new immigrants should be prevented from entering the country. On this point public opinion has not changed for 1 year. Workers who were encouraged to come during a time of economic expansion have the right to stay but the tolerance level has been reached and from now on the borders should be closed.

The case of immigrants who do not work is more controversial, although the French attitude toward them has changed. One year ago, 46 percent wanted to send them back to their countries. Now only 43 percent feel this way. A majority believe that those among these unemployed who are here legally have the right to stay. This right is based on the fact that they have contributed to ASSEDIC [Association for Promotion of Employment in Industry and Business] before being unemployed.

But this brings up a very controversial question: Can these immigrants who are going to continue to live in France be integrated into French society? Fifty percent believe this is true compared to 42 percent who object that the differences are an insurmountable obstacle. And those involved must want to be integrated; many examples show that this is often not the case.

Customs are the primary obstacle to integration for 49 percent of those questioned. Religion is cited next by 23 percent and language by 20 percent, although these three differences are interdependent. A positive point is that skin color is not considered an obstacle to integration.

Despite these items favoring immigrants, there are nevertheless some reservations when a certain sometimes aggressive intelligentsia claims Socialist ideas as its own and tries to go beyond the acceptable. For example, the French would not want as prime minister a Frenchman of North African origin, although one's level of education is also a factor here. Fifty-three percent of those polled cannot foresee such a possibility, but 63 percent of those with some university education agree that it is possible compared to 25 percent who have only a primary education.

This same attitude of rejection is shown toward Francois Mitterrand's plan to grant immigrants who have lived in France a certain amount of time the right to vote in local elections. This right should remain the privilege of the French citizen.

That said, the problem of integrating almost 5 million individuals with different customs, religions and languages remains.

Are they well treated? They are treated normally according to 43 percent of those questioned. This is perhaps less true as regards Algerians; the Algerian war has left traces which religious ideology and day-to-day events have not helped to eliminate.

Political Solutions

No one denies immigrants who contribute the right to unemployment and family compensation. This is a moral obligation. Free access to the public schools for immigrants' children is also understood even if it creates real problems in some cities with a sizable foreign population. This is the price of integration. A less definite majority also agrees that children of immigrants who are born in France and stay here should automatically become French citizens when they turn 18. But do they want this? The French who are secularly oriented even agree to the building of mosques.

Since the French public is not racist, as this poll shows, it is logical that the poll showed an attitude of indifference toward movements such as "SOS Racism," while showing sympathy, rather than hostility, toward the slogan "Don't touch my friend."

In the light of what has preceded it is not surprising that none of the solutions put forth by politicians is widely accepted. Forty-one percent of the French have no opinion about these solutions or see no solution. Those who favor one solution or another are unenthusiastic. Twenty percent say that Mitterrand's solutions are satisfactory, but 15 percent are behind Jean-Marie Le Pen and 14 percent behind Jacques Chirac.

The public is either not well acquainted with the proposals contained in the election campaigns (which seems likely) or the public believes that none of them is the miracle cure. The candidates who counted on using the immigration issue in their election campaign are disappointed, except perhaps Le Pen, who, according to 46 percent of those polled, says out loud what many Frenchmen think. But is this enough to convince voters who refuse overly radical solutions?

This survey helps to see the immigration issue rationally. Emotions have been excluded. Reactions would probably have been different if we had questioned the French about their feelings toward North Africans! At the same time, no questions were asked about the issue of safety and immigration. It would not be a good idea to make this a major issue in the election campaign even if the immigrant's fate cannot be totally absent from the discussion.

The Sofres Survey

- Survey done for LE FIGARO between 22 and 28 November 1985
- National sample of 1,000 individuals representing the entire population over 18 years of age
- Quota sampling (sex, age, occupation of head of household) and categorization by region and city size

I. Send Back Illegal Immigrants

QUESTION: Which of these two opinions do you agree with most?

		<u>All illegal immigrants in France should be returned to their countries</u>	<u>Illegal immigrants in France for a long time should be able to have their status legalized</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
	TOTAL: 100%	71	22	7
SEX				
- Male	100%	74	20	6
- Female	100%	68	25	7
AGE				
- 18 to 24	100%	66	26	8
- 25 to 34	100%	68	26	6
- 35 to 49	100%	67	27	6
- 50 to 64	100%	77	17	6
- 65 and over	100%	76	17	7
OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (new PCS categories)				
- Farmer	100%	81	12	7
- Craftsman, merchant, business owner	100%	80	13	7
- Upper level professional	100%	57	34	9
- Mid level professional and employees	100%	65	29	6
-Mid level professional	100%	62	32	6
-Employee	100%	70	26	4
- Laborer	100%	73	21	6
- Not working, retired	100%	74	19	7
PARTY PREFERENCE				
- Communist	100%	50	45	5
- Socialist	100%	67	28	5
- UDF	100%	76	19	5
- RPR	100%	81	11	8
- National Front*	100%	93	7	-
EDUCATION				
- Primary school	100%	76	16	8
- Secondary school	100%	73	22	5
- Technical or business school	100%	74	20	6
- University	100%	54	39	7

*Because of the small number responding, results should be interpreted cautiously

QUESTION: Among the opinions given below regarding immigrant workers, which corresponds most to the situation you would like to see?

	<u>Nov 84</u> <u>Nouvel Obs/</u> <u>Sofres Poll</u>	<u>Nov 85</u>
- A large number of immigrant workers should be returned to their countries	25	25
-New immigrant workers should be prevented from entering France	68	67
-French borders should be opened	5	6
--No opinion	2	2
TOTAL	100	100

QUESTION: Which of these opinions do you agree with most?

	<u>Nov 84</u> <u>LICRA/SOFRES</u> <u>Poll</u>	<u>Nov 85</u>
-All immigrants who are not working should be returned to their countries	46	43
-Those who are legally in France have acquired the right to stay.	49	53
--No opinion	5	4
TOTAL	100	100

II. Integration

QUESTION: Which of these two opinions do you agree with most?

--Most of the immigrants living in France could be integrated into French society. It is a question of time.	50
--Most of the immigrants could not be integrated into French society because they are too different	42
--No opinion	8
TOTAL	100

QUESTION: From among these possible differences between Frenchmen and immigrants, which, in your opinion, would make co-existence difficult?

- Language	20
- Religion	23
- Skin color	8
- Customs	49
- No difference	27
- No opinion	6

(Total is greater than 100 because those polled could give more than one response)

III. Not a North African Prime Minister

QUESTION: Would you mind having a prime minister of North African origin in France one day?

		<u>Would not</u> <u>mind</u>	<u>Would</u> <u>mind</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Opinion</u>
TOTAL:	100%	37	53	10
SEX				
- Male	100%	41	50	9
- Female	100%	34	56	10
AGE				
- 18 to 24	100%	40	46	14
- 25 to 34	100%	42	49	9
- 35 to 49	100%	38	51	11
- 50 to 64	100%	36	57	7
- 65 and over	100%	28	62	10
OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (new PCS categories)				
- Farmer	100%	24	66	10
- Craftsman, merchant, business owner	100%	28	57	15
- Upper level professional	100%	58	35	7
- Mid level professional and employee	100%	41	47	12
--Mid level professional	100%	47	42	11
--Employee	100%	34	52	14
- Laborer	100%	33	58	9
- Not working, retired	100%	34	58	8
PARTY PREFERENCE				
- Communist	100%	50	41	9
- Socialist	100%	50	42	8
- UDF	100%	33	62	5
- RPR	100%	26	65	9
- National Front*	100%	14	83	3
EDUCATION				
- Primary school	100%	25	65	10
- Secondary school	100%	40	52	8
- Technical or business school	100%	37	54	9
- University	100%	63	26	11

*Because of the small number responding, results should be interpreted cautiously

QUESTION: Francois Mitterrand wants to allow immigrants who have lived in France a certain amount of time to vote in local elections. Do you or do you not favor such a measure?

--Favor	35
--Do not favor	55
--No opinion	10

TOTAL	100
-------	-----

IV. How Are They Treated?

QUESTION: On the whole, do you think that immigrant workers in France are treated well, treated normally or treated poorly?

	<u>April 75</u> <u>Provincial Press/</u> <u>Sofres Poll *</u>	<u>Nov 85</u>
--Treated well	13	31
--Treated normally	44	43
--Treated poorly	35	21
--No opinion	8	5
TOTAL	100	100

* In April 1975, the exact wording of the question was: "On the whole, do you think that Algerian workers in France are treated well, treated normally or treated poorly?"

QUESTION: Do you think it is normal or abnormal that...

	<u>Normal</u>	<u>Abnormal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
--immigrants who contribute receive unemployment payments when they lose their jobs?	90	7	3
--children of immigrants have free access to the public schools?	89	7	4
--immigrants who contribute to Social Security receive family payments?	90	7	3
--immigrant children born in France and staying here automatically become French citizens when they turn 18?	62	27	11
--immigrants have mosques to practice their religion if they want?	65	23	12

V. "SOS Racism"

QUESTION: How do you feel about the SOS Racism movement ("Don't touch my friend")?

--Sympathetic	35
--Hostile	11
--Indifferent	44
--No opinion	10
TOTAL	100

VI. Who Suggests Solutions?

QUESTION: According to you, which of the following politicians have proposed satisfactory solutions to the immigration issue?

--Laurent Fabius	13
--Jacques Chirac	14
--Francois Mitterrand	20
--Jean-Marie Le Pen	15
--Michel Rocard	12
--Simone Veil	9
--Georges Marchais	4
--Valery Giscard d'Estaing	6
--Lionel Jospin	7
--Raymond Barre	11
--None of them	10
--No opinion	31

(Total is greater than 100 because those polled could give more than one response)

VI. Le Pen

QUESTION: As for Jean-Marie Le Pen and immigration, do you think

--that he says out loud what many Frenchman only think?	46
--that he has unacceptable proposals and purposely caricatures reality?	42
--no opinion	12
TOTAL	100

9720
CSO:3519/69

POLITICAL

FRANCE

COMMENTARY ON JOXE DENIAL OF CLANDESTINE IMMIGRATION TALLY

Paris LIBERATION in French 13 Nov 85 p 22

[Article by R.P.B.: "Number of Illegal Immigrants Unfathomable"]

[Text] The controversy over the actual number of illegal immigrants living in France is a continually recurrent phenomenon. [Interior Minister] Pierre Joxe, who this afternoon in the National Assembly is scheduled to answer questions of current interest, is expected to repudiate the figure of 300,000 officially reported by the AFP [FRENCH NEWS AGENCY], a figure his ministry has never released.

The Interior Ministry has gone beserk. Pierre Joxe's staff has not ceased its fulminations ever since an AFP dispatch dated Monday evening reported--in what it claimed to be an exclusive--that the estimated number of illegal immigrants in France as of end-1983 was 300,000. The interior minister's staff spent the entire day yesterday trying to determine whether to publish a denial statement or leave it up to Joxe himself to reply during this Wednesday's oral question period in the National Assembly. Apparently it was decided to take the latter approach.

The most curious aspect of this issue is that the minister is going to have to repudiate a figure his department has never released. As one ministerial adviser confided to us, apart from the fact that "it would be a political boner to say there are 300,000 illegal aliens in France", this fringe segment of the foreign population cannot, by its very nature, be accurately counted. Yet this fact did not deter Didier Bariani of the UDF [Union for French Democracy] from claiming that the 300,000 figure is "an underestimate" and that "an order of magnitude figure of 500,000" is more realistic. He explained that his estimate obtained by "cross-checks"--of public assistance, housing and school attendance data--is closer to reality than the strange figure of 300,000 for which the Interior Ministry assumes no responsibility.

Wrong, retorted Gerard Fuchs, chairman of the ONI (National Immigration Office). In his view, 300,000 "is a maximum figure" which he personally does not believe. According to Fuchs, the number of illegal immigrants is "approximately 100,000." In support of his figure, he pointed out that in 1981-1982 some 130,000 illegal aliens registered and were granted legal status, and in a forced, artificial manner he argued "that another number of the same order of magnitude failed

to register." In the ONI chairman's opinion, "some employers probably preferred to have these immigrants retain their illegal status and thus avoid having to pay social security contributions".

It should be noted that between August 1981 and June 1982, exactly 119,342 permanently employed illegal immigrants--127,123 when including merchants and seasonal workers--registered, obtained legal status, and were granted residence permits. Some 12.4 percent of this number declared they had arrived in France before 1975, 47.6 percent had arrived between 1975 and 1979, and 40 percent in 1980. The overwhelming majority of these wage earners were employed in construction, service, clothes manufacture, and agricultural work. Some 80 percent were under 32 years of age in 1981, and 17 percent were under 22.

In another connection, the Interior Ministry has indicated that the figure of 4,485,715 persons constituting, according to the AFP, France's foreign population as of 31 December 1984, is really, the number of residence permits issued to adults authorized to live in France and to their children under age 16. Because this figure does not take account of deaths, departures or returns to country of origin, it is higher than the number of foreigners actually residing in France. Hence the true figure probably lies between the residence permit count of 4,485,715--a 0.38 percent increase from 31 December 1983--and the 1982 census count of 3,600,100 foreigners.

Of France's five largest foreign population groups, only the Moroccans showed any increase--a slight one--in 1983. The number of residence permits granted to Moroccans rose from 492,669 as of 31 December 1982 to 519,871 a year later. Comparative figures for the Portuguese are 866,595 and 859,554 respectively; for the Algerians, 805,355 and 777,037; for the Italians, 441,042 and 426,325; and for the Spaniards, 395,364 and 380,282.

Thus the total number of residence permits issued to these five major groups of foreigners declined 1.26 percent, in other words fell from 3,001,025 at end-1982 to 2,963,063 by end-1983. Detailed figures for 1984 have not yet been released.

8041

CSO: 3519/46

POLITICAL

GREECE

PAPANDREOU SEEKS PASOK UNITY AFTER LALLOTIS RESIGNATION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Nov 85 p 1

[Excerpt] Through two personal interventions and discussions, today at the ministerial council and tomorrow at PASOK's Central Committee, the prime minister will be making an effort to avert an open split brought about in the government party by Mr Laliotis's resignation. Since yesterday, the latter has abstained from "active political and party activity." As revealed in Mr Laliotis' long statement, the reason for his resignation and abstention is exactly what I KATHIMERINI had reported the day before yesterday and yesterday: his opposition to the new policy now being pursued by Mr Papandreou. In disagreeing with the policy now being followed by the government, Mr Laliotis has at the same time continued his steadfast belief in PASOK's constitutional principles. a fact that is being interpreted by political observers as a written political security statement for some other phase in PASOK's existence.

As for Mr Papandreou, he is not worried over this document. To the contrary, he is casting his weight for two things: (1) to blunt the shocking sensation that this incident caused in the party's left wing grass roots and to preserve the precarious acceptance of the new economic policy on a party-wide level; and (2) to find, in the long run, a replacement for Mr Laliotis in the Deputy Ministry to the Prime Minister.

Only after confronting these two issues as satisfactorily as possible will Mr Papandreou give his attention to the "outward" serious matters of the party and government.

The clearest foretaste of Mr Papandreou's endeavor to make PASOK's unity appear firm and solid is that he hastened to stress in his statement of yesterday that "the problem that has cropped up with the departure of Kostas Laliotis has no connection with either a 'leftist' or 'rightist' deviation." (Mr Laliotis himself says just the opposite). At any rate, the silence maintained by Mr Papandreou's departing associate is helping the prime minister "to interpret authoritatively" the reasons for his resignation and indeed to go so far as calling the cadres of both the government and PASOK for a change in daily policy....

5671

CSO: 3521/47

POLITICAL

GREECE

GOVERNMENT REACTION TO POLYTECHNIC VIOLENCE ASSESSED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by G. Karagiorgas: "Warning"]

[Excerpts] Developments that followed the events at the Polytechnic Institute opened for us a window into PASOK's future that until the other day it had tried to keep shut. At least for many people. But it was also a warning to all that small-time Machiavelians at Kastri dinners had misunderstood the tolerance of their leader to a forced symbiosis with the party's Left.

And in other instances the mobilization of the masses of PASOK's extreme leftist wing has from time to time hidden various failures. The people's attention had then been distracted from problems that were of direct interest to them and was concentrated sometimes on the Chemical Laboratory, sometimes on the pillaging of central shops by "persons protected" by strong police detachments made up of unknown hooded individuals.

This week, following the public outcry throughout the country over the devaluation of the drachma and the aftereffects it had and would have in the future following the first labor strike and in view of a new nationwide strike by the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] on the occasion of the official celebration of 17 November, the occupation of the Chemical Laboratory was undertaken for several days.

For the first time, however, the decision for ending the occupation was carried out lightning fast. And, perhaps, it also struck down its inspirers. Subsequently, another occupation was undertaken, that of the Polytechnic Institute. It was carried out more as a show of strength than as an endeavor to shift public opinion away from burning issues. When the main streets of a capital become devoid of people every night and security forces are on standby day and night, it is almost impossible for any trade union administration to insist on proclaiming a strike.

But this time fate did not favor the planners. This time it cast a dead youngster at their feet. It blocked their way. It ruined their plans. From that very moment the situation changed. Already the government had for some time been obliged to exercise a rightist policy because of the burden of the economic impasse and because of the pressure to ensure aid from the Common Market with whatever tradeoffs. It is a policy that it had never foreseen but it was dragged toward it through the

people's reaction to its failures. The socialist party that governs has also fallen victim to the customary disasters of all dogmatists.

As the French academician Jean Dutourde writes with regard to Mr Mitterrand, when the socialist party and the communist party get along together they are condemned to live the life of couples that have grown old together. They hate each other, they curse each other, they insult each other and each one hopes for the death of the other. No one, however, seeks recourse to divorce because that costs a lot and creates a sensation in family circles. It is exactly this phenomenon that we here have been following for some time now in the love affair-cooperation-tolerance between PASOK and the Left generally-speaking that has been recently suffering.

The Chemical Laboratory, therefore, that was delivered of its occupiers by an instantaneous police raid constituted a painful revelation to its organizers. It proved that they had not occupied it as a diversion that would have helped the government but was a warning for everything that it could expect in case it should deviate by relying on its conservative wing. In answer to the Chemical Laboratory, the Polytechnic Institute was occupied a few hours after the death of the young demonstrator.

The government has found itself in an impasse. The corpse of the youngster was set up as a dissuasive barrier for every new violent effort to put down small uprisings that have put to the torch and have destroyed banks, shops and vehicles, that have paralyzed the center of the capital with adverse repercussions abroad particularly in the EEC countries from whom, by backing down and entreating, we have asked for money for even short-term economic relief.

Suddenly, as in a fairy tale, some invisible wand stopped the symphony of anarchy. Abruptly. Like a knife. Exactly at the moment when the summit became conscious of, indeed in a dramatic fashion, of the warning issued it from a position of revolutionary power. Not from unknown parts but from within its own ranks with multifaceted ideological orientations.

They are now preparing sensational rearrangements of personnel in various important sectors. The "Realpolitik" to which the prime minister was forced to conform directs him to get rid of as soon as possible the dangerous explosive load of associates of his who are impatient and ambitious. And they issue a warning.

5671

CSO: 3521/47

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND, PASOK VIEWS ON PASOK'S 'BREACH' ANALYZED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24-25 Nov 85 pp 1, 7

/Article by Stamos Zoulas/

/Text/ How and how much can the dispute in the government party's leftist wing influence the political reckoning between ND and PASOK? The event seems to be confronted with different criteria by each of the two major parties. ND hastened to describe it as a "breach," meaning a major split, while PASOK appears to believe that the "split" can in the long run be changed into a crack, meaning a dividing line that would prevent the outflow of its cadres and voters to "adversary" political camps. The difference in evaluations and expectations is most clear. It could also be described as most significant since it is with these criteria that both PASOK and ND are tending to shape their policies. Already the major government opposition party appears to be favoring and encouraging the widening of the gap that has been created in PASOK's leftist wing. For his part, Mr A. Papandreou not only does he not denounce the turncoats as disrupters and renegades but even avoids describing them as daydreamers, from the moment when Mr K. Laliotis had taken them under his wing.

Mr Papandreou's stance vis-a-vis the party's "leftist conscience" does not, of course, indicate any preplanned turnabout nor even any controlled political movement. It merely has to do with the implementation of tactics that are dictated by the proverb "one must chose the lesser of two evils." The uprising in the leftist wing is real and painful for him but also dangerous for the future of the party. So, since PASOK's president could not put down the uprising nor avert the outflows to the Left, it is natural that he is now turning his endeavors to the only attainable goal, i.e. the neutralization and --if this is at all possible-- the maintenance of party influence over the "rebels."

At this point mention should be made about another substantial difference in the relative evaluations of the unrising in Kastri and on Regillis Stree. The ND leadership considers it self-evident that the split that has occurred within PASOK has immediate repercussions on its electoral grass roots that now have yet another proof of the failure of "Change" and yet another reason for discouragement so as to abandon Mr Papandreou's party.

Mr Papandreou's Evaluation

On the other hand, Kastro reckons the cost of the "uprising" only at the cadre level and among its youth. Mr Papandreou and the Kastro entourage are certain that the "breach" does not have any direct and basic effects on the electoral grass roots but could bring about indirect and secondary repercussions. This is so because PASOK's party mechanism was based primarily on its leftist cell that is now "withdrawing" to become "the conscience of the movement" or is becoming independent or finally is being neutralized.

The influence of this cell was and still is analogous among PASOK's youth where significant divisive acts are already taking place.

In other words, the uprising is effectively hurting the two hubs to which PASOK primarily owes its organizational structure and its success in electoral battles.

In this light and even if Mr K. Laliotis had not "on his own initiative" approached the "uprising" it is possible that Mr Papandreou himself would have exhorted him to this move because the former deputy minister to the prime minister is the most capable person to lead or to subdue the uprising. Incorruptible and popular, he has the greatest influence over the leftist wing of the movement, a fact that was frankly recognized by the prime minister himself who on Thursday "wished" Mr Laliotis "Godspeed" with so many praises and words of satisfaction that he almost gave the impression that the former government spokesman was departing on some "directed mission."

ND's Contribution

The peculiar thing was that ND too, within the context of tactically encouraging the intra-PASOK differences, hastened to reinforce Mr Laliotis' authority, "contributing" to the impression that the former deputy minister had fallen victim to his endeavor to bring about a more objective and pluralistic form of television.

Evidently ND did not realize or did not think it appropriate to remark that the "positive" change, in recent weeks, in the state television media related primarily to a "more pluralistic" presence of leftist views brought about by opposition over the economic measures and the GSEE /Greek General Confederation of Labor/ events. The major government opposition party benefited from this "opening" to the extent that the promotion of its views was judged advisable by former ERT /Greek Radio and Television/ officials because it decreased the impression of most intense "intra-family fighting" that had broken out within PASOK. And, of course, this "concession" to ND constituted anything but a cause for an intra-governmental clash for the simple reason that the major government opposition party had the slightest of influence and intervention in the antagonisms and trade union fights having as their epicenter the economic measures or the incidents on the occasion of the Polytechnic Institute's anniversary.

These same arguments reinforce the evaluation that the added measures for limiting the informing of the public announced by the prime minister yesterday are primarily aimed at imposing intra-party "censorship" and at blocking --to the extent possible-- every access to the mass media of those disagreeing.

In this way Mr Papandreou hopes simply to restrain and isolate the uprising, avoiding for the time being any aggressive act that could lead those dissenters from going over to the KKE or the KKE (Int.). At the same time, the PASOK president is trying to maintain contact with this group and to limit disagreements to "within the party itself." Besides, this contact, thanks to Mr Laliotis, had not been cut even when the break had reached its most acute point with the clash in the GSEE.

With the hope that the disagreement will remain under control, Kastri, as evidenced by Papandreou's reaction to Laliotis' resignation, is already examining possibilities for exploiting the "uprising" that embraces various scenarios in political developments.

Firstly, the existence of a political pole between PASOK and the KKE not only constitutes a barrier to the outflow of party cadres and followers to Mr Florakis' party but could possibly attract those forces that have already been driven back into the extreme Left (St. Panagoulis, Manol. Drettakis, etc.).

Moreover, this political arena will exert continuous pressure on PASOK from the Left that Mr Papandreou would be able to exploit both for the purpose of taking exclusive possession of centrist titles as well as for revising every "rightist turn" of his policy, according to the impulse and expediency of the moment.

The bipolar expression of Greek socialism also clearly serves Mr Papandreou's probable intention to get into the office of the presidency of the republic while holding on to his party strength and selecting as his successors and continuers of his task two of the most trusted cadres of Kastri. This scenario that is already being talked about within the ranks of the party "entrusts" one of the two roles of the descendants to Mr K. Laliotis, while the second "is destined" --after an interregnum period-- to Mr G.A. Papandreou.

The Prime Minister's Goal

As much as these judgements and expectations can be considered groundless, premature or unreal, they continue having as their origin an immediate and specific goal. That is, the consolidation of the correlation of forces that were shaped in the 1981 elections and that were since then maintained in subsequent elections (Right 40 percent, Left 60 percent). In other words, what is being sought is that every bit of damage done to PASOK or opposition to the government would work and expand in the more specific and broader area of the Left, in the form of communicating vessels, from which the "Right" would be cut off.

To succeed in this goal Mr Papandreou will not hesitate moving forward to the establishment of the simple proportional electoral system, being indifferent as to whether a new "opposition" party to the left of the party should take away from PASOK's strength and have it shrink to 30-35 percent. Even more so, if he himself should be a mere spectator of the forthcoming election battle from the balcony of the presidential mansion.

Besides, the "motive" for the simple proportional system might possibly have corresponding repercussions on ND also, with the first result being the political survival of the "Democratic Revival" and a hoped for --by PASOK-- development, a multifaceted split that Mr Papandreou sees as possible, interpreting the belated and unjustified adoption of the simple proportional system by certain distinguished cadres of the major government opposition party.

In other words, PASOK is hopeful that through a controlled split it will be able to broaden the possibility of alliances in the Left and will hold on to power without recourse to support or reliance on the KKE. On the other hand, ND, under present conditions, has nothing to hope for from the existence of the multiple party system that the simple proportional electoral system favors since its political isolation is maintained with this system.

Consequently, for the major government opposition party the only warranted strategy is the attempt to upset the present correlation of forces and the attainment of a self-powered majority through a shrinkage of the "broader Left" from 60 percent to 50 percent and under. This goal must not be considered unattainable for two reasons: first of all, because the increase of the strength of the Left is due exclusively to PASOK's unnatural gigantism and consequently depends directly on the political aftereffects of "Change." (Suddenly in France no one had thought of considering Mr. Mitterrand's victory as permanent and an irreversible overthrow of the correlation of forces between Left and Right. Today, however, after the failure of the French socialist experiment --in any case smaller as compared to the disaster of the Greek "Change"--everyone agrees that the strength of the socialists has fallen to below 30 percent). Secondly, because, except for the 1974 elections the results of which are attributed to ephemeral coincidence, ND would be able to invoke the strength of "the broader Right" that has always fluctuated around 50 percent. More indicative, in this light, is the correlation of political forces that the 1977 elections demonstrated (ND 41 percent, National Party 7 percent, neo-liberals and KODISO /Democratic Socialism Party/ 2 percent, EDIK /Democratic Center Union/ 12 percent, PASOK 25 percent, KKE 10 percent, KKE (Int.) 3 percent). In other words with the polarizing confrontation, the Right garnered 50 percent, the Left 38 percent and the Center 12 percent.

Finally, it is understandable that within the context of such a strategy, ND has no reason to rejoice at or long for the enlargement of the leftist "rebellion" in PASOK. This is so because such tactics would do anything but contribute to the uncaging of PASOK's conservative mass of voters that also constitute ND's primary objective goal.

5671

CSO: 3521/47

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND GRASSROOTS SEEN NEGLECTED

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 6 Dec 85 p 10

[Text] Political observers see an acute dissatisfaction with the recommencement of a very bad practice in the ND party. A practice that testifies to how far from reality live those party deputies—if not all, at least a large number of them—who manifestly, and even stubbornly, one could say, do not want to be aware of the true situation. We are talking about those famous banquets where one of them speaks and dozens of his colleagues listen to and applaud him, while hundreds of their political friends gather around to also listen and applaud. And at the end they depart en masse late at night or at midday for their homes, with the illusion that everything is going well.

Many people have been wondering whether perhaps the leader of the ND should propose that there be an end immediately to this farcical comedy, which benefits absolutely nobody (neither the speakers nor the audiences nor the party itself). Perhaps it would be more profitable for all if these very same deputies left the halls and the restaurants of the Intercontinental, the Hilton, and the Meg. Vretania, and went down to confront the party's rank and file directly? And engaged in a dialogue with the people down there at the grassroots level? And explained to them the program and the positions of the ND, the things that Papandreou promised prior to the elections, and what he is doing a few weeks later? And in this way persuaded those who have been misled to open their eyes? Is it not true that Mitsotakis had promised something of the sort in a recent session of the Parliamentary Group? Why has he forgotten this so soon? Why does he not send the deputies—since they themselves refuse to go—out into the countryside, into the villages? Moreover, is it not true that this is what the rank and file are insistently demanding of him—a more extensive, regular, sustained, and effective contact between the party and the grassroots?

12114

CSO: 3521/69

POLITICAL

GREECE

RESULTS OF POLL ON ND, PASOK, POLITICIANS' POPULARITY

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 7 Dec 85 p 9

[Text] Konstandinos Karamanlis still continues to be the most popular political figure in the country (!), according to the outcome of a secret poll that was done on behalf of the PASOK government in mid-November in the area of the capital, Piraeus, and suburbs.

The percentage of Athenians who choose K. Karamanlis at the present time is 53 percent. Here the ND emerges as the top party, with 32.5 percent, and PASOK is second with 32 percent. But what is calamitous for PASOK is that in the region of the capital this preference has fallen to 32 percent from the 44 percent that it received in the elections of June 1985.

On the other hand, the ND's percentage is above PASOK's percentage even by six percentage points, if to the ND's 32.5 percent one adds the 5.5 percent received by the DI ANA [Democratic Renewal] (for a total of 38 percent). That is, with the DI ANA percentage added, the ND is at the same level as it was in the elections of June 1985.

Nevertheless, the unwavering devotion of the capital residents to the person of Kon. Karamanlis is especially impressive. Particularly when we have 53 percent of these Athenians favorably disposed toward the former president of the republic, despite the fact that he is not engaging in active politics.

Andreas in a Slump

Curiously, the figure second in popularity is Kh. Sartzetakis, who was given 50 percent. But political observers believe that the present president is receiving here the support of PASOK, the KKE, and the KKE-Interior, and in fact not their complete support, since the total of the percentage of these three parties on the Left comes to 54 percent. Consequently, Sartzetakis has a percentage loss of 4 percent from the faction that voted for him.

Papandreou is the third most popular political figure, with 44 percent. But the percentage of Athens and Piraeus residents who are satisfied with his policy as premier is only 37 percent.

In the sector of the New Democracy, the figure first in popularity is G. Rallis, with a percentage of 32 percent. He is followed by K. Mitsotakis, with 29 percent. And immediately after him comes E. Averof, with a percentage of 28 percent.

The leader of DI ANA, Kon. Stefanopoulos, enjoys a much higher popularity than his party (5 percent), since he mustered a percentage of 29 percent!

Kyrkos and Florakis also had popularities greater in percentage than that of their parties. The former, with 24 percent, is ahead of Florakis, who receives 23 percent. And this is true even though the KKE ranks higher than the KKE-Interior by 11 percentage points.

The Most Suitable Leader of the ND

According to the results of this poll, out of 100 followers of the ND, 71 are satisfied with the way Mitsotakis handled his duties as leader of the official opposition. Some 26 are not satisfied, and 3 did not respond.

But as the leader of the ND, Mitsotakis has a lower percentage of preferences among the party's followers in the capital region where the poll was conducted. Of 100 followers of the ND, 51 consider him to be the most suitable as the leader of the party. Immediately after him comes Stefanopoulos, with 16 votes, Rallis with 12, Averof with 9, Evert with 4, Boutos with 2, Varvitsiotis with 1, and Samaras with 1. Of these 100 followers of the ND, 4 did not respond.

Papandreou's Second-in-Command

To the question of who among the officers of PASOK is the most qualified to be proclaimed as Papandreou's second-in-command, of 100 party followers 17 are in favor of Tsokhatzopoulos, 14 favor Gennimatas, 12 favor Arsenis, 9 favor Koutsogiorgas, 8 favor Kharalambopoulos and Simitis, and 7 favor Avgierinos and Laliotis. Of those questioned, 8 did not respond.

Of the parties, the ND leads with 32.5 percent, followed by PASOK with some 32 percent, the KKE with 16.5 percent (at the same level as in the 1981 elections), DI ANA with 5.5 percent, and the KKE-Interior with 5.5 percent. Out of 100 followers of the ND, 86 choose it again, while 12 are embracing DI ANA. One person did not respond, and one has gone over to the KKE-Interior. Moreover, out of 100 PASOK adherents, in the wake of the 1985 elections 73 choose this party again. One is going over to the ND, 1 to the DI ANA, 4 to the KKE-Interior, 9 to the KKE, and 12 did not respond.

One distinctive feature is that in response to the question of what party today best upholds the interests of workers, out of 100 people questioned some 30 believe it is PASOK, 29 the ND, 24 the KKE, 7 the KKE-Interior, and 4 the DI ANA, while 6 did not respond.

However, more of the residents of the capital area (32 percent) want an ND rule-alone government than any other configuration, with only 30 percent wanting a PASOK rule-alone government, only 13 percent wanting a PASOK-KKE government, and 6 percent wanting an ND-PASOK coalition.

The study was conducted by the public-survey company Eurodim between 19 and 25 November 1985, with a sample of 600 persons who reside in the area of Athens-Piraeus and environs. These were selected by the method of establishing quotas according to sex, age, area, and voting districts.

This poll was published yesterday in the PONDIKI.

In this publication, it is not stated who ordered the poll to be taken.

Table 1. If elections were held again today for the Greek parliament, which of these parties would you vote for?

	(3) Νέα Δημοκρατία	(6) Δημοκρατική Ανανέωση	(4) ΠΑΣΟΚ	(5) ΚΚΕ-εσ.	ΚΚΕ	(7) Δεν απάντησαν
(1) ΣΥΝΟΛΟ	32,5	5,5	32	5,5	16,5	7
(2) Κόμμα που γήφισαν Εκλογές 1985						
(3) Νέα Δημοκρατία	86	12	0	1	0	1
(4) ΠΑΣΟΚ	1	1	73	4	9	12
(5) ΚΚΕ-εσ.	0	0	5	89	0	6
(5) ΚΚΕ	0	1	0	0	97	2

Key:

1. Total
2. Party voted for in 1985 elections
3. New Democracy
4. PASOK
5. KKE-Interior
6. Democratic Renewal
7. No response

Table 2. Regardless of what party you would vote for, what party do you think best upholds the interests of the workers today?

	Η ΝΔ (3)	Η Δημο- κρατική Ανανεώ- ση (6)	Το ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	Το ΚΚΕ.α. (5)	Το ΚΚΕ (7)	Δεν απάντη- σαν (7)
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	29	4	30	7	24	6
Κόμμα που υπήρξαν Εκλογές 1985 (2)						
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	79	8	1	1	3	8
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	1	1	66	8	20	4
ΚΚΕ.α. (5)	3	0	6	83	8	0
ΚΚΕ	0	0	0	0	99	1

Key: Same as Table 1

Table 3. Popularity of politicians (respondents having a very good or fairly good opinion for each)

	(6) Σαρτζετάκης	(7) Καραμανλής	(8) Παπανδρέου	(9) Μητσοτάκης	(10) Φλωράκης	(11) Ράλλης	(12) Κύρκος	(13) Αβέρωφ	(14) Στεφανόπουλος
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	50	53	44	29	23	32	24	28	29
Κόμμα που υπήρξαν Εκλογές 1985 (2)									
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	9	95	6	76	4	77	13	72	57
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	89	34	87	2	18	6	27	4	15
ΚΚΕ.α. (5)	54	14	23	0	20	9	100	6	9
ΚΚΕ	43	7	14	1	91	1	14	0	5

Key:

1. to 5. Same as Table 1
6. Sartzetakis
7. Karamanlis
8. Papandreu
9. Mitsotakis

10. Florakis
11. Rallis
12. Kyrkos
13. Averof
14. Stefanopoulos

Table 4. As to Sartzetakis as president of the republic, are you:

	(6) Πολύ ή αρκετά ευχαριστημένος	(7) Λίγο ή καθόλου ευχαριστημένος	(8) Δεν απάντησαν
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	50	44	6
Κόμμα που γήφισαν: Εκλογές 1985 (2)			
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	11	83	6
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	86	10	4
Κ.Κ.Ε.α. (5)	54	37	9
Κ.Κ.Ε.	44	52	4

Key:

1. to 5. Same as Table 1
6. Very or fairly satisfied
7. Not very or not at all satisfied
8. No response

Table 5: Who do you believe is the most suited to be leader of the ND?

	(6) Αβέρωφ	(7) Βαρθολομαίωτης	(8) Έβερι	(9) Μητσοτάκης	(10) Μπούτιος	(11) Ράλλης	(12) Σαμαράς	(13) Στεφανόπουλος	(14) Δεν απάντησαν
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	8	3	4	25	5	13	2	24	16
Κόμμα που γήφισαν: Εκλογές 1985 (2)									
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	9	1	4	51	2	12	1	16	4
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	8	3	3	12	8	16	2	30	18
Κ.Κ.Ε.α. (5)	6	8	3	3	0	8	6	26	40
Κ.Κ.Ε.	3	4	2	9	11	6	2	26	37

Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. to 5. Same as Table 1 | 10. Boutsos |
| 6. Averof | 11. Rallis |
| 7. Varvitsiotis | 12. Samaras |
| 8. Evert | 13. Stefanopoulos |
| 9. Mitsotakis | 14. No response |

Table 6. In the immediate future, it is likely that a PASOK officer will be chosen as Papandreou's second-in-command. In your opinion, what PASOK politician is the most qualified for this position?

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	10	11	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Αλευράς	Αρσένης	Αυγερινός	Γεννηματάς	Κουτσόγιωργας	Λαλιώτης	Σιμίτης	Τσοχατζόπουλος	Χαραλαμπίδης	Δεν Απάντησαν
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	15	9	5	13	9	6	7	10	9	17
Κόμμα που υπήρξεσαν Εκλογές 1985 (2)										
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	21	9	2	11	8	2	6	6	10	25
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	12	10	7	14	9	7	8	17	8	8
Κ.Κ.Ε.α. (5)	3	11	3	34	3	14	0	6	9	17
ΚΕΕ	15	5	12	11	8	6	6	8	4	25

Key:

1. to 5. Same as Table 1
6. Alevras
7. Arsenis
8. Avgerinos
9. Gennimatas

10. Koutsogiorgas
11. Laliotis
12. Simitis
13. Tsokhatzopoulos
14. Kharalambopoulos
15. No response

Table 7. What form of government is best for the country today?

	(6) Κυβέρνηση ΝΔ-ΕΠΕΝ	(7) Αυτοδύναμη κυβέρνηση ΝΔ	(8) Κυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΝΔ	(9) Αυτοδύναμη κυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ	(10) Κυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΚΚΕ	(11) Κυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΚΚΕ	(12) Κυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΚΚΕ	(13) Δεν απάντησαν
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	2	32	6	30	5	13	5	7
Κόμμα που γήφισαν: Εκλογές 1985 (2)								
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	4	86	7	1	1	0	0	1
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	0	1	7	68	5	9	7	3
ΚΚΕ.ε. (5)	0	3	3	0	66	0	17	11
ΚΚΕ	0	2	0	0	0	66	5	27

Key:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1. to 5. Same as Table 1 | 10. PASOK-KKE-Int. government |
| 6. ND/EPEN [National Political Union] government | 11. PASOK-KKE government |
| 7. ND rule-alone government | 12. PASOK-KKE-Int.-KKE government |
| 8. PASOK-ND government | 13. No response |
| 9. PASOK rule-alone government | |

Table 8. As of now, regarding Papandreou as the country's premier are you:

	Πολύ ή αρκετά (6) ευχαριστημένος	Λίγο ή καθόλου (7) ευχαριστημένος
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	37	63
Κόμμα που γήφισαν: Εκλογές 1985 (2)		
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	3	97
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	78	22
ΚΚΕ.ε. (5)	9	91
ΚΚΕ	8	92

Key:

- 1 to 5. Same as Table 1
6. Very or moderately satisfied
7. Not very or not at all satisfied

Table 9. As of now, regarding Mitsotakis as leader of the official opposition, are you:

	Πολύ (6) ή αρκετά ευχαριστημένος	(7) Λίγο ή καθόλου ευχαριστημένος	(8) Δεν απάντησαν
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ (1)	28	70	2
Κόμμα που γήφισαν: Εκλογές 1985 (2)			
Νέα Δημοκρατία (3)	71	26	3
ΠΑΣΟΚ (4)	3	95	2
Κ.Κ.Ε.α. (5)	0	100	0
Κ.Κ.Ε.	1	98	1

Key:

1. to 5. Same as Table 1
6. Very or moderately satisfied
7. Not very or not at all satisfied
8. No response

12114

CSO: 3621/69

POLITICAL

GREECE

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY DAY WITH PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 30 Nov 85 p 2

[Excerpts] "A Stable and generalized peace must urgently be established in the Middle East through negotiations in which the PLO, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, must participate. To achieve such a peace, all Israeli forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon immediately and without conditions, and the rights of the Palestinians to a homeland must be enforced."

This statement was made by Nikos Kaloudis, member of the Political Bureau of the KKE's Central Committee, at yesterday's reception given by the Council of Arab Ambassadors and the heads of Arab missions in Athens on the occasion of the celebration of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (29 November). The reception was also attended by Akis Tsokhatzopoulos, member of the PASOK Executive Bureau, who was the bearer of a solidarity message from the president of the PASOK, Andreas Papandreou. Other guests included New Democracy President K. Mitsotakis, the secretary general of the [KKE] "int," G. Baniyas, the press representative of the DI-ANA and M. Glezos.

The celebration was opened by the dean of the Arab diplomatic corps in Athens. A salute was brought by the head of the PLO representation in Athens, Massoud Gandour. A message was sent by Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Papoulias, in which he stressed that the Greek Government firmly supports the "struggle of the Palestinian people for self-determination and the establishment of its own homeland."

/9604

CSO: 3521/73

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

VAN DEN BROEK SEEKS GOOD RELATIONS WITH SURINAME

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 12 Dec 85 pp 2-3

[Text]

T h e H a g u e, December 12 - Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek yesterday pledged to do his very best to normalise relations with Surinam but told parliament that little headway had so far been made.

The minister was replying to criticism on Dutch policy towards its former South American colony during the second day of Second Chamber debates on his ministry's 1986 budget.

Dutch News

The emergence of dialogue between Surinam's military leader Desi Bouterse and pre-coup political parties could be an important new development, Van den Broek admitted.

But he added there was still uncertainty on the precise nature of heralded moves towards 'true democracy'.

The Netherlands suspended development aid to Surinam in 1983 in protest at the December 1982 killings of opponents to the regime of Lieutenant-Colonel Bouterse. Since then relations have been frosty and Surinam reduced its diplomatic representation here to chargé d'affaires level last May.

Reforms Still Vague

Van den Broek said the Dutch government was unclear as to the precise nature of reforms announced by Bouterse which were described by National Assembly Chairman Ulrich Aron as 'in line with the principles of genuine democracy'.

The Dutch government was also in the dark about proposals to consult the people, but looked eagerly forward to a full normalisation of diplomatic relations, Van den Broek said.

Next week the Dutch Ambassador to Paramaribo, Dirk Jan van Houten would return to Surinam after a short stay here with a message from the Dutch government, Van den Broek said.

The message would reiterate the Dutch demand for concrete steps towards democracy as a condition for the resumption of aid payments and set out the steps the Netherlands expected from the Surinamese government and to be 'defined by all parties concerned', Van den Broek said.

Relations could be fully normalised only when these conditions were met and when it was beyond doubt that the Surinamese people would be consulted, the foreign minister said.

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

NEW EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH SOUTH MOLUCCANS

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 9 Dec 85 p 5

[Text]

The Hague, December 9 - The Dutch have begun delicate efforts to come to terms with the South Moluccans living in their midst 10 years after the exile community's grievances exploded into guerrilla violence.

A cabinet committee under Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers met Moluccan leaders recently to suggest wiping past mistakes and ill-feelings from the slate and tackling problems of unemployment and poor housing together.

In a gesture heavy with significance for the 40,000 Moluccans, who have long felt the Dutch helped cheat them of an independent homeland in what is now Indonesia, Lubbers also offered to erect a memorial to commemorate their arrival here in 1951.

A gang of gunmen thrust the Moluccan problem into world headlines in December 1975 by seizing a Dutch train and taking the passengers hostage.

The siege lasted 12 days and left three dead, while a concurrent armed occupation of the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam lasted 15 days and cost one life. It was the beginning of a short but desperate guerrilla war.

Betrayed Loyalty

Most Moluccans here opposed the violence but supported the aims of the guerrillas. They wanted independence for the island chain where they came from in the former Dutch East Indies, but the Indonesian government rejected the claim outright.

Ten years on, the yearning for a nation of their own is still strong. But the violence has passed and Dutch officials say Moluccan leaders are showing a new readiness to accept that life in the Netherlands is more than temporary.

They have agreed to join the government in three months of consultations on their problems, after which they will meet Lubbers again. Both sides have hailed the step as a major advance.

For the older South Moluccans, the offer of formal Dutch memorial to their arrival in the Netherlands is a landmark. They remember the story as a tale of loyalty betrayed.

A century ago South Moluccans formed the backbone of the Dutch imperial army. So they stayed until World War Two brought the end of empire and the emergence of an independent Indonesia which quickly shrugged off Dutch proposals for autonomy for the South Moluccan chain.

Resistance in the islands was crushed by the new Jakarta government and about 4,000 South Moluccans still serving elsewhere with the Dutch forces refused to return home.

/9274

CSO: 3600/19

MILITARY

DENMARK

YOUNG OFFICERS QUESTION BALTIC DEFENSE DOCTRINE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Dec 85 p 14

[Article by DAGENS NYHETER correspondent Christian Palme]

[Text] Copenhagen--Defending the approach to the Baltic Sea through the Great and Little Belts has traditionally been Denmark's most important strategic problem. But recently two young officers and researchers have caused quite a stir by questioning the classic doctrine.

The map has to be given a quarter turn to clearly show what NATO military strategists believe about Soviet plans in the Baltic. Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein lie at the mouth of the Baltic like a "cork in a bottle," blocking passage from Soviet naval bases and shipyards into ocean waters.

In peacetime it is no problem for big naval ships to pass through the Belts. An international convention dating back to 1857 makes these straits international waters. The civilian and military fleets of all nations have the right to pass freely through the Great Belt, the Little Belt and the Oresund. But what is the importance of the straits in wartime?

As in 1914

The opinion in NATO and Denmark is quite clear: control over the approaches to the Baltic Sea is vital to the Soviet Union. The primary aim of Denmark with its great minelaying capacity and of NATO's reinforcement plans is to defend the Belts from a Soviet attack in the event of war. This is evident from the very name of NATO's unified command for Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein at Karup air base in Jutland. It is called "Headquarters Allied Forces Baltic Approaches" (shortened to BALTAP).

The doctrine was given a lot of space when the Foreign Ministry wrote a report at the request of Folketing on Denmark's security policy situation in the 1980's. The Dyvig report, named for the high-ranking official in charge of preparing the report, devoted a long section to Denmark's geographic location:

"The Soviet Union still has a large part of its total shipyard capacity located on the Baltic Sea and there is a substantial movement of both civilian and military ships through the Danish Belts. There is no doubt that free passage through the Belts plays a large role. From a military point of view the importance of the Danish Belts as a passageway is no less today than it was in 1914 and control of these straits and laying mines in them could quickly become a problem once again."

Similar opinions can be heard on all sides in the Danish military establishment. They are repeated at meetings and conferences, drummed into recruits and reiterated in every document published by the Danish armed forces. Suddenly some new strains are being heard. Two mildly rebellious officers and researchers have outlined a scenario that turns the old ideas upside down.

Michael Clemmesen, a major in the Danish Army as well as a historian, argues that Denmark's importance as a Baltic barricade has declined with the development of military aviation technology.

Denmark is very important when it comes to the defense situation for its Nordic neighbors, Clemmesen says.

Interrupted

"How important our situation is for connections between the Soviet fleet and shipyards in the Baltic on the one hand and the Soviet North Fleet on the other in a combat situation is more doubtful," he said.

"Even with full control over Denmark, traffic between the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic would be interrupted until the Soviet Union wins sea and air supremacy over the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea."

The Soviet Union can obtain safe passage to the Baltic Sea only if it completely knocks NATO out in the North Atlantic and ensures safe passage along the entire coast of Norway, according to Clemmesen.

The Soviet Union lacks modern minesweeping equipment in the Baltic Sea and Baltic shipyards would be unimportant in a brief war.

An assessment similar to Clemmesen's has been made by Christian J. Andersen, also a major and section leader in the intelligence service of the Danish armed forces.

Jutland Important

"The composition and maneuver patterns of the Soviet Baltic Fleet point exclusively in the direction of operations aimed at achieving supremacy over the Baltic," writes Andersen.

"The Baltic Sea has acquired a clearly secondary role and it is not necessary for Soviet naval operations in the Atlantic," he notes.

Control of the Belts could be important in a protracted war but it is not a primary objective. Instead both Clemmesen and Andersen point to Jutland as the Soviet Union's most important interest.

"The Jutland peninsula is very important as a base area for air operations aimed at the East," said Clemmesen. "From Jutland airplanes can strike at Soviet ground troops in central Europe. From Jutland it is possible to prevent the Soviet Union from moving supply shipments from highways and railroads to ships in the Baltic."

His conclusion is that it is of vital importance to the Soviet Union to hamper air operations directed at the East from Jutland.

Andersen draws the same conclusion but he places special emphasis on the provision of cover for an attack on central Europe. In an effort to secure their north flank the Warsaw Pact countries would try to occupy the entire Jutland peninsula and establish air supremacy over the western part of the Baltic.

Clemmesen and Andersen have sparked a lot of debate in Denmark with their views, but the military leadership is far from relinquishing its ideas about the importance of the Belts. It is not that easy to demolish the military strategy beliefs of several centuries.

6578

CSO: 3650/85

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

VON BUELOW ASSERTS BUNDESWEHR LACKS RESERVIST CONCEPT

Bonn LOYAL in German Oct 85 pp 11-15

[Interview with SPD defense expert Andreas von Buelow conducted at Bonn by Harald Zulauf, date not given: "Bundeswehr Has No reservist Concept"]

[Text] Dr Andreas von Buelow. SPD defense expert and former state secretary in the Federal Defense Ministry attacks Bundeswehr leadership with brass knuckles: He speaks of ineffective training, slouching, excessive fear of war as well as of the lack of conception in working with the reserves.

LOYAL readers will recall that Andreas von Buelow had to represent and defend much of which he is criticizing--including the "nonexistent reservist concept" and deployment readiness--as a member of the erstwhile government, as parliamentary state secretary and later Federal Minister. A buelow strategy paper--he is currently chairman of the security policy commission of the SPD federal committee--has caused much political turbulence in the FRG.

In Bonn Harald Zulauf talked with the SPD defense expert. LOYAL will follow the excerpts from Buelow's statements with a critical discussion.

[Question] While the federal government has decided to extend military service to 18 months you are demanding a reduction to seven to eight months. Yet every military leader, from the chief of staff to a platoon leader considers this demand to be illusory. In that case the defense ability of the Bundeswehr is said to be no longer secure.

[Answer] Of course, this is precisely the question. Currently the training of our young inductees is intensive in basic training, but half a year later there are complaints about a grand slouching. Naturally, an army in peacetime cannot be in high gear and offer a good show, rather people are sitting there like professional firemen waiting for a fire to break out. And the great question is whether parts of this could not be transformed into a kind of volunteer firemen.

[Question] What is this supposed to look like?

[Answer] Well, one is relying more on reservists. After all, this is also a question of utilization. Is it really sensible to spend the 13,000 Mark that

every inductee costs us a year for keeping him as long as possible in the barracks, frustrated and lazy? Is it not much more sensible to train a man first well, keep training him over the years, but in return shorten his military obligation in the beginning, something that will increase motivation? For motivation is destroyed currently by the long military service in which little is happening.

[Question] But when you are now loudly proclaiming that the military service, carried out by 200,000 young men every year with great sacrifices, is in the end only wasted time, the trust of our citizens subject to service in our defense efforts and the Bundeswehr is not exactly reinforced. Then they will surely ask, "Why are we still doing this?"

[Answer] But this question is totally justified. And we politicians must give them an honest answer.

"The Inductees, They are not all Merely Slouches"

For the most part, the inductees come to the Bundeswehr quite motivated. It is not so that these are all people who have to be dragged in like the greatest slouches. And then they are greatly astonished to see what kind of slouching takes place after basic training. But I cannot hire animators for the Bundeswehr who would keep these young people in good spirits for 15 months.

In that case it is justifiable to ask whether the reservist concept is not much more efficient. Even the defense structure commission said already in 1971: "For God's sake reduce the existing forces so that you will keep money for weapons." When a general with a couple of stars on his shoulders says that, people hang on his lips. But when a politician says the same thing then all of this is supposed to be irresponsible and so forth.

[Question] Now you are also demanding a radical change of our military structure toward a militia army. But isn't the current structure and strength of the Bundeswehr a considerably greater deterrent than a militia army with guerilla fighters?

[Answer] I am not at all demanding a transition to the militia, but I say rather that we should attempt to include militia-type components in the Bundeswehr. A kind of covering force or fusiliers. The mix ratio between highly mechanized combat forces and rather static infantry defense forces must be changed. One can certainly not abandon the tank completely. But the question is whether it has to be the main weapon system, something I doubt, also from the cost standpoint. After all, such a thing costs 5.5 million marks. An insane price. Only a track has to be destroyed and the marvel is immobile. The question is whether other constructions would not be more cost-effective.

And the ability to mobilize more reserve units would provide an additional great potential for the FRG in a time of tension, something that would be an additional conflict deterrent. But these reservists must be well trained. And there should be a reservist concept. The one we have is not.

[Question] How come?

[Answer] Because the reservists today are not trained for their tasks. Everybody stares only at the 495,000 men of the active force. At the same time, it is not really combat-ready. Because you can subtract at least 100,000 soldiers who are being newly trained. The current training system is simply ineffective. They train 100 percent of every annual cohort completely in mechanized units, and once these soldiers leave the Bundeswehr after 15 months, new greenhorns arrive in the force, going through the same training and manning the same weapons system that the old soldiers have just abandoned. Once an emergency arises, the reservists who have been trained on these modern weapons systems do not even have access to these weapons anymore. They must take on totally new functions, guard bridges and things like that. They have not even learned how to engage a tank. Basically, looking at the total defense system in an emergency, this is not a persuasive total defense structure. And I know from the Hardthoehe as well as from many conversations with reservists that basically the total fixation on current units makes it both personnel wise and resource wise impossible to train reservists so that in case of emergency a well trained army of 1.3 million soldiers would be ready.

[Question] And what would the SPD's training and reservist concept look like if you had to do it?

"If the Russians Would Stand in Front of German Houses in 24 Hours..."

[Answer] Well, I would make the reservist concept according to the pattern--a man must be splendidly trained he must be able to master his weapons, and he must not get unused to his total activity. Because today the major part of the reservist does not train at all anymore. A reservist concept must not be made in peacetime from the present standpoints. Woerner's entire concept is based on how to scrape up the people so that we will have as close to 495,000 men as possible so that the Americans will not get mad at us. There is even a little cheating here and 30,000 men are counted who do not even exist. Basically, all of this takes place from the standpoint--for God's sake, the Russians could be facing German houses with their tanks in 24 hours. If one operates under this trauma then one must organize in like fashion. Then, however, the Americans would also have to reintroduce mandatory military training, if this were really the case. But it is not the case. Nobody, up to deeply conservative circles, believes that there will be war. And in the USSR nobody considers that either. And if war were imminent there would be considerable prior warnings. After all, the USSR will not march into Western Europe like a Sunday walk. It must prepare considerably for this.

[Question] Do you believe that you will find support for your concept from the reservists involved, who in that case would probably have to perform more training exercises than envisioned in the personnel concept of the Bundeswehr for the 90s?

[Answer] Well, the way it happens today is that soldiers are trained for 15 months, are discharged late in June, and then receive word that they have to go for their first exercise in October. This is the most unmotivating thing you can imagine. Then at last it comes behind him, presumably he has crossed off days for a long time, he has stayed that the day would finally come for

his discharge. The way it is done now is a devastating kind of organizing for reservist work.

One must use such a man when he is later married and has one or two children. At that time he is tickled pink to get out of the regular rut for ten days. But at that time he must not simply be thrown into a wild mob with which he has never had any doing; he must be assigned to his old unit that he knows, where he will be happy to meet his comrades once again. But if one acts as if people were to be considered merely a subsystem of weapons systems and says, you were once a rifleman and now you'll be guarding an ammunition dump for ten years, frustration will of course result.

[Question] The employers are not exactly going to be overjoyed about increased training exercises of their employees.

"An 18-Year Old Can Still Be Chased Around, A Reservist No Longer"

[Answer] I maintain that once the employer knows that the reservist has an exercise every four years, for example, and he knows that it will be in the fall, he can prepare for it. This is something totally different from what happens now when the callup orders come most often suddenly. Everything must be made basically more plannable. The army's love must be devoted to the reservists and not merely to the active units. Much must be changed to achieve this, the entire mentality must be changed. An 18-year old without a family can still be chased around. A reservist cannot be treated like that. That is a proven man. Here totally different human leadership skills must be mastered.

[Question] Your concept has many similarities with the well-known alternative defense strategies and structures that were examined last year in the defense committee by many defense experts as to their feasibility. After half a year of intensive deliberations the conclusion was reached that there is no alternative to flexible response strategy. Do you know better?

[Answer] Well, flexible response is basically already a recognition of the non-credibility of nuclear deterrence. It is an attempt to replace conventional weakness--an imaginary one. I maintain--with nuclear deterrence, and will not function in an emergency. For example, considering the first use of nuclear weapons, I am extremely sceptical, since every field nuclear weapon that we fire will automatically bring about an appropriate counterstrike. The bottom line is that we do not have an iota of advantage. Flexible response has thus so many credibility gaps that we would be well advised to look for new possibilities.

[question] Which will look like?

[Answer] To create a structural non-attack possibility. That is, not to have the ability anymore to advance into enemy territory. To that end we must get away from our highly mobile defense structures, both in the Bundeswehr and in the Red Army. Both go back to the cooperation between the secret Reichswehr and the Red Army. Red Army regulations for combat of mobile, mechanized forces for 1929 stem from the cooperation with the Reichswehr and all have the focus on the tank as the main weapon system. And these structures have been

established to achieve a shock-like penetration of enemy lines in order to disturb and break the defense in the enemy rear areas. But such a structure is not designed to create real trust in the security of the borders and the integrity of the territory in either East or West. And when our military men say that the Bundeswehr is in no condition to achieve a penetration of the eastern borders, not even from the logistic standpoint, then I say from the Russian standpoint: Logistics are easily built up, if they do not exist already. From the Eastern standpoint the ability to penetrate into major areas of the GDR is enough.

[Question] Do you really believe that the Bundeswehr possesses today the attack capability?

[Answer] No. It does not even have the maps to march into the GDR. And, after all, our alliance partners are extremely anxious to make sure that we do not have any kind of such capabilities. Presumably they are watching with eagle eyes whether we are even deliberating about something like that. On the other hand, such a tank is basically autonomous for 500 kilometers, especially when the fuel supply is advanced. What disturbs me in the entire discussion is the total inability of the current government and many military men to place themselves in the situation of the other side. But when they are not able to do that, we will find no solution for Europe in the next decade. Then everything will stay as it is now.

[Question] Well, our strategy of deterrence has secured peace for 30 years. Do you doubt that it can do it over the next decades?

[Answer] Of course, the deterrence system can function for another 30 or 40 years. I do not feel insecure because the Bundeswehr has 5000 tanks. The security of our country is already assured, and I maintain that, even conventionally, the Warsaw pact will not be in a position to overrun the present defense. To be sure, some things such as ammunition supply must still be put in order. However, as has been said, one-sided defense strategies cannot contribute to mutual trust development and, to date, they have prevented really meaningful disarmament steps. These structures keep the military experts in East and West at a high level of tension. The result is, that, for example, that the USSR suppresses social changes in its area of influence for purely defense reasons. But such changes are precisely the ones desired by the Europeans.

[Question] Now you demand from the USSR that it remove its troops from the satellite states should the Bundeswehr achieve a lower peacetime strength, through, say, a reduction in the term of service...

[Answer] Yes, sir!

[Question] ...but do you really believe that this demand will produce more from the Kremlin than a tired smile?

"A Tired Smile from the Kremlin is not impossible"

[Answer] I do not think it is at all impossible that they will smile tiredly. And I am also sure that there will be debate in the USSR whether it will be

wise to remove forces even then. But only if the USSR desires that the tensions remain the way they are will it refuse to entertain such offers. In that case it will also be a clear signal for us. Or it may be willing--as was said by some people in talks that we of the SPD have had--to remove at first up to 50 percent of their forces from Eastern Europe. Naturally step by step. in accordance with the reduction of the Bundeswehr strength.

Why should I as a Western European not pose such a demand. I would rather have 220,000 Soviet soldiers in the GDR than 440,000. In that case at least half of my problem would already be solved.

[Question] But according to your view the Americans should then also gradually pull out of the FRG, something that has already earned you great public criticism. Would you also demand initial steps by the U.S. to first remove units from West Germany in order to entice the USSR to pull back its soldiers from the GDR?

[Answer] No. I think that this is impossible. The USSR simply must accept that the Americans are considerably further away, that they would have to be brought in by ship. In my paper I wrote: after the year 2000 it is conceivable that the GDR and Poland will be able to defend themselves, that we will accept their borders and that we will realign our defense structures in a fashion that these countries will no longer have any fear of us. Then the USSR should finally be in the position to withdraw from the forward position, and then the Americans also would have to pull back to the United States, step by step.

[Question] But the Red Army is back in the GDR is faster than the U.S. Army here.

[Answer] Sure, there are people who do not accept the withdrawal of the Yanks for that reason. But one who as a West European feels so impotent to organize his own defense with 300 million people and a threefold gross national product cannot be helped. In that case we will remain a province, such as we used to be a Roman one and up to now we have been more or less an American one. Then all of Europe will be an appendage--East to East and West to West.

[Question] While Bundeswehr and NATO leadership continues to stress the perils of a conventional inferiority of NATO to the Warsaw pact in order to raise the nuclear threshold, you maintain that there is already a military balance, including in conventional arms. Are our military leaders telling us an untruth?

[Answer] Well, every time when Soviet arms have been used against Western weapons it has turned out that our technology has been far superior. The Israelis have in many wars shown themselves superior with Western material and with adventurous, inferior strength ratios. So, things must not be quite so awful with our alleged inferiority.

The USSR also has the habit of not scrapping its old weapons but to store them. Here there is excellent room for manipulation. A considerable part of it cannot really be deployed anymore.

The Soviet forces in the GDR are certainly a combat-ready force, there is no doubt that. On the other hand, they are no more than 440,000 men. But I say that we would be wise to view them with greater sobriety. I do not say that we are superior. We certainly have considerable conventional weaknesses, but the other side has them too. And from the standpoint of personnel numbers the Warsaw Pact is in no way superior.

The entire threat concept of some overfrightened ones is only due to the fact that they count the Poles as a full aggressive force under Russian command, the same with the Czechs, the same with the GDR's NVA. And I simply do not believe that their deployment can be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint. Thus the West is not at all so awfully inferior, in the imaginary area of three to one, like some people would make us believe.

[Question] Even if the SPD should win the elections in 1987 with this security policy program, do you believe that you would put this concept into effect with governmental responsibility? Possibly against the opposition of the Americans who would be enthusiastic about, say, a reduction of the term of service?

"Where is Our Policy Made, in America or here?"

[Answer] Where then is our policy made, in America or here? the Americans have been in the position to transition from a draftee army with which they entered NATO to a volunteer army. The British have been in the position to transition from a draftee army to a professional army. The French have been in the position to markedly decrease their service obligation, and, moreover, to leave the integration, something that was the worst hit against NATO.

Can the Germans be forbidden to organize, say, the reservists of our force differently than today? After all, the Americans and the British have hardly any reservists.

Presumably my party will initially decide to maintain the term of service at 15 months. But let us try such a reservist concept, deploy in broad areas reservists who know the country, who can operate the appropriate weapons systems and who do not need such an insane leadership effort. Let us just announce a German reservist unit to fight against an American brigade in the NATO fall exercises. Then we could see who could teach whom. Here I am not at all convinced that a well trained reservist force would be incapable of stopping such an American brigade conventionally. And if such a reservist concept functions and the Americans do not accept it, well, then we just have to be in conflict with them.

[Question] Your demands have been envisioned only for the end of the millennium, but the political effects are of course felt even today. There has been vivid discussion about your paper. Don't you ideas about the withdrawal of American forces give renewed ammunition to those in the U.S. Congress who have been demanding troop withdrawals for a long period, and namely right now, not in the year 2000?

[Answer] Well, what the American Congress demands from us is not all that realistic either. After the Vietnam War the Americans made massive reductions

in their weapons programs, then they suddenly are shocked by the increased Russian military potential and then they force the entire NATO to increase its defense expenditures by three percent annually. At the same time we had done our homework in the 70s and had for a decade increased our expenditures for the Bundeswehr by 2.5 percent in real terms. Now this is an incredible thing to almost blackmail us now with the three percent demand.

We must see that our defense contribution to the NATO is reliable and effective. Whether we do that like the Americans with volunteers, or whether we say that we take every young man for eight months and subsequently for appropriate exercises. NATO and the American Congress should leave that to us. The decisive thing is that we deliver our reliable contribution within the framework of the alliance. And whether this is done by 18-year old recruits or 32-year old reservists is our business.

"The SPD Does Not Want to Get Out of the NATO, He Who Says this Libels Us"

[Question] Many of your critics fear that with this paper the SPD has taken the first step toward leaving the alliance.

[Answer] Well, we have 20,000 locals in the SPD. Not a single one of these has decided or recommended that we leave the NATO. This is simply slander that is again and again levied at us.

What Lafontaine discusses is the question whether the FRG should, like France, reject an automatic military chain of command of an American supreme commander. Thus he discusses along de Gaulle's line, because he says that otherwise certain threats cannot be eliminated. But I do not think like that.

[Question] Thus the SPD "Yes" to the alliance remains firm?

[Answer] Yes, sir! We do not want out of the NATO, we want to change the strategy within the alliance. But our "Yes" to the alliance does not remove the opportunity to critically view from the German standpoint an American administration that believes the NATO is weak and thus puts in round after round of rearmament programs while being very hesitant in disarmament steps.

[Question] Dr von Buslow, thank you very much for the interesting conversation. Echoes will not be wanting. I am convinced of that.

9240/9312

CNO: 3620/120

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MISSION, TRAINING PROPOSED FOR FIELD REPLACEMENT BATTALIONS

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Sep/Oct 85
pp 238-240

[Article by Ehrenfried Boege: "Thought on Training and Operational Planning for Field Replacement Battalions"]

[Text] The field replacement battalions are administratively subordinate to the brigade commands, which have thus become responsible for the care and training of personnel called up during a mobilization.

This task, which is not an easy one to perform, is actually a duty which has to be discharged on a continuous basis, but for which there are no personnel available at the brigade headquarters. It is for that reason often carried out as "work of the second order," even though everyone is convinced of the importance and necessity of these requirements. Reported on below are thoughts based on experiences of ways in which this task can be carried out nevertheless.

Personnel

A field replacement battalion is composed of activity-duty cadre personnel and reservists called to active duty during a mobilization and not belonging to the standby readiness. The minimum ratio of active-duty soldiers in the manning has also been fixed in harmony with the billets in the mobilization plan of the Bundeswehr which are urgently in need of manning.

The more active duty soldiers can be employed for key positions within a field replacement battalion, the better the care of the reservists while not taking part in military exercises as well as in the preparation and conduct of military exercises/mobilization alert exercises can be assured. However, the numerical ratio of active-duty personnel to mobilization assignees in a field replacement battalion will vary in the brigades, if for no other reason than that the peacetime billets available there, best suited for that purpose, will vary greatly by number and function (i.e., depending on the number of available training companies, requirements of higher headquarters for personnel release, etc.).

The reservists assigned to the field replacement company of a field replacement battalion also differ, among other things, by their assignment

to the various service branches (e.g., those which the brigades also have at their disposal). Since the field replacement companies--aside from small arms--have no materiel worth mentioning at their disposal, a self-conducted proficiency training program for the mobilization utilization of personnel as such is not possible.

A grouping of all assigned mobilization reservists by

- branches of service and
- planned utilization

makes it clear that the replacement personnel, aside from their assignment to the respective field replacement company, can also be classified by the two criteria given above. Assignment, training, and utilization possibilities are thus to be more closely examined by means of these "category keys."

Assignment, Training

If the mobilization personnel assigned to the field replacement companies are classified by branch of service, the possibility presents itself for having these personnel trained in the units subordinate to the respective brigade.

Depending on the field replacement battalion type, the number of reservists thus determined can vary by branch of service and can be relatively high in certain areas. Just one armored infantry type B1 field replacement battalion, for example, has 270 infantry and 100 armored troops at its disposal. These figures are of a magnitude which makes it seemingly impossible to task the active battalion with the training of the soldiers.

When further categorizing the reservists by mobilization utilization (not all belong to the replacement personnel), functional designation, and tasking, the armored infantry troops, for example, can be further broken down into the following:

- functional personnel of the command squads of the field replacement companies,
- functional personnel of the headquarters and support company of the field replacement battalion, and:
- operational personnel for functions of the headquarters and support company of the armored infantry battalion(s),
- garrison (barracks) duties of the combat/fire companies,
- personnel replacement in the armored infantry platoons,
- personnel replacement in the mortar company.

An additional grouping of replacement personnel into the three categories, in consonance with a 3-year exercise cadence for the individual reservist, yields soldiers in numbers which the active battalion can definitely be expected to be able to train in two to four-week military exercises.

Additional relief for the active battalions/independent companies results from the type of organization of the brigade, whereby active combat/combat support battalions and independent companies, as servicing battalions/companies, are tasked with training responsibilities for from 20 to 90 additional reservists per year.

Since these figures also:

- include command and functional personnel, no additional time-limited requirements are levied; and,
- a subdivision of replacement personnel into crews, detachments, squads and platoons can be carried out which in turn can be distributed in toto or in parts among several active companies,

a training task such as this appears not only to make sense but also to be entirely reasonable.

The facilitation of the training of reservists through a division by exercise rhythm [cadence] and company can be expanded by increasingly programming and training certain functional specialties during leave times. Surely not every billet lends itself to this, but this is nevertheless possible to a greater extent than it has been practiced in training planning to date--in most cases limited to officer billets only. Because of the continuously increasing number of annual leave days of active duty soldiers alone, the possibilities for this have increased to the point where the incumbents of certain billets require as many as three leave replacements [stand-ins] or would enable the utilization of three reservists.

The personal bond of the reservists to the field replacement battalion and to the servicing battalion/company responsible for their training can be increased by making it possible for reservists of the standby readiness of the training battalion/independent company to replace reservists who are leaving the field replacement battalion. This procedure also suggests itself for those garrisons which continue to have a relatively high proportion of conscripts assigned whose homes are far away, since the out-planning and replacement planning of reservists can always be spread over several years and the difficulties result from various temporally non-related factors (lacking of aptitude, age, change in status, out-planning required because of a promotion, etc.)

This suggested allocation of reservists to the active troop units of a brigade can be made possible by means of a "standing order," if the division is done by unit element and line as well as TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) designation. The personnel are to be similarly carried on paper in the manpower of the field replacement battalion, so that continuous changes of name listings are not necessary. The "packets" allocated to the units can be recalled by them at the field replacement battalion for call-up purposes, so that the efforts of the training battalion/company could focus "entirely" on the primary task, the training of reservists.

Operational Possibilities

The organizations of field replacement battalions to date have conformed primarily to the structure of the units of the higher headquarters, with aspects concerning the possible employment of field replacement personnel following the arrival of the reservists having thus far been disregarded in this connection. Reservists of a field replacement battalion in such large numbers and usable in so many different ways should not go to waste, even though they are actually of only limited operational value, at least temporarily, for a field brigade.

For that reason, several different types of operations of field replacement battalions have developed during exercises, which should influence future reflections on the organization of field replacement battalions.

In the process, it must of course be taken into account that field replacement battalions have a mobilization assignment which must not be jeopardized. Its primary task is, and can only be, personnel replacement. An initial examination will therefore have to determine when personnel replacements become necessary.

Independently of the above, however, thought must also be given to the general tasking of a field replacement battalion once the alert is sounded but before the first personnel are withdrawn.

By level of training, equipment, and organization, two possible solutions suggest themselves which can also make it possible--albeit in stages--for refresher training as well to be given on major equipment items:

- operational utilization as alternate crews,
- operational utilization as security and reinforcement personnel.

Utilization as alternate crews is a complete failure in many service branches "for lack of bodies," and in others because, for one thing, there is no immediate requirement for their services before and after the commencement of a combat engagement, and, for another, the number of replacement personnel is so small that crews could be exchanged only on a selected basis, e.g. in one company or one platoon at most. The desired objective of relief is small, all things considered, (and) the solution of the transportation problem is not without difficulties.

The assignment of security tasks or the use of such to reinforce available personnel would, on the other hand, give noticeable relief to active troops and would give replacement personnel an immediate mission, but would hamper the subsequent withdrawal of the individual reservist and his assignment as a personnel replacement.

Various measures are possible for the immediate operational utilization of replacement personnel, i.e., for the foresighted operational planning, which could be used singly, consecutively, or together. Possible missions, the performance of which depends on the branch of service to which assigned,

could be as follows, depending on the strength of the forces of a field replacement battalion that are to be employed:

- securing of barriers [obstacles, roadblocks],
- taking over barriers [obstacles] in depth,
- keeping open bridges/gaps in depth,
- securing command posts (main/rear) or rear area facilities (field repair points, supply points),
- giving damage control support (engineers),
- reinforcing units that are exposed to stress particularly early (repair/engineers),
- replacement of exhausted soldiers, and
- setting up and operating straggler and POE collecting points.

The standing mission of the battalion, to make personnel replacements available, could still be fulfilled.

Summary

The possibilities outlined above could be assigned as individual tasks to the variously organized field replacement companies. Their distribution on the battlefield then is dependent on the branches of service available in the companies and the tasking given accordingly.

In the allocation of areas, the G-3 and G-4 must give consideration to this operational planning--dispersed but mission-oriented. Part of the command personnel per se of the field replacement battalion, after reaching the operating area, are additionally available to the brigade commander as a true command reserve.

If consideration is given to these proposals in future organizations of field replacement battalions, the tasking of the elements of field replacement companies could become still more variegated, and the gain for field brigades more effective.

12689/9190

CSO: 3620/118

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRIEFS

RESERVISTS EMPLOYER SUPPORT SOUGHT--Duesseldorf--The planned extension of the basic military service tour from 15 to 18 months, as well as the programming of more military training areas for reservists, represent a burden in the personnel sector for the German economy and the administrations. This was pointed out by Guenter Kuhlmann (Board of Trade [Industrie- und Handelskammer--IHK] in Staade) in an article for the publication "Bundeswehr aktuell." The author emphasizes that the Bundeswehr as well is especially hard hit by the problem caused by the low birthrate years, and that, among other things, the deputy to the chief of staff of the army and officer-in-charge of reservist affairs, Lt Gen Heinz Kaich, is currently seeking the support of economic and administrative leaders for the new reservist concept of the Federal ministry of defense. Kuhlmann explains that, in today's tense labor market situation, even the most understanding reservist, when opening the "blue letter" (the order to report for reserve training) sent by the kreis recruiting and replacement office, will wonder if he can afford to be absent from his job for one or in some cases several weeks. Even now a considerable number of so-called M-day assignment reservists performing senior duties in the three military services are sacrificing part of their annual vacation time, which, according to Kuhlmann, can hardly be reconciled with paragraph 8 of the Federal leave law. Understandably, thus Kuhlmann continues, the employers, in view of the new reservist concept, will more often than in the past request the Hardthoehe [seat of the ministry of defense] to consider time factors to the maximum extent possible when calling up employees, i.e. to call them up when they can best be spared. Deferments, when required in the public interest or by the importance of the enterprise, or excusing an employee from participating in reserve training, when such participation would mean a personal hardship for the reservist, are legally possible options for accommodating the desires of private and also public employers and the individual himself. In addition to the peacetime manning of 495,000 soldiers, circa 750,000 reservists with M-day assignments are needed in a national defense emergency. [Text] [Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 20 Sep 85 p3] 12689/9312

RESERVISTS CIVIL DEFENSE POTENTIAL--Duesseldorf--On the subject of peace and security policy, the kreis [CDU] organization of Neuss will bring forward a motion at the Rhenish CDU state [land] party congress in Duesseldorf on 18 and 19 October which has the discussion of basic principles as its goal. In

justifying this move, the two members of the defense committee in Bonn, Bundestag members Willy Wimmer (election district Neuss) and Bernd Wilz (election district Solingen-Remscheid), also addressed questions related to Bundeswehr planning up to the year 2000. Organization and defense strategy of the Bundeswehr should be reconsidered. A greater utilization of the 2.6 to 2.8 million reservists is also demanded. The Bundestag members recommend the employment of reservists in disaster control (fire departments, technical relief organizations, etc). The freedom to choose between disaster control and the Bundeswehr, on the other hand, must be discontinued. Wimmer: "Whoever can serve must also serve." With their well-founded training, reservists could benefit disaster control considerably. A change in the current system would be feasible by the end of the 1980's. Basically, the two representatives--Wimmer is at the same time spokesman for defense policies in the CDU caucus in the Bundestag--wish to trigger a discussion of security policies within the Rhenish CDU, which would have to continue nationwide within the party. The principles cited in the motion to be made at the party congress speak of great efforts to overcome the threat of nuclear annihilation. Disarmament negotiations should concentrate on the reduction of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in East and West. A zone free of atomic weapons, on the other hand, would bring no benefits, since it would not prevent the stocking of atomic weapons. Progress at the MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions] negotiations in Vienna would be conceivable if the Soviets withdraw a tank army from the GDR. [Text] [Duesseldorf WESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11 Oct 85 p 3] 12689/9312

RESERVE OFFICERS EXTENSION COURSE--Hammelburg--A new course, titled "Tactical Advanced Training for Reserve Officers," recently had its premier at Combat Troops School 1 in Hammelburg. This course is designed to enable reserve staff officers to pass their tactical knowledge on while working with reservists within and outside the Bundeswehr, and to do this on their own responsibility. Participants in the pilot course were commanders or deputy commanders of infantry units of battalion size and up. [Text] [Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 6 Nov 85 p 1] 12689/9312

CSO: 3620/150

MILITARY

FRANCE

MITTERRAND SEEKS FRENCH ROLE IN EFA PROGRAM

Paris LE MONDE in French 10-11 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "Variable Geometry Fighter Aircraft"]

[Text] President Mitterrand announced in Bonn on Friday 8 November that France was prepared to take a small role in the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) program.

After the breakup of the five-nation meeting in Turin on 1 August 1985, France had found itself alone versus the four European countries--West Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain--that had agreed to build the EFA. In an effort to avert this setback, Mitterrand had urged his partners to show some imagination in trying to resolve their impasse.

In essence, the chief of state had argued that Europe could follow for its military aviation the example of what it is successfully doing for its civil aviation. In the latter case, the existence of different requirements submitted by the various airlines had prompted European manufacturers of the Airbus to plan for a series or family of transports. Why not readopt this same strategy for the EFA since military requirements in Europe do not coincide?

During his talks with Helmut Kohl on 24 August 1985 at Fort Bregancon, the French president, suggested to the West German chancellor that Europe could have the aircraft industries of five or even more nations collaborate on several European fighter aircraft projects. In that way, two complementary types of aircraft could coexist. One would be a heavy fighter optimized for air superiority and designed more particularly for the four countries having signed the Turin agreement. The other would be a light fighter for the French Air Force.

In his more recent 8 November discussions in Bonn with West German officials, Mitterrand reiterated his earlier proposal but with additional details.

His proposal requests that French manufacturers be given a 5 to 10 percent share in the first program--the 10.5-ton twin-engine jet fighter approved at the Turin meeting--in exchange for participation by manufacturers of the four European countries--including Spain which already favors such an arrangement--in the second program, namely France's 9-ton twin-engine jet fighter.

As explained, on 8 November, by French Defense Minister Paul Quilès, this proposal does not mean that the five-nation EFA program is being revived and that the five air forces would each buy both types of aircraft. According specifically to the defense minister, France would contribute its expertise in avionics to the heavier aircraft of its four partners while the latter would, within their capabilities, help France develop and build its own lighter aircraft.

President Mitterrand's proposal has one essentially political point in its favor. If this crisscross cooperation were to succeed, it would demonstrate Europe's willingness and capacity to take an active part in its own defense by rising above national susceptibilities. Yet from an engineering, industrial and financial standpoint, practical implementation of the French proposal is a very complicated matter, in that it presupposes, as is the case with the Airbus, existence of an extragovernmental multinational consortium assuming full responsibility for directing execution of the various projects from beginning to end.

8041

CSO: 3519/47

MILITARY

FRANCE

COL ARNAUBEC (SPARTACUS) CRITICIZES PS MILITARY POLICY

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 124-125

[Article by Spartacus (Colonel Gerard Arnaubec): "Spartacus Accuses Quiles of Wanting to Break the Army"]

[Text] Murmurs and whispers to the effect that the army is sick. And then, suddenly, a cry: the army is dying! Strategy, armament, "crisis management" by politicians, all are bones of contention. The great mute [army] has now become loquacious in an effort to ward off the dangers hanging over our country.

High-level military authorities have been systematically calling attention to these dangers since the day the socialists assumed power. It will be recalled that General Delaunay, the army chief of staff, resigned in March 1983 with a great-to-do, impugning the evolution in France's strategy and stigmatizing the havoc wrought by psychological warfare and by insidious propaganda directed at us by the Eastern bloc. These were impalatable truths for a socialist-communist government to swallow.

Exactly 1 year later, in March 1984, General Copel resigned from the French Air Force, and published a book, "Vaincre la guerre" [Vanquish War]. In this book, which made a great stir, General Copel challenged the latest strategic options chosen by the country's top-level political and military authorities. He wrote "Nuclear deters only nuclear". He argued that against an attack conducted solely with conventional and chemical warfare weapons, the French Army lacked the conventional troops and materiel enabling it to check the aggressor. Addressing himself to the aged hierarchs of official French strategy, he asserted, and I agree with him, that our president will never take the initiative in triggering the nuclear holocaust. I will go further and say that if our NATO allies ever suspected him of considering taking such an initiative when they were opposed to it, they could, if they felt it to be absolutely necessary, neutralize a significant part of our strategic nuclear force even before the order to commit that force had been issued.

The most recent cry uttered by our military still resounds in our ears. It had to do with armament. On 1 November 1985, General Philippe Arnold, commander of the 1st Armored Division--one of the army's most prestigious commands--revealed that the AMX-30 main battle tank, the backbone of the French Army's armored forces, is technically obsolete, and that West German

and British main battle tanks are vastly superior. We are two generations behind. The defense minister's response: "Certain generals are the ones who are two wars behind in their thinking". This is a ridiculous remark when one realizes that Philippe Arnold--without wishing to minimize the courage of his action--simply said what any French citizen can learn by reading the military periodicals--for example, the excellent INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW--which are on sale in most bookstores. Relieving a general of his command for such a reason is nothing short of ludicrous. Defense Minister Paul Quilès has now fully realized this and announced that General Arnold will be given a new assignment very shortly. Nevertheless, the ruthless ouster of the 1st Armored Division commander has created a shock wave within the army. Look out for the backlash!

After the protests about strategy and armament there remains the problems of "crisis management" by politicians. The army was able, behind the scenes, to compel the government to negotiate with the Auckland authorities over the fate of the Turenge [alias of two French Army intelligence agents held in New Zealand in connection with the bombing of the Greenpeace flagship "Rainbow Warrior"]. Their case is not closed, but it is progressing satisfactorily. However, I would rather have nothing to do with that affair. Hence for purposes of characterizing the army's disgust at the government's action, I shall limit myself to discussing my own case, namely "Operation Manta" in Chad.

After having been in the thick of the highly difficult problems posed by moving and then supporting a 3,000-man expeditionary force more than 5,000 kilometers from France, and after having gauged the enormous risks our troops would have run if Qadhafi had not halted his advance at Fada and Faya-Largeau in early August 1983, I could not concede having a megalomaniacal camel driver snub us politically and militarily while flouting our withdrawing "peacekeeping forces". The armed forces general staff's very recent theory of "crisis management" demands that there be no winner or loser at the end of such contingency operations as "Manta". A sorry admission of impotence in Francois Mitterrand's Chadian adventure is the fact that in that operation there was a winner, namely the chief of the Libyan Jamahiriya, and a loser, the President of France.

The pusillanimous conduct of our socialist rulers has produced rumblings of mutiny. And let me tell you this exclusive secret: the defense minister currently suspects certain Naval Aviation officers—who took part in the perilous raid on Baalbek, conducted to avenge the 58 paratroopers buried beneath the ruins of the Drakkar building in Beirut on 23 October 1983--of also wanting to shed full light on that lamentable episode in the saga of the "peacekeeping forces".

Why are there so many cries of alarm within the army? Because military personnel no longer have confidence in the men who took up their governmental perch in May 1981. Servicemen are sick and tired of bombastic statements, of lies and treachery, of soccer's apprentices and head-hunters.

A person has to have a short memory to dare castigate General Arnold, when Colonel De Gaulle, reiterating General Etienne's views, preached about the value of tanks much before the outbreak of World War II. De Gaulle was not transferred. But that did not prevent Adolf Hitler from getting to Paris and gazing upon the Eiffel Tower from the Trocadero esplanade one morning in June 1940.

Is it indiscipline, spiced this time with a pinch of treachery, to show that "France's vocation to play a role in world affairs" is constantly being affirmed--as Regis Debray has written--but yet that our country has neither the political will nor military resources, and even less the diplomatic determination, to oppose the expansionist designs of a Qadhdhafi?

It was decided, however, that Delaunay was impossible, Copel and Arnold indisciplined, and Spartacus disloyal.

And yet this list of scandals is far from complete. Indeed, in addition to the Turenges--who falsely claimed to be man and wife, and are the expiatory victims of Pierre Joxe's political ambitions--there are, at the present time, some 1,200 French "blue helmets" [UN forces] who are hostages to the rival Druse, Shiite, Christian and other factions clashing in southern Lebanon, plus a few dozen other French troops--little mention is ever made of them--in the Sinai within submachine gun range of the first Egyptian soldier to go berserk. No sooner had Francois Mitterrand reveled in the pomp of the funeral ceremony for the 54 French paratroopers sacrificed in Beirut on the altar of socialist pacifism, that he lost no time in offering nearly 80 new hostages, the well-known "white helmets", to "President Gemayel's puppet government." Five of these "peacekeeping soldiers" have already been shot to death by fanatics!

The vast majority of army personnel continues to be silent. But the destructive action taken by the government has revived interest in a pithy phrase throughout the army. That phrase is the heart-rending cry uttered one day by Marshal Lyautey: "Indiscipline is a soldier's most difficult duty". Our duty today is to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

8041

CSO: 3519/47

MILITARY

FRANCE

GROUP CREATED TO STUDY USE OF WEAPONS, AIR FORCE IN SPACE

Paris AIR ACTUALITIES in French Nov 85 p 8

[Article: "Air Space Group"]

[Text] The Air [Force] Space Group (GEA) was formed within the Air Force Headquarters and General Staff (EMAA) on 15 September 1985. This group is charged with the task of conducting studies on the impact the use of space may possibly have on French Air Force equipment, organization, and operational concepts.

Chaired by the EMAA's deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, a general officer, the group is directed by the head of the Forecasting and Study Office (BPE). Its permanent secretariat is manned by personnel of that office's space section. All elements of the EMAA are represented within the group. The Air Space Group has a very broad sphere of activity. It is specifically charged with:

- a. Representing the air force within the Military Space Coordination Group and participating in preparation of the multi-year military space plan;
- b. Monitoring various aspects of all space programs in coordination with such competent military and civil activities as the Space Studies Group, Armed Forces Headquarters and General Staff, Strategic Studies Group, National Defense General Secretariat, National Center for Space Studies (CNES), etc.;
- c. Keeping itself abreast of developments in the strategic, technical, financial, legislative, and regulatory aspects of national and international space policy;
- d. Conducting air force-related study of scientific, technical and operational problems stemming from the use of space (in association with such competent agencies as, for example, the Center for Studies and Research in Aerospace Medicine);
- e. Coordinating and ensuring the consistency of air force requirements pertaining to the use of space;
- f. Examining the foreseeable impact of possible military use of space on air force operational concepts;

- g. Proposing new or revised studies to meet air force requirements in space or reckon with changing aerospace threats;
- h. Studying possible organizational structures in the light of the diverse aspects of military space;
- i. Monitoring space budgets and the funding of national and international aerospace programs.

Creation of the GEA is a concrete expression of the importance the air force, in its entirety, attaches to space, and also of the air force's desire to be present and take an active role in that domain which is the natural extension of its everyday sphere of activity.

It will be recalled that the first two French astronauts were Colonel Chretien and Lieutenant Colonel Baudry, both of whom are engineers and fighter pilots and Air Force Academy graduates.

The group of new astronauts recently selected by the CNES again includes two graduates of the Air Force Academy: Lieutenant Colonel Tognini of the Cazaux Flight Test Center and Lieutenant Colonel Haignere who was recently assigned to the BPE's space section after 5 years service as a test pilot at the Flight Test Center.

8041

CSO: 3519/47

MILITARY

FRANCE

DEFENSE MINISTRY COUNSELOR ON BUDGET POLICY 1981-1986

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 85 pp 31-70

[Article by Frederic Tiberghien, rapporteur of the Council of State, technical counselor of the office of the minister of defense since May 1983 has offered DEFENSE NATIONALE a very well documented article on defense budget policy since 1981, which follows: "Defense Effort Since 1981."

[Text] The ambition of the defense policy which was adopted in 1981 was to modernize our armed forces, increase their efficiency and intensify their ties with the nation.

The following main targets were set in order to obtain it: to modernize our nuclear forces, which guarantee France's independence and international credibility; to modernize our conventional forces and their support, our ground forces in particular; to improve national army service and continue to enhance the status of the military; and to lay the foundations of a military spatial policy, of which we were woefully short.

Although this action was not perfectly understood at all times at its beginning, the understanding of it has greatly improved today. Support for it would be even total at this point if we were willing to acknowledge that the funds necessary for its implementation were provided.

For this is the last major objection still formulated in opposing the government's defense policy: the white papers on defense, which were issued last summer, were mainly on this subject. It is thus that recently the political debate concerning our defense was reduced to a budgetary one.

On the basis of a study of the development of financial resources appropriated for the defense of France and their utilization, the purpose of this article is to present the priorities of the government's activity and indicate the manner in which the necessary financial means for the implementation of the set targets were provided.

Development of Defense Allocations

A. Trends Based on Major Indicators

1. Amount of Defense Budget Excluding Pensions

Table 1

	In billion francs and in CP (Payment Credits) ²											
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986						
Current		%	%	%	%	%						
Francs	104.4 -	119.6 +14.5	132.3 +11.3	142.1 +6.7	150.2 5.7	158.35 +5.4						
Constant												
Francs	104.4 -	106.8 +2.3	108.6 +1.7	108.2 -0.4	108.3 +0.1	110.1 +1.7						

1) The inflation index for the figures given in this article is the one most currently used in this case: prices in merchant PIB [GNP]. Bearing in mind the date at which this article was signed to press, the price indicators used were those of the economic budgets for the spring of 1985. The figure of 3.7 percent was applied to 1986.

2) The programming laws being based on payment credits since 1977, all figures mentioned in this article are in CP.

2. Share of the Defense Budget in the State Budget

Table 2

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Share	16.9 %	15.5 %	15.5 %	15.1 %	15.1 %	15.4 %

3. Share of the Defense Budget in the State Budget Other Than the Public Debt

Table 3

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Share	18 %	16.7 %	16.1 %	16.3 %	16.5 %	16.9 %


4. Share of Military Investments in State Capital Investments (titles IV and VI)

Table 4

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Share	47.9 %	46 %	44.7 %	45.7 %	46.3 %	49.1 %

5. Share of the State and Defense Budgets of the PIBm

Diagram 1



These tables and graphs reveal the following trends:

Our overall defense effort did not weaken between 1981 and 1986, for the non-pension budget increased throughout the period by 1.1 percent annually in volume, which equals two-thirds of the increased national wealth in terms of PIBm (+1.6 %);

The share of the defense budget as part of the state budget reached its lowest point between 1983 and 1985, showing a recovery in 1986;

This share, in terms of the state budget, excluding the public debt, declined until 1983 but began to increase as of 1984;

growth of the public debt, its relative share has been increasing since 1983; military investments have followed the same trend in state capital expenditures.

B. Allocations for Operations and Equipment

1. Change in volume

Table 5

Year	Title III		Title IV		Total defense	
	Amount	Growth	Amount	Growth	Amount	Growth
1981	56.7	-	47.7	-	104.4	-
1982 ¹	59.4	+4.8 %	47.4	-0.6 %	106.8	+2.3 %
1983	58.9	-0.8 %	49.7	+4.9 %	108.6	+1.7 %
1984	57.5	-2.4 %	50.7	+2 %	108.2	-0.4 %
1985	56.6	-1.6 %	51.7	+2 %	108.3	-0.1 %
1986	57.5	+1.6 %	52.6	+1.8 %	110.1	+1.7 %
Average						
Growth 81-86	-	+0.3 %	-	+2 %	-	+1.1 %

(1) All figures for 1982, unless otherwise indicated, are after the annulment of funds in title IV.

This basic feature enables us to single out the main features of the budgetary policy pursued during the legislative period:

Between 1981 and 1986 the average annual growth of funds for equipment was 2 percent in volume, thus indicating their priorities;

Taking such priorities into consideration, budgetary adjustments were made in operational expenditures, the growth of which fluctuated as the years went by. With a low overall budget growth, such expenditures for voluntarily restrained (1984-1985); with a strong budget growth, they followed the general trend;

For the entire 1981-1986 period, operational funds increased slightly, thus maintaining the armament purchasing power.¹

The balance which the government chose, therefore, was a difficult one: during a period of economic crisis it refused to increase the appropriation of defense funds from the national wealth; equipment financing, however, was continued.

2. Development of Relative Shares

Table 6

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Share, Title III...	59	57.9	56.8	55	54.3	55.6	54.3	53.1	52.3	52.2
Share of										
Titles V and VI.	41	42.1	43.2	45	45.7	44.4	45.7	46.9	47.7	47.8
Total.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The increased share of equipment expenditures as part of the defense budget, quite clearly shown in this table, is a consequence of the trends we indicated. It shows an incontestable continuity from previous years. This emphasis on equipment means the specific translation in terms of the armed forces of the policy of modernization undertaken by the government in the key sectors of national life. One-half of French military appropriations will soon be allocated for equipment.

Analysis of the Evolution and Utilization of Operational Funds

Following a spectacular growth between 1974 and 1981 (+ 37.7 % in volume)², the cost of French military operational instruments became virtually stable between 1981 and 1986. Does this mean that no change took place in the allocation of such expenditures or that no major reform was undertaken by the government due to the lack of necessary funds?

A. Study of the Development of Major Defense Categories

1. General Trends

Table 7

Expense category	1981	1982	In million constant francs 1981			
			1983	1984	1985	1986 ¹
Salaries and social expenditures....	37,986	39,634	39,454	38,901	38,841	39,239
Food.....	1,965	1,955	2,008	1,974	1,944	1,938
Fuels.....	3,846	4,301	3,924	3,330	3,165	3,339
Materiel maintenance...	3,962	3,833	3,876	3,816	3,651	3,753
Operations.....	9,088	9,690	9,660	9,465	8,984	9,198
Total.....	56,758	58,891	58,923	57,487	56,587	57,467

(1) The elimination of the supplementary fuel budget starting with 1986 is normally the result of the separate valuation of its share, previously included in fuel allocations as an individual cost category. For purposes of homogeneity, the structure for 1986 is the same as for 1985.

Table 7 emphasizes the following main features: after showing a substantial increase in 1982, the amount of defense salaries stabilized at roughly 39 billion 1981 constant francs; this is an unprecedented halt since the end of the 1960s;

Food allocations showed a remarkable stability;

Substantial savings were achieved in fuel allocations since 1982;

Maintenance funds included in Title III were equally stabilized in volume;

Finally, strictly operational funds, after a substantial drop in 1985, regained the level of the beginning of the period in 1986, i.e., in the final account, their development was stabilized as well.

2. Evolution of Salary Costs

The obtained result has two major explanations: the policy followed by the government relative to public office and the reduction of the forces as stipulated by the military programming law.

After granting substantial advantages to its officials in 1981 and 1982, from which the defense personnel benefited as much as, the policy pursued by the government was one of maintaining their average mass purchase power. The stabilization of the mass of salaries followed, shown perfectly clearly in Table 7.

To this we add the result of personnel reductions by 35,000 people as stipulated in the programming law. This reduction was carried out as quickly as possible after the programming law was passed in the summer of 1983; more than half of it was completed by the end of 1985. The resulting net savings between 1984 and 1986 were in excess of 1.8 billion francs.

Briefly, the bet which was made in 1983 of achieving substantial savings³ through personnel reduction, such as not to alter our defense capability, was won.

3. Evolution of Fuel Expenditures

Between 1974 and 1980 fuel expenditures had had to be quadrupled in current francs as a result of the initial petroleum price shocks, so that we could continue to acquire a steady amount of fuels, except for the period between 1975 and 1977.

These funds more than doubled in current francs between 1980 and 1982; since then they have been declining without such a decline to be translated into a major drop in consumption as shown in Appendix 1, by virtue, specifically, of drops in barrel prices.

4. Evolution of Materiel Maintenance Funds⁴

5. Evolution of Current Operational Funds

The amount of such funds greatly determines the view of their beneficiaries on development of their living standard. The amount increased significantly in 1982 as shown in Table 7. It dropped subsequently but climbed again in 1986. As was the case with other items, 1984 and 1985 were the hardest years for the managers. Since the level which had been reached by the end of the period was slightly higher than at the beginning, the study of this item confirms that the purchasing power of the armed forces was retained between 1981 and 1986.⁵

B. Did the Stabilization of Operational Funds Prevent Necessary Reforms and Alter Our Defense Capability?

It would not be possible, nor is this the subject of this article, to draw up a balance of the reforms made between 1981 and 1986. It would be interesting, however, to choose one or two areas to illustrate the effort shown in terms of

inventiveness and organization displayed, in order to have accomplished major changes despite virtually amounts of funds.

1. Taking into consideration salaries included in Title III (more than two-thirds), unquestionably the personnel policy offers the most remarkable example of this viewpoint.

The steps taken to improve the financial condition of defense personnel, described as "categorical measures," developed as follows, starting with 1970:

Table 8

In million constant francs 1981

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Regular army personnel.....	172.8	427.7	267	308.7	543.1	471.2	1,914.8
Conscripted.....	0	34.6	61.7	45	25.2	204.7	0
Civilian personnel...	24.2	42.0	19.7	52.1	21.2	11.2	55.2
Total.....	197.0	504.3	348.4	405.8	589.5	767.1	1,970.0

Table 8 continued

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
818.6	235	153.8	146.2	24	11.7	11.4	19.3	12.5	48.4	
167.1	43.5	33.8	34.5	98	238.4	71.4	46.9	32.5	97.5	
16.3	9.1	25.5	15.5	8.9	4.8	5	2.6	1.7	2.9	
1,002	287.6	213.1	196.2	130.9	254.9	87.8	68.8	46.7	148.8	


Although decreed in 1977, the category halt was slow in yielding results. Such results become truly apparent starting with 1981, thus contributing to the stabilization of defense salaries.

Therefore, this is a clash between two components. Whereas economic growth remained quite high and because insufficient funds were appropriated for the country's defense,⁶ between 1968 and 1978 the French government sacrificed the long term military equipment of the country, bearing in mind the need they faced in improving the military condition and the level of activities of the armed forces.

This analysis is unquestionably confirmed by Diagram 2 which traces the growth of the major components of Title III in terms of volume.

Conversely, the present government has maintained withholdings from the national wealth to the benefit of the defense establishment, despite a reduced economic growth. Noting, however, that the military situation has been substantially improved and no longer requires a significant and immediate financial effort, it has reduced the distribution of category advantages in the long term interests of the country and its military equipment and modernization.

Diagram 2



A clear exception is shown in Table 8, however: Conscripts continued to benefit from a sustained financial effort on the part of the state after 1981. The upkeep of conscripts was improved by 14.2 percent on an average and affected all ranks. Table 9 shows the development of maintenance costs in constant francs by rank:

Table 9

Rank	In 1981 constant francs						Percent of Change 81/86
	1981 Rate on 1 April	1982 Rate on 1 Jan.	1983 Rate on 1 July	1984 Rate on 1 Sept.	1985 Rate on 1 July	1986 Rate on 1 Jan.	
Officer							
Candidate...	22.00	25.50	27.00	28.80	29.20	30.25	+37.50 %
Sergeant....	15.00	17.10	20.40	23.10	24.35	25.10	+67.35 %
Lance Corp..	13.00	14.40	16.30	18.50	19.50	20.20	+55.40 %
Corporal....	11.50	12.50	14.30	16.45	17.00	17.60	+53.00 %
1st Class...	10.50	11.25	11.70	12.35	12.20	12.60	+20.00 %
2nd Class...	10.50	10.25	10.20	10.30	9.75	10.10	- 4.00 % ¹

1) Taking into consideration the creation of a bonus for field service in 1982, virtually doubled in 1985, the purchase power of the maintenance of a second class conscript in a combat unit has shown clear improvement.

The amount of the upkeep was rated in order to encourage assumption of responsibility in the armed forces; a bonus was introduced for service in the field, to reward those who engage in field operations and experience the constraints of military life; free travel and additional leave were introduced. Free transportation on German railroads was granted to conscripts serving in the French armed forces and a special compensation for fluctuations in the exchange rate of the German mark was established in their favor.

These new financial benefits were also paralleled by a significant number of steps which made profound changes in the conditions of national military service: The creation of a long-term voluntary service, which met with great success, a reform of general discipline regulations, thus abolishing useless constraints, development of regimental commissions, development of cultural and vocational training activities within the framework of protocols coordinated with concerned ministries, reform of the conscientious objector system, elimination of the unfair loss of pension because of accident, increased number of auxiliary policemen, initiation to data processing, lesser disparity in housing allowances (the indirect consequence of which led to savings in transportation costs), etc.

All such important reforms emphasized the active enrollment of young people in the armed forces and preserved the financial benefits of personnel already in the services. This example shows perfectly clearly that without experiencing financial difficulties the government was able to make extensive reforms, which were expected by those affected, and to increase youth involvement.

The substantial reduction in funds for "category measures" does not, however, mean that no further improvements will be made in the condition of the military and defense personnel. Priorities have been set in the area of social justice. Like civilian employees, military personnel were granted an additional week of paid leave. This legislation will be rounded up with compensations for previous injustices: substantial increase in some retirement pensions, increases in the special progressive payments to voluntary enlisted soldiers and corporals (involving more than 20,000, who were the least well paid defense personnel, and the wages of some of whom were way below the average salary) and, finally, the establishment of long term contracts which would guarantee enlisted personnel possibilities of a more secure career.

Another priority is that of higher compensation for risks and duties specific to military conditions. Indemnity for killed or wounded military personnel in the course of military operations outside the country, police actions or criminal attempts, was substantially raised. Moving compensation will be enacted in 1986: 50 million francs have been appropriated to this effect. Steps to facilitate the retirement and reemployment in civilian positions were also revised and extended to some noncommissioned officers.

Finally, the reduction of personnel took place without worsening career prospects of regular army personnel.

All in all, improvements in the materiel situation of the personnel were carried out without obstructing the taking of qualitative and equally very important steps (extending union rights in defense establishments, reform and

regionalizing of the superior military council, opening the armed forces to women, raising the level of recruitment of noncommissioned officers, extending training time in officer schools, etc.).

Briefly, personnel policy was characterized by a selective approach: The funds which were made available went in their entirety to alleviate the hardships of military life.

2. The other example concerns the operational activities of the armed forces. Did the slight drop in fuel consumption and limitations in operational costs lead to a decline in the training and operational worthiness of the forces?

Available statistical data indicate that the level of activity did not show and overall decline between 1981 and 1986 with the selective exception of 1984 (naval aviation), and in 1985, as shown in table 10 (a favorable development of petroleum prices and the exchange rate of the dollar would unquestionably change somewhat the projections which had been made at the end of 1984 of a five percent reduction in addition to 1985 operations).

Table 10

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 1st half year perform. proj.	1986	
AIR							
(flight hours).	420,000	410,050	400,000 ¹	400,000	200,000	385,000	400,000
NAVY							
Combat Navy							
(days at sea)...	86	86	100	102	56	95	100
Naval Aviation							
(flight hours).	95,400	97,705	97,700	93,000		92,500	97,000
ARMY							
(days of action)	100 ²	100	100	100		100	100
including with basic equipment	47	47	50	45		40	42

1) 400,000 hours is the norm stipulated in the military programming law.

2) In 1975 the number of days in the field was 70 per year, 35 of which with basic equipment.

However, it is true that the nature of such activities had to be adapted to the difficulty of the times: the air force gave priority to its combat aviation by controlling more strictly the flying time of other air force personnel; some field exercises of the ground forces were canceled and converted into PC and transmission exercises; sorties with materiel were more limited but remained quite higher than the level reached 10 years previously; the emphasis was in heavy investments in simulators.

All in all, whereas activity funds (which include fuel and some operational expenditures as detailed in Appendix 2) showed a development which substantially contrasted with the development of the period, a development

which reflects quite faithfully fluctuations in Title III, in terms of volume their overall standard was maintained as indicated in Table 11:

Table 11						
1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
145	155	147	147.5	150	142.9	148

This upkeep of the purchase power of activity funds is the reason for which the level of activities remained, even in 1985, quite above the 1975 level (Index 105, which is the reason for which the occasional comparison made with the situations which prevailed at that time (the Karlsruhe and Draguignan incidents) is by no means conclusive. The maintaining of the purchase power also explains the fact that despite the undeniable sacrifices which were asked of the units in 1984 and 1985 and which were courageously accepted, their operational worth did not decline. Actually, the trend of the previous two years was overturned in 1986: The increase in volume of Title III allows a five percent increase in the volume of activities.

To conclude, the two examples we provided, which do not cover the entire subject but pertain to areas dear to defense personnel, indicate that the management of the funds involved no magic. Important reallocation of funds took place, substantial savings were achieved and reforms which changed the faith of our defense were carried out.

Analysis of the Development and Utilization of Equipment Funds

The further efforts made in terms of equipment were a major target of governmental action. In order to prove this, it would suffice to place this effort within a long-term context before undertaking the study of the priorities which were retained and improvements which were thus made in our defense.

A. French Military Equipment Effort: Does the 1981-1986 Period Indicate a Break With the Past?

1. Table 12 shows the development in constant francs, between 1960 and 1986 of funds for Titles V and VI for the country's military equipment:

Table 12													
In billion 1985 constant francs													
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Initial													
Structure..	32.4	30.7	28.8	38.1	42.8	47.4	50.2	52.8	54.2	50.3	48.8	47.8	48.4
1985													
Structure..	36.4	34.7	32.8	41.8	46.4	51	53.7	56.4	56.1	51.9	50.4	49.4	50

Table 12 (continued)

1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
51.3	50	47.4	47.4	50	54.2	57.5	61.6	66.3	66.6	69	70.5	71.7	73
52.7	50.7	48.1	48.1	50.8	55.2	58.6	62.8	66.3	66.6	69	70.5	71.7	73


Diagram 3 is a visual presentation of this development.

2. The table and the diagram provide extensive information:

After declining until 1962 (end of the war in Algeria), military equipment funds showed a spectacular increase until 1968; the fact that such funds almost doubled in 6 years was clearly related to the establishment of our nuclear forces, under the impetus of General de Gaulle;

After reaching their peak in 1967-1968, equipment efforts literally collapsed: by 1978 they were still below their 1968 level; what makes this decline even worse is that meanwhile the PIBm increased by 57 percent⁷;

Diagram 3



Although an unquestionable increase was began in 1976, at least until 1978 it was merely to compensate for the previous decline;

The start of the 7-year term of F. Mitterrand showed no break whatsoever with the past; on the contrary, let us emphasize the perfect continuity with the previous efforts, which proceeded smoothly.

3. Increasing funds, therefore, were appropriated by the government for equipping our forces; this supplement enabled us to finance the general updating of our defense. This budgetary effort may be synthesized by the figures in Table 12: Between 1976 and 1981, the government appropriated 53.2 billion constant francs more than it had during the five preceding years for the country's military equipment; between 1981 and 1986 the government allocated 16.3 billion more than in the 1981 budget. The closeness of such figures, however, should not mislead us: If we retain as a reference the 1976 budget, the increased purchase power of the armed forces between 1981 and 1986 was 100.3 billion. In absolute figures, therefore, this increase was double between 1981 and 1986 compared to the 1976-1981 period. The good results in terms of purchases, deliveries, studies and research, therefore, were neither miraculous nor fictitious. They were based on a willful, tenacious and persistent financial effort.

B. Detailed Analysis of Major Defense Categories

1. General Trends

Equipment expenditures developed as shown in Table 13.

Table 13

	1981	1982	In billion 1981 constant francs			
			1983	1984	1985	1986
Nuclear forces.....	14.3	13.9	15.7	16.6	16.9	17.6
Major programs.....	11.8	13	9.1	9.3	9.9	11.1
Long-term studies (*)...	1.8	5.3	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.4
Development (*).....	3.5		3.1	3.6	3.8	3.9
Other production.....	5.9	5	9.6	8.6	8.1	7.2
Ammunition (**).....	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.7	2.6
Ordnance upkeep.....	2.8	2.8	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.5
Personnel maintenance...	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1
Infrastructure.....	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.2
Total.....	47.7	50.2	49.7	50.7	51.7	52.6

(*) Special long term studies and nuclear development.

(**) Other than ammunition included in the major programs.

This picture emphasizes the following major features:

Priority was given to the nuclear forces, for funds appropriated for them increased by more than four percent annually (a rate almost triple that of the growth of the PIPm for the same period);

Conventional individual programs included in the military programming law also benefited from a substantial priority (+ 8 percent annually): Their relative share declined when the previous law expired in 1983; it resumed its growth in 1984 with the new law; this priority granted to the major programs did not take place to the detriment of other armament programs ("other production"), for their growth averaged five percent annually;

Long term studies as well showed a spectacular growth (+ 6 percent per year, or nearly quadruple the percentage of growth of the PIBm);

Development increased less (+ 2 percent) but was equally higher than the growth of the PIBm;

Infrastructural funds remained stable, while funds for ammunition and personnel maintenance declined.⁸

Briefly, this shows that the choices had been made: accelerated updating of nuclear forces, updating conventional forces through the major programs and armament manufacturing, and preparations for the future through the study and development of materials for the future.

2. Funds Allocated for Nuclear Forces:

Table 14 shows the development of the various components of such expenditures:

Table 14

	1981	1982	1983	In billion 1981 francs		
				1984	1985	1986
Research and Development.....	7.7	7.9	7.3	7.4	6.7	6.7
Manufacturing.....	3.5	4.1	5.2	6.0	6.9	7.3
Upkeep.....	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.4
Infrastructure.....	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.1
Total.....	14.3	13.9	15.7	16.5	16.9	17.5

This development is of interest, for it characterizes the efforts made over a 5-year period.

Funds for research and development declined by nearly 13 percent between 1981 and 1986. This decline was the consequence of the development of the M4 missile, with which our sixth nuclear submarine, L'Inflexible, is armed, and which was commissioned in 1985. Excluding the funds for the development of the M4⁽⁹⁾, funds for research increased from 5.5 billion francs in 1981 to 6.4 billion in 1986: this proves that our efforts did not abate and that we are currently working on future developments and preparing materiel to be used in the future (the Hades program, which succeeded the Pluton program, was

initiated in 1983; studies for a new generation submarine, to be commissioned in 1994, were undertaken in 1981, etc.).

Between 1981 and 1986 armament production funds more than doubled: it is this doubling of funds in 5 years that explains the updating of our nuclear forces, of which virtually all components benefited: the hardening of installations at the Albion Plateau was completed in 1984; L'Inflexible was commissioned, as planned, in 1985; the program for rebuilding first generation nuclear submarines was undertaken with a view to arming them with M4; the first redesigned Mirage V will become operational, as planned, in 1986; the first Mirage 2000 N, armed with ASMP missile, will be delivered in 1986; KC 125 supply airplanes are being equipped with CFM 56 jet engines; the program of hardening communications channel for launching is in good shape. All in all, French nuclear deterrence has covered a major stage in the course of the laws which were passed, marked by gaining access to a multiple warhead technology, a significant advance in the hardening of our installations and a remarkable improvement in the performance of our manned nuclear forces.¹⁰

Let us also note the stabilization of the cost of maintenance of our nuclear forces, although the number of our nuclear submarines permanently deployed at sea reached 3 in 1983.

As to infrastructural expenditures, they paralleled the doubling of production funds (completion of building workshops, special ammunition dumps, etc.).

The breakdown of funds between strategic nuclear forces and prestrategic nuclear forces was as follows:

Table 15.

	In billion 1981 constant francs					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Strategic Forces.....	13.4	14.4	14.5	14.7	14.6	14.6
Prestrategic Forces.....	0.9	0.7	1.2	1.9	2.3	3
Total.....	14.3	15.1	15.7	16.6	16.9	17.6

Whereas funds appropriated for strategic forces accounted for more than 80 percent of total appropriations for nuclear forces during the period, the increase in funds for prestrategic armaments was extremely rapid. This was due above all to the production of ASMP missiles and Mirage 200 N programs which had been started before 1981, and the development of the Hades, which was started in 1983.

3. Research, Study and Development Funds

Table 16 shows the general lines of our military research and development over the past five years.

This table calls for the following comments:

The amount of funds appropriated for research and development remained stable for the period; it accounted for slightly over 25 percent of equipment funds;

Long-term research was given obvious priority, both in the nuclear and conventional areas (their annual growth averaged five percent);

Table 16

	In billion 1981 constant francs					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Long range studies						
Conventional.....	1.8	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.4
Nuclear.....	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.9	2
Long range studies--total Title V...	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.9	4.3	4.4
Long range studies Title III.....	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Totals Titles III + V.....	3.7	3.9	3.7	4.2	4.6	4.7
Development						
Classical.....	3.6	3.8	3.1	3.6	3.8	3.9
Nuclear.....	6	6.2	5.7	5.6	4.8	4.7
Total Title V.....	9.6	10	8.8	9.2	8.6	9.6
Total research and development Title V.....	13	13.6	12.2	13.1	12.9	13
Total research and development Titles III + V.....	13.3	13.9	12.5	13.4	13.1	13.3

Whereas nuclear development was reduced (item B-2), and whereas this reduction explains the overall reduction in development for the period, the reduction in nuclear development was paralleled by a significant growth of conventional development (+ 2 percent per year), especially with the enactment of the new programming law. It was indeed under this law that the development was undertaken of materiel scheduled to take over in the 1990s from those currently in service (tanks of the future, helicopter gunships, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and future fighter aircraft, to mention the main items only), or else new items, such as surveillance satellites. Almost all developments of the main items scheduled to begin service over the next 10 years would have been completed or initiated between 1981 and 1986.

Based on a study according to which national independence rests, in the final account, on our capacity to conceive, develop and manufacture either alone or on a cooperative basis all essential armament systems, the government quite accurately emphasized long-term research and conventional development, which are guarantees for updating our forces and preparing for the future.

4. Funds for Upkeep

Table 17 shows the development of funds for materiel upkeep starting with 1981.¹¹

Table 17

	In million 1981 constant francs					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Title III funds.....	3,962	3,834	3,877	3,816	3,651	3,752
Title V funds.....	5,301	5,370	5,724	5,774	5,601	5,977
Total.....	9,263	9,204	9,601	9,590	9,252	9,729

This table indicates the following features:

Materiel upkeep was not sacrificed, for the purchase power of the funds was increased by five percent during the period despite a rather contrasting development which was a direct reflection of the overall defense budget;

A cutback took place in 1985 (- 3.6 percent), consistent with the slight decline in activities planned for that year;

A substantial increase occurred in 1986 (+ 5 percent), equally consistent with the five percent increase in activities compared with 1985.


This table also shows that increased materiel upkeep funds were properly kept in check during the period. Their increase (+ 5 percent) was below the growth of the PIBm (7.9 percent).

In this case we also have a break with the preceding period: The previous trend was one of very fast growth, exceeding that of the PIBm, which, together with the wage policy and the enhancement of activities, which had reached its lowest point in 1975, contributed to the considerable increase which we emphasized in the cost of maintenance of our military system between 1975 and 1981. This development for the three branches of the armed forces is shown in Diagram 4.

Actually, the changes in the fluctuation of funds occurred slightly before 1981 and probably reflects the double influence of the stabilization of activities of the armed forces on a high level, starting with the 1980s and technical progress. The diagram leads to the assumption that the initial beneficial results of the changes which took place between 1980 and 1986 were due, on the one hand, to the changes made in maintenance methods (installation of test benches, selective maintenance, modular equipment, etc.) and, on the other, investments in the computerized management of spare parts. In all probability, the stabilization of funds is also an indication of substantial gains in productivity: the fact that the curve of the air force is different from that of the other branches would be an indication not only of the reduced number of flight hours since 1970 but also gains in productivity achieved faster than elsewhere in flight equipment maintenance; the curve for the army, in turn, would reflect the influence of the recently increased power of

combat helicopter force, also emphasizing, however, the existence of a substantial productivity potential.

Diagram 4




5. Funds for Conventional and Nuclear Production

Tables 13 and 14 clearly show the great increase in funds appropriated for armament production.¹² In addition to equipping our armed forces with model ordnance, the government was also concerned with maintaining industrial activities and, therefore, indirectly, employment; the increase of budget funds allocated for manufacturing also played a substantial role as a shock absorber whenever arms exports declined in some sectors and during some periods of time.

This phenomenon is illustrated in Diagram 5, which shows the development of the amount of manufacturing of funds included in chapter 53 of the budget of each of the three arms. Subsequent to a strong growth between 1977 and 1981, production funds continued to increase at a pace higher than the PIBm.

Diagram 5



Budget Reduction and Implementation

A. Reduction

Table 18 is of interest for it shows the specific development of one of the parameters essential for the proper implementation of each of the latest programming laws, that of the PIBm prices. All the laws pertaining to the program or programming, having been so far formulated in current francs, the price fluctuations in terms of initial projections affects quite extensively the actual changes in the purchasing power of the armed forces, initially set for the term of the law and, therefore, the physical exercising of said purchasing power. Michel Debre quite rightly formulated the most serious criticism of the 1984-1988 programming law in the course of the review of the draft 1984 finance law: "...Neither you nor we will be able to implement the law the program the implementation of which would be based on the assumption that inflation would remain below the five percent level. Its rate will be probably higher ...an inflation which has developed for the past 12 years and has constantly delayed the building of our nuclear submarines...I can not help but think that an inflation which directly or indirectly is wrecking your budget, harshly yesterday and more harshly tomorrow, would have as its sole consequence that of altering the firmness of our defense policy..."

The table is instructive in showing that the laws of 1971-1975 and 1977-1982 were undermined by a substantial and increasing price deviation. Hence a substantial loss of purchase power following the unfavorable development of inflation; it alone accounts for a substantial share of the final disparity compared to the initial target¹³ (for example, the Audit Office assessed the financial loss suffered in terms of the target of resources, which was modified midway, as established by the 1977-1982 programming law at 48 billion francs; more than one-half of this loss was caused by inflation).

Table 18

	Law 1971-1975					1976	Law 1977-1982						1983	Law 1984-1988		
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975		1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982		1984	1985	1986
PIBm proje -Cost	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	—	7	7	7	7	7	7	—	6.2	5	5
-Amount	5.95	5.95	5.95	5.95	5.95	—	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	—	2	2	2
PIBm implement. -Cost	5.5	6.1	7.3	10.8	12.7	9.9	8.4	9.8	10.4	11.5	11.3	12	9.5	7.1	5.9 ^(*)	4 ^(*)
-Amount	5.5	6.1	5.8	3.0	- 0.4	4.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	1.4	0.5	2	0.6	1.5	1.3 ^(*)	2.1 ^(*)
Gap Imp./Project.																
-Cost	+ 2.8	+ 3.4	+ 4.6	+ 8.1	+ 10	—	+ 1.4	+ 2.8	+ 3.4	+ 4.5	+ 4.3	+ 5	—	+ 0.9	+ 0.9 ^(*)	- 1 ^(*)
-Amount	- 0.45	+ 0.15	- 0.15	- 2.95	- 6.35	—	- 1.2	- 1.2	- 1.1	- 3.1	- 4	- 2.5	—	- 0.5	- 0.7 ^(*)	+ 0.1 ^(*)

(*) Projection. Economic and financial report relative to the 1986 finance law.

From this viewpoint, the 1984-1988 law is atypical compared with the preceding ones. In general, actual implementations are much closer to projections. Above all, however, and for the first time, price deviations have been quite insignificant compared to the initial projections and are continuing to decline, to the point that it would not be absurd to think today that they could disappear in the course of the implementation of the law. Naturally, this explains quite well the current successes achieved in the struggle against inflation and, for the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, the armed forces may well suffer no losses in purchasing power due to inflation. The collapse of the defense budget from inflation, justly denounced by Debre, therefore, is on its way out.¹⁴ It is self evident that this break with the past facilitates the management of programs and will thus contribute to a better implementation of the law in physical terms.

B. Budget Implementation

Three positive factors may be singled out confirming the relative stability of funds allocated for defense and the priority assigned to equipment.

1. The transfer of appropriations for Title V to Title III, which disturb the proper development of the programs and, for that reason, were criticized by the Audits Office, were considered current practice until 1981; they have been since abandoned to the benefit of a movement in the opposite direction, as shown in the following table.

Table 19

	In million 1981 francs						
	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Net Transfers from Title V to Title III.....	105.9	66.3	174.9	588.4	-	-	-
Net Transfers from Title III to Title V.....	-	-	-	-	697.3	53.1	-

The virtual elimination of this practice was the result of a strict management of operational funds but also the political will of not hindering the proper development of programs for the modernizing of our forces.

2. Setting the 1982 fiscal year aside, in the course of which 3.4 billion CP francs were cut without, in the final account, any reduction in the equipment effort, there has been no cut in funds in the defense budget since that time. Therefore, and in accordance with commitments, the defense budget has not been affected by circumstantial fluctuations, specifically those of budget fund control.

3. Substantial additional funds were appropriated between 1981 and 1984 to cover the cost overruns caused by operations abroad. The funds which were

appropriated were substantially higher than those which had been appropriated during previous years for the same purposes, as shown in Table 20.

Table 20

	In million 1981 constant francs							
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Foreign operational cost overruns	281.7	809	587.6	385.4	385.7	549.4	299.1	1,447
Net amount of funds appropriated for foreign operations	0	165.1	225.4	0	164.3	0	611.7	571.2

The table shows that the median rate of covering cost overruns for operations abroad in terms of net fund allocations was 18.9 percent between 1977 and 1980, and 37 percent between 1981 and 1984. We can justifiably claim, therefore, that it doubled compared with the preceding period and that the implementation of defense budgets between 1981 and 1984 took place harmoniously and without any major hazards.

Conclusions

On Defense Budget Management

The defense effort did not abate between 1981 and 1986. The recognized priority assigned to equipment, i.e., to long-term developments, led to some restrictions relative to operations without the operational value of the armed forces having been affected; nor was it paralleled by a deliberate short-term sacrifice (the purchasing power of funds for operations, maintenance, activities or, briefly, for all aspects of everyday life, was maintained for the entire period under consideration).

Substantial savings were achieved in operational funds between 1981 and 1986: this is best confirmed by the fact that the operational cost of our armed forces in constant francs was lower in 1986 as compared to 1981. It would be difficult to pursue this course without triggering a new force reduction, which is currently not under consideration.¹⁵

For the entire period, the equipment effort was pursued without any major upheavals, thus laying the foundations for future defense. Nor did the strictness with which operational funds were managed hinder the implementation of a considerable number of reforms. This proves, therefore, that with a stabilized withholding from our national resources, the modernizing of our forces could be pursued without any short-term sacrifices or yielding to an excessive rearmament policy.

This was the only sensible attitude possible, taking into consideration the deep crisis experienced by Europe and France. The method which was adopted--

preparing for the future without sacrificing the present, with a steady withholding of funds from national resources--helped to strengthen the national consensus on defense. Adding to the funds appropriated for defense at a rate higher than the growth of the economy and, consequently, if such increase in military allocations were to be made to the detriment of civilian projects (hospitals, schools, etc.), the consensus could disintegrate, and the only result would be to open the way to antimilitarism. The national defense consensus also rests, in a period of crisis, on the moderate use of funds taken from the national resources.

Comparative Defense and State Budget Management

No criticism could be voiced on the management of the defense budget for the 1981-1986 period: virtually all additional resources allocated for defense since 1981 were for purposes of investment, modernization and preparations for the future.

Whereas state expenditures were greatly increased in 1982 and 1983, massive recruitment, the general allocation of rank benefits and the enhancement of living standards were firmly avoided by the Ministry of Defense. On the contrary, starting with the summer of 1983, a reduction in the forces was implemented; this was an absolute prerequisite if the updating of our defenses was to be pursued. Whereas the Ministry of Defense was the subject of a substantial share of the cuts in funds in 1982, it was a just compensation that its share of the reduction in mandatory funding was relatively lesser than it could have been starting with 1984 (Diagram 1).

The Ministry of Defense remained unaffected by the clear expansion, as shown in Diagram 1, which characterized the management of public funds between 1940 and 1984, also shown in Table 21:

Table 21

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Salaries					
Defense.....	+16.3%	+18 %	+ 9.1%	+5.5%	+5.5%
State.....	+15.9%	+19.5%	+ 9.1%	+6.1%	+6.4%
Operations					
Defense.....	+16.6%	+15.7%	+7.7%	+2.4%	+0.8%
State.....	+16.2%	+22.8%	+ 9.5%	+7.3%	+1.7%
Equipment					
Defense.....	+19.7%	+18.1%	+ 8.2%	+9.3%	+7.7%
State.....	+14 %	+23.2%	+10.5%	+7.3%	+6.7%

Source: Functional presentation of state expenditures

Therefore, the management of military funds was economical¹⁷ and future-oriented, consistent in all matters with the basic and long term interest of the country, its armed forces and its industry.

Defense Policy

Available survey data show that the young people of our country alone seem to have realized the importance of a modernization accomplished in an atmosphere of a virtually general indifference. However, this is a phenomenon which already matters: The youth of this country increasingly believes in the value of our defense and one of the major merits of the government is to have substantially reconciled the army with the youth of the nation.

An extensive updating of our armed forces, still underestimated by public opinion, has been accomplished starting with 1981. It is a historical irony that this modernization met with a certain lack of understanding by the opposition. It would be logical to think that the very recent decline of the political debate on defense stems from a deep lack of understanding of the budgetary policy pursued over the past 5 years. The situation today, therefore, is the opposite of the one which prevailed between 1962 and 1968, a time during which the government was imposing upon the armed forces with the advent of nuclear weapons an accelerated modernization, which suffered from a lack of understanding for quite some time. This unexpected switch in views on defense problems is paralleled by a sense of general satisfaction in the country at large: The fact that it rallied around nuclear weapons means that the government can be credited with having achieved a true consensus on defense at the end of the legislative period.

The similarity between the 1962-1968 and 1981-1986 periods is not fortuitous. General de Gaulle based his policy on the phenomenon of the gap between operational (Title III) and equipment (Title V) funds, as shown in diagram 6¹⁸, manifested by a very substantial increase in funds appropriated for nuclear weapons.

This was the price for gaining nuclear power status. After General de Gaulle, the country's military policy collapsed: The defense budget became stagnant, equipment funds were sacrificed to the benefit of a costly improvement in military life and a significant increase in operational funds. The 1977-1982 period was characterized by a harmonious development of the two essential components of the defense budget, a harmony made possible by the expansion rate of the PIBm, which remained high. The year 1983 was a turning point: There was a slow-down in economic growth and a crisis in public funds forced a change in policy. In a budget which, reflecting the national economy, experiences a reduced growth, the gap phenomenon noted between 1962 and 1968 was virtually identical: In order to finance the accelerated modernizing of our defense, the government asked the military to lower its living standard temporarily and slightly. During that period as well, funds for nuclear armaments continued to grow at an annual four percent rate so that the historical peak which such funds reached in 1967 will soon be reached again as shown in Diagram 7.

Diagram 6





Diagram 7



As was the case between 1963 and 1968, the voice of France is being heard more strongly on the international stage and its influence in the world increased between 1982 and 1986: Analysts who attribute the status of world power maintained by France to the possession of nuclear weapons will find here a weighty argument in their favor.

France speaks loud and clear when it updates its military equipment and emphasizes nuclear armaments. It is this, perhaps, that is the secret key of the frequently emphasized similarity between Charles de Gaulle and F. Mitterrand as presidents.

In any case, a material and financial base for the modernization of our armed forces does exist. The thesis of the collapse of the defense effort as of 1981 cannot withstand a serious look at the figures. Our defense does not have to be rebuilt. It had declined after 1969 and its reconstruction has been pursued without interruption starting with 1977. The legacy of the 1981-1986 period will be brilliant and may be accepted proudly. It also indicates that political change poses no difficulties for our defense and the proper functioning of our institutions.

Appendix 1

Analysis of the Development of Fuel Funds

Table 7 shows the decline in constant francs of funds for fuel, based on the PIBm price index. However, there is no reason for the price of fuel, which influences PIBm prices, to follow the same development. Actually, the price depends on two major factors: the price per barrel of petroleum in France, a price set on the international market in dollars; and the levels of French internal finances, which affect army finances on the national territory in ratios varying according to the type of fuel used.

This may be confirmed quite clearly by the study of the development of funds and amounts of fuel placed at the disposal of the air force, on the one hand, and the army on the other.

Air Force

Air force fuel funds account for more than one-half of the total fuel funds appropriated for defense, for which reason they should be studied separately. Without overburdening this article with tables, two statements may be made: In current francs, the fuel allocations for the air force have exceeded the 1981 level by 10 to 20 percent; for the same time interval the price of TR0 jet fuel delivered to the air force exceeded the 1981 level by 4-19 percent.

This last statement is quite important. Contrary to the idea which may occur a priori, jetfuel price increases between 1981 and 1986 were clearly below price increases in the PIBm. This confirms the disparity between this indicator and fuel price changes.

This comparison between fuel allocations and prices shows that the amounts used have shown a minimal decrease since 1981, as indicated in Table 22.

Table 22

Armed Forces	1981	1982	1983	1984
Amounts used (thousand cubic meters)	812	809	789	794
Percent of variation relative to 1981	-	-1%	-2%	-2%

The 1985 figures are unknown, for the year has not ended yet; however, there are major reasons to believe that this year will be much better than anticipated by virtue of the combined decline in the rate of the dollar and crude oil prices. In terms of 1984 a decline in consumption would not exceed 2-3 percent. Conversely, taking into consideration the particular efforts made in terms of fuel allocations included in the 1986 budget, we should go back to the 1982-1983 level. In the final account, within a few percentage points, the amount of fuel used by the air force has remained virtually stable since 1981.¹⁹

Infantry

Infantry is becoming increasingly airborne: It is no surprise, therefore, that nearly one-quarter of its fuel consumption is now in jet fuel used by army air force helicopters. The remaining three-quarters are gasoline and diesel fuel, the tax on which was substantially increased (compared with 1981, the 1985 rates of the Military Fuel Procurement Services increased by more than 60 percent for gasoline and 50 percent for diesel fuel).

During the same time interval, the army fuel appropriations showed a 10 percent increase compared with 1981 (in 1984 and 1985), a 25 percent increase for 2 years (1982 and 1983) and 20 percent for 1986. Although substantial, such percentages fall below the changes in the prices of diesel fuel and gasoline noted. Therefore, one could have feared a sharp drop in consumption. Nothing of the sort happened, as indicated in Table 23.

Table 23

Armed Forces	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 ¹	1986 ¹
Consumed quantities (thousand cubic meters)	183.2	189.2	183.8	164.6	172.8	181.4
Percent of fluctuation compared with 1981	-	+3.3%	-	-11.3%	-5.7%	-1%

(1) Projected

The substantial decrease in fuel consumption in 1984 has been overemphasized in statistical figures, for the reserve which was built up quite legitimately in 1982 and 1983, a period during which allocation increases exceeded prices increases, actually reduced the 1984 and 1985 drops.

How to explain the fact that the decrease in consumption was minor and that the 1986 level will match that of 1981? Two explanations could be brought forth: As we have seen, infantry is consuming an increasing volume of jet fuel, the price of which has shown a relatively small increase during the period under consideration; substantial numbers of modern vehicles, armored or not, were procured between 1981 and 1985, using diesel fuel, and old heavy gasoline-consuming vehicles were taken out of circulation. Although diesel fuel and gasoline prices fluctuated quite similarly, the difference in prices of these two fuel categories continued to increase: from 68 francs per hectoliter on 1 July 1981 they reached 150 francs per hectoliter on 1 July 1985.

Therefore, by using vehicles powered by less expensive diesel fuel compared to gasoline, infantry behaved in a perfectly rational and economical manner which explains why price increases were amortized by ordnance substitutions and did not lead to the dramatic effects which were feared relative to amounts purchases, and, therefore, consumed.²⁰ Such a judicious policy was worth noting.

Appendix 2

Development of Operational Funds

The various expenditure categories developed as shown in Table

Table 24

	In million 1981 constant francs					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Data Processing	289.9	293.9	286	273.5	278.7	397.7 ¹
Real Estate						
Maintenance	933.6	1,015.1	1,007.5	930.5	881.3	887.2
Current Materiel						
Maintenance	686.2	705.1	758.6	684.7	656	668.6
Heat and Light	1,282.2	1,324.7	1,409.7	1,295.7	1,258.9	1,256.2
Training	291.8	292.8	292.4	267.9	246	256.1
Current Operations	5,605.5	6,058	5,906.2	6,013	5,664.2	5,747.6
Total.....	9,088.2	9,689.6	9,660.3	9,465.6	8,984.5	9,197.5

(1) The figure includes substantial transfers from Title V to Title III

The table shows a time stability in current maintenance costs for materiel and data processing, and a relative reduction in funds for real estate maintenance and training whenever Title III shows a decline (in 1984 and 1985), and substantial heating and lighting costs starting with 1983, and a relative inertia in the reduction of current operational funds, with the exception of 1985, when substantial savings were made. Such funds will catch up or regain their previous levels in 1986: the growth in volume will be

resumed on a significant level after three years of effort. Daily management, therefore, will be easier in 1986 compared with the three preceding years.

FOOTNOTES

1. This established fact hardly changes if we no longer take into consideration the initial finance laws but the budgets implemented between 1981 and 1984: Operational funds amounted to 57.9 billion in 1981, 58.9 billion in 1982, 60.5 billion in 1983 and 58.1 billion in 1984. Furthermore, we should take into consideration the reduction in armed forces, which means that a certain increase in purchasing power corresponded to a virtually unchanged amount of funds.
2. It is true that the lack of increase in the amount of operational funds between 1959 and 1974 had to be compensated for.
3. This applies above all to salaries, and, to a lesser extent, food and operational costs. Gross operational cost savings achieved thanks to this reduction exceeded 2 billion in 3 years.
4. See chapter B-4.
5. A more detailed analysis of such funds is provided in Appendix 2.
6. See chapter 1 A-5.
7. The gaps in equipping our forces, which are still emphasized today, are the result of this breakdown in the defense effort between 1968 and 1978. The lack of expenditure of such funds at that time will be felt for a long time to come, undoubtedly for some 25 years, despite a certain subsequent recovery.
8. However, the significance of this drop is reduced by the fact that the programming law of 1984-1988 was the first to include ammunition programs among the major programs. Furthermore, the reduction in personnel explains in part the drop in clothing funds.
9. Since the number of nuclear programs is very small, it is perfectly normal for the respective share of studies, manufacturing and maintenance to be modified in the course of time.
10. The permanent deployment of M4 missiles at sea will be 100 percent reached by the end of 1987, authorizing at that time an increase in our retaliation capacity by a factor of 4.5 compared with 1984.
11. Since these funds were distributed between Titles III and V, it seemed preferable to consolidate them to neutralize changes in time budgetary allocations. They include the cost of upkeep of nuclear forces mentioned in Table 24.
12. This strong increase in manufacturing funds explains the numerous deliveries of materials between 1981 and 1986. However, their enumeration is

not the object of this article. Conversely, let us emphasize that such deliveries led to crossing a certain number of quality thresholds which were extremely important in terms of our defense: night combat, introduction of command data processing, development of battlefield management, etc.

13. Despite the fact that the fund allocations have always been quite higher than the projections in the programming laws, in order to ensure the partial compensation for this phenomenon; let us nevertheless emphasize that operations derived a greater benefit from this additional appropriation compared with equipment (by a 5:1 ratio between 1977 and 1982).
14. In retrospect this new feature in the defense policy could shore up the view according to which a 1984-1988 budget in constant francs would, in the final account, result in a very small additional guarantee for the defense budget in terms of setting this amount in current francs.
15. This is outlined by some who clearly claim that support forces, particularly in infantry, should be reduced. Others are firmly opposed.
16. A total of 2,311 military jobs were created with the 1982 and 1983 budgets, 1,900 of which in the gendarmerie. As to civilian employees, 7,864 of the 8,234 new jobs consisted of granting special retirement pensions to temporary workers, without any actual change in personnel strength.
17. Another example of the fact that personnel policy could be used to illustrate this management feature is that of nationalizations. The Ministry of Defense is the only one to have carried out nationalizations affecting 51 percent of capital at most, and, therefore, considered "economical" in terms of public funds. Control over the Matra group cost about 700 million francs; that of the AMD-BA was cost-free. Such assumption of control was accomplished with the full agreement of the heads of the involved enterprises.
18. Such a policy was unquestionably accompanied by excessive sacrifices in terms of military conditions and daily life in the armed forces, hence an equally excessive shock of the 1974-1977 period we spoke of.
19. The actual impact of this slight decrease would be lessened by taking into consideration that new less fuel-consuming equipment was introduced starting with the 1980s: Epsilon instead of Fouga Magister, new airplane engines, etc.
20. A similar phenomenon occurred in the gendarmerie.

5157
CSO: 3519/51

MILITARY

FRANCE

FRANCE

MILITARY USE OF MERCHANT FLEET—Speaking yesterday at the Institute of the Sea, Admiral Leenhardt, the navy chief of staff, stressed the necessity of having a large national merchant fleet. "In case of war," he said, "such a fleet projects national power, being manned more and more by seamen whose competence is well-known to us and which we would need in wartime." Referring to the addition of the "Atlantic-Cartier" to the General Shipping Company's container-ship fleet, Admiral Leenhardt felt that this ship would make a very good flight deck. Similarly, modern tuna clippers and refrigerator ships constitute remarkable small helicopter carriers. In addition, the navy chief of staff dwelt on the need to continue improving our submarine fleet, particularly with nuclear attack submarines. This statement was made at a time when misgivings have been expressed in military circles following the announcement of funding authorization in the 1986 budget for construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Will submarine construction suffer on account of this? [Text] [Brest OUEST FRANCE in French 29 Oct 85 p 29] 8041

CSO: 3519/47

ECONOMIC

GREECE

UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS RELEASED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 4 Dec 85 p 16

[Text] The number of people unemployed in Greece at the end of 1984 came to 310,300 persons, which accounts for 8.1 percent of the country's labor force, whereas in 1983 the figure was 299,000, accounting for 7.8 percent of the labor force, according to data of the Statistical Service from the relevant study on employment in the labor force.

In 1982 the unemployment number was 215,300 persons, or 5.8 percent of the labor force, whereas in 1981 the figure for those unemployed was 148,500, or 4 percent of the labor force. That is, within the 4 years of the PASOK administration the number of unemployed people more than doubled. Of the figure of 310,300 unemployed in 1984, some 129,600 persons or 41.8 percent of such unemployed people belong to the age group from 14 to 24 years old, a number that makes up about 24 percent of the total number for this group as a whole.

In the capital area, the number of unemployed people at the end of 1984 comes to 139,600 persons, corresponding to 12 percent of the labor force in this area and amounting to 45 percent of all unemployed persons.

Statistics on Women

Also distinctive is the increase in the number of unemployed women during the period between 1981 and 1984. Specifically, whereas in 1981 the number of unemployed women was 66,700 and that of men was 81,900 persons, the figure for unemployed women in 1984 is 160,200 and that for men is 150,100 persons. That is, whereas the number of unemployed women more than doubled, the number of unemployed men increased by about 83 percent.




Figure: Unemployed Exceed 300,000 Persons

Key:

1. Thousands
2. Unemployment in Greece

12114

CSO: 3521/69

ENERGY

SWEDEN

ENERGY MINISTER REASSERTS 2010 END DATE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Dec 85 p 9

[Article by DAGENS NYHETER's Goteborg correspondent Peter Sandberg:
"Birgitta Dahl's Campaign to Phase Out Nuclear Power"]

[Text] "We are living in a new energy policy reality and it includes the phasing out of nuclear power," Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl said on Tuesday. In 1990 an alternative energy development plan must be submitted, 1995 is the date when a decision must be made on a conversion plan and by 2010 nuclear power will have been phased out with the help of conservation, counter-pressure, solar power and natural gas.

The energy minister said that the "new energy policy reality" is the result of the referendum outcome and the fact that energy technology is now making great strides while at the same time energy conservation measures have had a much greater effect than had been anticipated.

"Current energy consumption is only 60 percent of the amount we predicted and planned for 10 years ago and even as late as 1980-81. We made plans for the consumption of 540 TWh in the mid-1980's and the actual figure is 350," said Birgitta Dahl.

She pointed out that domestic fuel now accounts for as large a share of our energy consumption as nuclear power and waterpower, in other words around 60 TWh.

Idyllic Picture

Despite some reservations the energy minister painted an idyllic picture of our future retreat from the nuclear power community.

"Future energy needs can be met with much less damage to the environment and fewer conflicts, while costing much less than previously anticipated.

"This definitely involves avoiding a massive use of coal and oil," the energy minister asserted.

With respect to phasing out nuclear power she referred to two important dates when decisions will be made. In 1990 a development plan must be submitted, a plan for the development of energy conservation measures and alternative energy production.

Five Years

"We have 5 years in which to try out various technical solutions," said Birgitta Dahl, listing as examples conservation, solar energy, domestic fuel, heat pumps, natural gas, a deliberate electrical usage policy, counter-pressure and wind power.

In 1995 a conversion plan must be submitted that will contain guidelines concerning the order in which reactors will be shut down, a decision that will be based on evaluations of the safety of individual reactors. The phasing out process will begin toward the end of the 1990's and be completed by 2010.

On Tuesday Birgitta Dahl visited Goteborg and Chalmers to look at new energy technology in the form of windpower, energy conservation in a residential district and an energy center with a so-called fluid bed (intended to reduce emissions from the burning of solid fuel).

She also revealed that the government is giving the State Power Board the authority to sign a guarantee of 100 million kronor for the so-called Vastgas project, which means that Swedegas can start making some bulk purchases and continue its planning activities.

The decision means that there will be a big pipeline that will make it possible to go beyond Goteborg to Trollhattan and Oslo, for example, or to central Sweden now that the government has given its approval to the project.

"The decision is important for two reasons. For one thing it will make less demands on the environment in western Sweden, which has been hard hit by acid rain, and for another gas is strategically important as a substitute for electricity when nuclear power is being phased out," said Birgitta Dahl.

6578

CSO: 3650/85

ENERGY

SWEDEN

NEW LAW REGULATING NUCLEAR PLANTS ENACTED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Dec 85 p 20

[Article by Bo B. Melander: "Nuclear Power Plant Act Rescinded"]

[Text] The Nuclear Power Plant Act governing the operation of nuclear reactors in Sweden was rescinded Thursday when the government transferred the five reactors covered by the act to a law that applies to all reactors, the Nuclear Technology Act.

Despite protests from the power industry, reactors will not be permitted to operate after the year 2010. The industry wanted permission to operate the reactors longer than that with no set date for termination.

The Nuclear Power Plant Act linked the reactors to nuclear waste processing, among other things. Now the reactors are no longer bound by that requirement but their maximum period of operation extends to 2010.

The government also decided that research on nuclear waste should be under the constant supervision of the authorities involved and a joint advisory committee where a majority of the members would be independent scientists.

The government also set guidelines for the authorities that will supervise the power industry's handling of waste and its research activities.

"The important thing is that the government and parliament have the ultimate responsibility for these matters and must make the final decisions," Birgitta Dahl told DAGENS NYHETER.

She said the government would now try to guarantee that extensive and high-quality research is carried out.

"The Nuclear Power Plant Act limited us to one method, but that restriction has now been eliminated."

The first review of current research will occur in the fall of 1986.

"The intention of the present legislation is to allow broad parliamentary majorities to assume the responsibility for how waste is handled in this

country. It is important to avoid having changes in government interfere with the long-range policy in this area," the energy minister said.

In connection with the government's decision on Thursday, Birgitta Dahl said:

"Drilling in the 1980's will be of a purely technical nature. It is not until the 1990's that we will look for suitable sites and we feel that local political bodies should take part in making these decisions. Now all that is required to perform drilling operations is to obtain the permission of the property owner."

6578

CSO: 3650/85

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

5 FEBRUARY 86